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1 Introduction
Les travaux présentés ci-dessous sont le reflet de mon activité de recherches eﬀec-
tuée au laboratoire THEMA de l’université Paris-X Nanterre2 de 1994 à 2005, et
poursuivie depuis au département d’économie de l’Ecole Polytechnique. Ces travaux
portent sur les propriétés prédictives et incitatives (à la prévention des risques) des
historiques individuels en assurance non-vie. Je remercie Georges Dionne de m’avoir
suggéré la première piste de recherches, qui consistait à intégrer les coûts des sinistres
dans la prédiction des risques. Mes recherches se sont donc inscrites d’abord dans
une littérature actuarielle appréciant le pouvoir prédictif des historiques individuels
en assurance non-vie. Elles sont présentées en section 2. Ma première contribution
a pris en compte le coût des sinistres dans la prédiction des risques en fréquence et
en prime pure ([12]). Ensuite, l’ancienneté de ces sinistres a été intégrée dans une
prédiction des risques en fréquence ([8], [9]). Pour ce faire, ces articles ont remis
en cause la constance dans le temps d’eﬀets aléatoires intégrés à des lois de nombre
d’accidents. La liaison entre les lois sur les eﬀets aléatoires et le risque fréquence
des contrats est étudiée dans [3].
De nombreuses règles monétaires et non monétaires utilisant les historiques des
assurés (systèmes bonus-malus, amendes, permis à points) ont une justification en
terme d’incitation à la prévention des risques. L’appréciation empirique de ces eﬀets
incitatifs est rendue diﬃcile par une double interprétation des historiques individu-
els. Ceux-ci peuvent à la fois révéler des caractéristiques cachées des lois de risque
(hétérogénéité inobservée), ou modifier ces lois. Des interactions avec Pierre-André
Chiappori m’ont conduit à m’intéresser à ce sujet et à participer à des publications
décrites plus en détail en section 3. Dans [5] et [6], des conditions d’élimination
de l’hétérogénéité inobservée dans les historiques d’assurance sont explicitées, et
appliquées aux contrats d’assurance automobile soumis au système bonus-malus
2L’université se nomme aujourd’hui Paris-Ouest Nanterre La Défense.
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français. Le comportement optimal d’un assuré dans un environnement incitatif
basé sur l’expérience individuelle est abordé dans les deux publications précitées,
ainsi que dans [1] s’agissant des permis à points.3 Cette dernière publication est le
fruit d’une longue collaboration avec Pierre Picard, Georges Dionne et Jean-Marc
Bourgeon sur le thème de la sécurité routière. On y analyse les eﬀets incitatifs des
permis à points, en fonction des règles d’amnistie des infractions. Ces amnisties
s’eﬀectuent, soit infraction par infraction une fois que celle-ci a atteint une certaine
ancienneté, ou globalement après une durée donnée sans infraction commise. En
présence d’aléa moral, nous montrons que les eﬀets incitatifs contrecarrent les eﬀets
de révélation de l’hétérogénéité inobservée si les amnisties s’eﬀectuent par infraction.
Par contre, ces deux eﬀets jouent dans le même sens dans le cas où les infractions
sont amnistiées globalement. Enfin, [1] propose des résultats théoriques sur les mod-
èles incitatifs, qui permettent des calculs de valeurs privées pour les sanctions non
monétaires associées aux permis à points.
Les sept publications précitées figurent dans ce dossier d’HDR. Mes autres pub-
lications concernent la prise en compte de la stratification des portefeuilles dans
l’évaluation des risques, avec une application aux flottes de véhicules ([10]), les mod-
èles à plusieurs équations (systèmes multi-garanties, [11]), et les échelles bonus-malus
([7]). Le lien entre la fraude à l’assurance et la sélection des sinistres par les experts
pour audit est analysé dans [4]. Des modèles intégrant le biais de sélection mettent
à jour le risque de fraude pour les sinistres non évalués par les experts. Des travaux
en cours sur les contrats de long terme et l’assurance dépendance ont donné lieu
à une publication ([2]) traitant des comportements optimaux d’achat d’assurance
dépendance. Ils sont évoqués dans la section 4, laquelle présente également mes
autres projets de recherche.
3Cf. également une version antérieure ([26]).
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2 Pouvoir prédictif des historiques individuels en
assurance non-vie: l’approche actuarielle, ses
méthodes et ses limites
2.1 "Experience rating" en assurance non-vie
L’usage des historiques individuels dans la tarification des contrats d’assurance non-
vie est presque systématique, et trouve deux justifications.
• La première est en terme de neutralité actuarielle. Les études statistiques
conduisent presque toujours au fait qu’une période sans sinistre est associée à
une diminution du risque estimé en fréquence d’accidents, et que l’occurrence
un sinistre entraîne une réévaluation de ce risque. On peut donc justifier les
systèmes bonus-malus par un argument de neutralité actuarielle.
• La seconde se situe en terme d’incitation à la prévention des risques. En assur-
ance non-vie, il existe une eﬃcacité à court terme des eﬀorts de prévention, et
il n’y a donc pas de fatalité à être un mauvais risque. Le contexte est diﬀérent
en ce qui concerne les risques viagers et de maladie. Le niveau de risque est
associé à un capital (santé par exemple) dont la dépréciation est partiellement
irréversible. Les eﬀorts de prévention n’ont d’eﬀet qu’à terme, et se pose un
risque de reclassification. Il est rare d’observer des pratiques d’"experience
rating" sur ces contrats.4
Le pouvoir prédictif des historiques individuels sur les risques est la résultante
de deux interprétations possibles de ces historiques. D’une part, ils révèlent une
4Hendel et Lizzeri (2003) mentionnent cependant des contrats aux Etats-Unis appelés "Select
and Ultimate" en assurance temporaire décès, où l’historique des examens de santé est utilisé dans
la tarification.
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hétérogénéité inobservée, exprimée de manière résiduelle par rapport à une informa-
tion observable sur les contrats. Cette hétérogénéité résiduelle est représentée par
des eﬀets aléatoires dans le modèle statistique évaluant les risques (cf. [13] pour une
revue de littérature). D’autre part, les historiques individuels modifient les niveaux
de risque. Cette synthèse reviendra en détail sur les eﬀets incitatifs du nombre
des sinistres et du temps, mais on peut également citer des eﬀets psychologiques
comme cause de modification. Les historiques modifient la perception des risques
et par suite les comportements de prévention. Tversky et Kahneman (1973) ont
proposé une théorie dite “availability bias”, selon laquelle l’estimation subjective de
la fréquence d’un évènement dépend de la facilité avec laquelle on peut s’en rap-
peler l’occurrence. De ce fait, il y a réévaluation d’un risque après l’occurrence d’un
évènement impliquant l’individu, et un eﬀet négatif de l’ancienneté des évènements
sur le niveau perçu du risque.
L’évaluation des risques à partir d’un principe de révélation de l’hétérogénéité in-
observée revient à prédire un eﬀet fixe individuel en utilisant l’estimation du modèle
à eﬀets aléatoires et un calcul d’espérance a posteriori. Les eﬀets temporels et par
évènement sont ceux qu’on observe sur les données réelles, à savoir une hausse des
risques avec le nombre d’accidents et une baisse avec le temps. Ils sont donc de type
"bonus-malus". Cette adéquation entre modèles et observations explique pourquoi
les calculs de prédiction de la littérature actuarielle sont fondés uniquement sur un
principe de révélation. Les approches paramétriques ont d’abord été privilégiées
(cf. Lemaire (1995) pour une synthèse), puis les calculs semi-paramétriques de pré-
dicteurs linéaires par rapport au nombre de sinistres (Bühlmann, 1967) sont devenus
populaires. L’approche semi-paramétrique concerne les moments du second ordre
du ou des eﬀets aléatoires. C’est à ma connaissance la première application im-
portante de méthodes développées et popularisées ensuite dans la communauté des
économètres par Hansen (1982), oﬀrant ainsi à Karl Pearson une revanche posthume
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sur Ronald Fisher.5 Les nombreuses extensions du modèle linéaire applicables aux
données d’assurance non-vie (Nelder et Wedderburn (1972), Gouriéroux et Monfort
(1984a, 1984b), Liang et Zeger (1986)) se situent entre les logiques paramétriques
et semi-paramétriques.
Le coeﬃcient bonus-malus actuariel pour le risque en fréquence est l’estimation
de (1 + 2)(1 + 2). Dans cette formule,  représente le nombre d’accidents
observé dans le passé sur l’individu, et  est le risque en fréquence (espérance math-
ématique du nombre d’accidents), calculé en fonction des variables observées dans
le passé. Enfin, 2 est la variance de l’eﬀet aléatoire qui rend compte du poids de
l’hétérogénéité inobservée. Le risque évalué pour la période suivante en fonction des
variables observables est multiplié par le coeﬃcient bonus-malus, ce qui conduit à
une prime intégrant l’historique individuel. Cette expression du coeﬃcient bonus-
malus est obtenue, soit par l’approche semi-paramétrique contraignant le coeﬃcient
à être une fonction aﬃne de , soit dans un cadre paramétrique où l’eﬀet aléatoire
suit une loi gamma (cf. Dionne, Vanasse (1989) pour un modèle de régression sur
lois binomiales négatives, mélanges de lois de Poisson associées aux loi gamma).
Le coeﬃcient bonus-malus peut également s’écrire
1 +  b2
1 + b b2 =
µ
× b
¶
+ ((1− )× 1)  = b b2
1 + b b2  (1)
Dans l’expression précédente, le coeﬃcient  est appelé crédibilité associée à
l’historique individuel: il représente le bonus pour un contrat sans sinistre. En eﬀet,
le coeﬃcient bonus-malus est égal à 1 en l’absence d’exposition au risque (on a alors
 = b = 0). Si b  0 et  = 0, le coeﬃcient bonus-malus est égal à 1− , et la
crédibilité est donc égale au bonus.
5En faisant un parallèle avec le vocabulaire de l’algèbre linéaire, un modèle paramétrique a une
forme "image" (les lois sont indicées par les paramètres) alors qu’un modèle semi-paramétrique est
de forme "noyau" (les paramètres indicent des contraintes sur les lois).
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2.2 Résumé des travaux de l’auteur
Les quatre premières publications figurant dans ce document s’inspirent de cette
approche.
La prise en compte de la gravité des sinistres par leur coût est détaillée dans [12].
Les modèles actuariels usuels prédisent le risque en fréquence, et il paraît naturel de
vouloir étendre leur portée au risque en prime pure (espérance du coût total). Dans
le cas du risque en fréquence, les lois de Poisson sont incontournables. Le processus
du nombre cumulé des accidents a des trajectoires croissantes. Si les sauts sont de
hauteur 1 (pas de sinistres simultanés) et si les accroissements du processus sont
indépendants, le processus est nécessairement de type Poisson. Le mélange des lois
créé par les eﬀets aléatoires permet d’introduire une dynamique sur les données, qui
se justifie si l’on observe une "surdispersion" sur les données. Cette surdispersion
signifie que la variance du nombre des sinistres est supérieure à leur moyenne, alors
qu’on a l’égalité entre ces deux moments pour les lois de Poisson. Dans le cas du
coût des sinistres, la situation est moins claire car il n’y a pas de famille de lois de
référence sur les réels positifs. On a coutume de les classer par queues de distri-
bution croissantes en terme d’équivalents asymptotiques (d’abord les lois gamma,
puis log-normales, puis de Pareto pour les familles les plus courantes). L’article [12]
étudie les deux premières familles de lois, la deuxième se prêtant plus aisément à
l’introduction d’une loi jointe sur les eﬀets aléatoires relatifs aux lois de nombre et
de coût de sinistres. Des calculs de pseudo-valeurs vraies (limites d’estimateurs en
présence d’erreur de spécification) permettent d’obtenir des estimateurs explicites
des paramètres du modèle. La famille des lois log-normales s’ajuste mieux aux don-
nées étudiées dans le papier que les lois gamma, le mélange des lois se justifie sur les
lois de coût comme de nombre de sinistres, et la corrélation entre les eﬀets aléatoires
est très proche de zéro. Le modèle est appliqué ensuite à des calculs de prédicteurs
de la prime pure des contrats, qui s’expriment comme le produit d’une estimation
a priori du risque et d’un coeﬃcient bonus-malus résumant l’historique individuel.
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Compte tenu de la quasi indépendance entre les eﬀets aléatoires associés aux lois de
coût comme de nombre de sinistres, le coeﬃcient bonus-malus sur la prime pure est
à peu près égal au produit des coeﬃcients associés aux risques en fréquence et en
coût moyen.
La prise en compte de l’ancienneté des sinistres est développée dans [8] et [9].6
Les études empiriques prouvent que le pouvoir prédictif des sinistres sur le risque
décroît avec leur ancienneté, eﬀet qui n’est pas pris en compte par les modèles à eﬀets
aléatoires constants. L’idée d’intégrer l’ancienneté des sinistres dans la prédiction
avait déjà été développée par Sundt (1981), mais avec des contraintes sur le modèle
qui rendaient les résultats peu crédibles. Dans [8] et [9], les corrélogrammes estimés
sur des eﬀets aléatoires dynamiques et stationnaires sont globalement décroissants.
L’introduction d’une dynamique dans les eﬀets aléatoires change en profondeur les
propriétés des prédicteurs du risque en fréquence. L’eﬀet "bonus" est plus faible
pour les contrats sans sinistres qu’avec l’approche usuelle. Par contre, il est renforcé
pour les contrats ayant eu des sinistres par le passé. A l’eﬀet "bonus" usuel créé
par la hausse de l’exposition au risque (hausse de b à  constant dans la formule
(1)) s’ajoute l’augmentation de l’ancienneté des sinistres. L’eﬀet "bonus" usuel est
renforcé dans un contexte où le pouvoir prédictif des évènements décroît avec leur an-
cienneté. Une autre diﬀérence d’importance concerne le poids donné aux historiques
individuels dans la prédiction, appelé crédibilité dans la littérature actuarielle et qui
représente la baisse relative du risque d’un contrat non sinistré, comparé au risque
a priori sur le contrat. Avec des eﬀets aléatoires constants, cette crédibilité tend
vers un (et la prime a posteriori tend vers zéro) quand la durée de l’historique tend
vers l’infini. Ce résultat sur les primes est en contradiction avec les pratiques de
6L’analyse économique des systèmes bonus-malus en assurance automobile (Henriet, Rochet
(1986)) conduit à distinguer des objectifs de sélection ou d’incitation à la prudence. Du point de
vue de la sélection, seule importe la fréquence des accidents passés. Du point de vue des incitations
à la prudence, la répartition des sinistres dans le temps doit intervenir dans le calcul de la prime.
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la tarification en assurance automobile.7 Avec des eﬀets aléatoires dynamiques, ce
résultat ne tient plus, et on peut avoir des crédibilités limites fortement inférieures à
un.8 On justifie ainsi un fait empirique important sur les poids des historiques dans
la tarification.
L’article [3] remet en cause l’équidistribution des eﬀets aléatoires dans un modèle
de risque en fréquence. L’examen des données d’assurance non-vie fait apparaître
un lien décroissant entre la variance de l’eﬀet aléatoire et le risque en fréquence
annuelle. En d’autres termes, l’hétérogénéité résiduelle augmente pour les risques
faibles. Cet article estime des liens paramétriques et non paramétriques entre le
risque en fréquence annuelle et la variance de l’eﬀet aléatoire. Un lien décroissant
est obtenu sur la base de données étudiée dans l’article, et on en déduit de nouvelles
propriétés des coeﬃcients bonus-malus. D’après la formule (1), la hausse relative
du risque suite au premier sinistre est constante, et égale à 2. Ce résultat est de
même nature que le malus appliqué en France, par exemple.9 A contrario, le bonus
actuariel croît avec l’exposition au risque. Les estimations faites en [3] conduisent à
une élasticité entre variance de l’eﬀet aléatoire et fréquence annuelle qui est proche
de -1. A l’inverse du résultat précité, c’est le bonus-période qui devient presque
indépendant du risque en fréquence annuelle, alors que le malus décroît avec ce
risque.
7En France, le bonus maximum est de 50% Il faut par ailleurs prendre en compte le déséquilibre
de l’échelle bonus-malus, qui fait que le bonus moyen croît avec l’ancienneté de l’assuré. Les assurés
avec 50% de bonus n’ont qu’un rabais de 20% par rapport au conducteur moyen. A l’inverse, les
systèmes actuariels sont équilibrés par construction et un bonus s’exprime par rapport à la moyenne
des contrats aussi bien que par rapport aux conducteurs débutants.
8C’est le maintien d’une contrainte d’égalité à un pour la crédibilité limite qui rendait les
prédicteurs proposés par Sundt (1981) diﬃcilement utilisables.
9Mais à la diﬀérence du système français, le malus de la formule actuarielle est une fonction
linéaire du nombre de sinistres passés.
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2.3 Limites de l’approche actuarielle
Les tarifications pratiquées en assurance non-vie sont loin de respecter la neutralité
actuarielle, même si les écarts sont moindres qu’en assurance vie et prévoyance. Les
subventions croisées entre les périodes d’un contrat sont de type "lowballing" ou
"highballing" selon que les premières périodes sont subventionnées par les suivantes,
ou le contraire. Une terminologie alternative est "back-loading" et "front-loading".
En assurance non-vie, on observe plutôt un phénomène de "lowballing", qui peut
être causé par l’extraction que les assureurs font de rentes d’information à partir
de l’historique des sinistres. Kunreuther et Pauly (1985) obtiennent un contrat de
cette nature dans un contexte d’absence d’engagement, où l’assuré ne prend ses
décisions d’achat que sur la prime courante. Le "lowballing" peut aussi être obtenu
si l’assureur intègre le fait que l’assuré ne fait pas toujours jouer la concurrence
lors du renouvellement du contrat. Taylor (1986) développe ainsi des politiques de
tarification optimales à partir d’un lien entre taux de résiliation et prix relatif par
rapport au marché.
A l’opposé, les pratiques de "highballing" concernent surtout les contrats d’assurance
vie et prévoyance. A la diﬀérence de l’assurance non-vie, les contrats sont de long
terme, avec engagement unilatéral de l’assureur.10 Les risques en vie et santé dépen-
dent d’abord de l’âge, et les assurés les plus jeunes subventionnent les plus âgés en
présence de "front-loading". Hendel et Lizzeri (2003) font une analyse empirique de
contrats d’assurance "temporaire décès" avec un modèle d’apprentissage symétrique
sur deux périodes, d’engagement unilatéral et d’hétérogénéité des acheteurs par rap-
port au coût du "front-loading". Le modèle prédit que les taux de résiliation en
deuxième période diminueront avec le niveau de "front-loading", et que les risques
moyens seront d’autant plus faibles que ce niveau sera élevé. Ce résultat est con-
10Seul l’assuré peut résilier le contrat jusqu’à un horizon donné. En assurance non-vie, l’assureur
peut résilier le contrat à la date anniversaire, même si dans les faits les résiliations sont massivement
à l’initiative des assurés (94% des résiliations en France pour l’assurance automobile).
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firmé empiriquement par les primes observées aux USA sur trois types de contrats
d’assurance "temporaire décès" (soit avec mise à jour annuelle des primes, ou avec
des paliers par tranche d’âge et "front-loading", soit avec des primes indexées sur
l’état de santé). Dans un contexte d’assurance non-vie, Dionne et Doherty (1994)
présentent un modèle à deux périodes de type "highballing" avec antisélection, en-
gagement unilatéral, et renégociation. Si l’assureur s’engage à une tarification en
seconde période basée sur l’historique et robuste à la renégociation, les meilleurs
risques choisiront ce contrat en première période plutôt qu’un contrat de court terme.
3 Identification et évaluation des eﬀets incitatifs
à la prévention créés par les historiques en as-
surance non-vie
3.1 Antisélection et aléa moral en assurance: une revue de
littérature
Les publications figurant ensuite dans ce document sont relatives à l’identification
des deux eﬀets de révélation et de modification des lois de risque par les historiques
individuels. Ce problème d’identification se pose à l’identique sur l’interprétation
des choix de couverture d’assurance, et en nous faisons une revue de littérature. Le
niveau de couverture d’un risque peut révéler une information non observable par
l’assureur (antisélection), mais aussi modifier le niveau d’eﬀort de prévention de ce
risque (aléa moral). L’analyse d’un choix de couverture conduit donc à identifier
l’antisélection et l’aléa moral. Les modèles économétriques traitant de l’asymétrie
d’information en assurance sont exposés dans Chiappori (2000) (cf. également les
synthèses de Dionne, Doherty, et Fombaron (2000) sur l’antisélection et de Chiap-
pori, Salanié (2000a) sur l’économétrie des contrats d’assurance).
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L’antisélection crée un lien croissant entre niveau de couverture et risque. Elle
a de ce point de vue le même eﬀet que l’aléa moral, comme le remarquent Chi-
appori et Salanié (2000). Les auteurs se placent dans un contexte d’assurance
unique, comme dans Rothschild et Stiglitz (1976).11 Chiappori et Salanié analy-
sent l’influence du niveau de couverture sur le risque en fréquence d’accidents re-
sponsables, à partir d’un fichier de jeunes conducteurs, ceci afin de ne pas avoir
à gérer l’utilisation de l’historique individuel dans les variables explicatives. Avec
un modèle probit bivarié sur les indicatrices d’accident et de présence d’assurance
complète, et intégrant l’information disponible sur les contrats, ils concluent à
l’absence d’asymétrie d’information. Cette conclusion est ensuite renforcée par
une analyse non paramétrique basée sur des statistiques locales dans l’échantillon.
Dionne, Gouriéroux et Vanasse (2001) abordent le même sujet, mais avec le niveau
de franchise dommages comme variable de choix. Ils commentent les formulations
statistiques traduisant l’indépendance entre le risque et le choix de couverture, ex-
primée conditionnellement aux variables décrivant le contrat. Ils étudient l’influence
des erreurs de spécification sur l’espérance de la variable de choix dans les tests
d’indépendance conditionnelle. Ils rappellent la nature résiduelle de l’antisélection
par rapport aux variables observables, et l’éliminent sur leurs données.
En assurance vie et santé, l’antisélection est bien présente également. Mais le
cadre d’analyse est diﬀérent de celui de l’assurance non-vie, le contrat d’assurance
n’étant pas exclusif du fait de la nature forfaitaire des contrats. Par exemple,
l’antisélection est indubitable en assurance viagère quand celle-ci est achetée volon-
tairement (ce n’est plus vrai si le capital converti en rente a été constitué par les
cotisations à un fonds de pension). Se sentir en bonne santé est une condition néces-
saire à l’achat de rente viagère, et cette information est d’autant plus discriminante
que l’on est âgé. Par contre, Finkelstein et McGarry (2006) observent de la "sélection
avantageuse" (i.e. un lien décroissant entre niveau de couverture et risque) sur les
11L’unicité du contrat suppose que la garantie est indemnitaire et non forfaitaire.
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garanties "temporaire décès" ou dépendance. Ce terme de "sélection avantageuse" a
été proposé par De Meza et Webb (2001) qui la justifient dans le cas où les individus
avec le moins d’aversion au risque - et donc les moins enclins à acheter de l’assurance
- ont peu d’activité de prévention du risque assuré. Ces hypothèses peuvent créer
une liaison décroissante entre achat d’assurance et niveau de risque, dans la mesure
où l’on ne conditionne pas par l’aversion au risque dans le calcul. Un tel résultat
permet d’avoir un eﬀet de révélation par le choix de couverture à l’opposé de l’aléa
moral, ce qui donne une explication possible sur l’absence d’asymétrie d’information
relevée empiriquement par Chiappori et Salanié (2000), et par Dionne, Gouriéroux
et Vanasse (2001). Fang, Keane et Silverman (2008) remarquent que toute infor-
mation privée positivement corrélée avec le niveau de couverture et négativement
corrélée avec le risque permet de créer de la "sélection avantageuse", comme De
Meza et Webb le font avec l’aversion au risque. Ils donnent l’exemple du lien entre
dépenses de santé des personnes âgées aux Etats-Unis, et possession d’une couver-
ture complémentaire à "medicare" (laquelle couverture est appelée "medigap"). En
conditionnant par les variables déterminant les prix, les détenteurs de cette cou-
verture complémentaire dépensent 4000 dollars de moins par an que ceux qui ne
l’ont pas. On obtient ainsi un résultat de type "sélection avantageuse", mais celui-ci
est inversé quand on rajoute l’information sur l’état de santé. A niveau de santé
donné, la couverture génère 2000 dollars par an de dépenses supplémentaires. Les
détenteurs de "medigap" ont un meilleur statut social et donc une meilleure santé
en moyenne que les autres personnes âgées, ce qui explique le résultat. En assur-
ance non-vie, Huang, Wang et Tzeng (2009) montrent qu’un résultat de "sélection
avantageuse" sur l’assurance incendie des entreprises à Taiwan est renversé si l’on
intègre les activités de prévention du risque (achats d’équipements anti-incendie ou
formation des salariés sur les risques).
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3.2 Révélation et modification des lois de risque par les his-
toriques individuels: identification et mesure
La littérature statistique a longtemps peiné à comprendre les problèmes d’identification
créés par l’interprétation des historiques individuels. En commentant un papier écrit
par Neyman (1939), Feller (1943) mentionne les deux interprétations des lois bino-
miales négatives en terme d’hétérogénéité inobservée, et en terme de modification
des lois par l’historique. Il remarque que cette double interprétation échappe à la
plupart des auteurs prenant l’un ou l’autre point de vue, y compris à Neyman.12
Feller conclut à l’impossibilité d’identifier la nature de la dynamique sur les données.
A la fin de son article, Feller mentionne toutefois l’idée qu’une analyse des durées
entre les évènements plutôt que de leur nombre permettrait peut-être de progresser
dans la voie d’une identification.
Le contenu de cet article n’échappa pas à Neyman, qui cosigna une dizaine
d’années plus tard un article (Bates, Neyman (1952)) proposant une manière d’éliminer
la loi de mélange associée à un processus de Poisson. En considérant une population
d’individus pour lesquels le nombre d’accidents suit un processus de Poisson dont le
paramètre varie selon les individus, les auteurs construisent un test basé sur le ré-
sultat suivant. Si l’on considère les individus ayant eu un accident et un seul sur un
intervalle, la date de cet accident suit une loi uniforme sur l’intervalle. Cette loi étant
indépendante du paramètre individuel, les auteurs proposent un test d’adéquation
des dates d’accidents à une loi uniforme, de type Kolmogorov-Smirnov. L’hypothèse
nulle est associée par les auteurs au fait que l’historique des accidents ne modifie
pas les lois individuelles, comme c’est le cas pour les processus de Poisson. Plusieurs
papiers de la littérature économétrique (Heckman, Borjas (1980) et [5], [6]) se sont
inspirés de cette contribution.
12Neyman était pourtant loin d’être un débutant, ayant déjà publié ses travaux sur les tests
optimaux en 1939.
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Mais la conclusion de Neyman et Bates est exagérément optimiste. En eﬀet, un
mélange de lois de Poisson peut s’appliquer à des individus réels, et non pas à des
classes d’individus associés à des variables observables données. Dans le premier cas,
l’historique modifierait les lois individuelles bien que l’hypothèse nulle soit vérifiée.
Par exemple, un processus de Poisson de paramètre mélangé suivant une loi ( )
est associé à une fonction de hasard dont la valeur en  et pour  sinistres survenus
entre 0 et  est égale à
() =  + + 
C’est un processus de Pólya, dont les lois marginales sont des binomiales néga-
tives. Appliquer ce processus à des individus soumis à des incitations supposerait
un eﬀort décroissant après chaque accident et croissant avec le temps. Mais les envi-
ronnements incitatifs convexes comme celui créé par le système bonus-malus français
induisent des eﬀets opposés. La fonction de hasard se comporte alors à l’opposé de
celle du processus de Pólya. Cela dit, une fonction de hasard de cette nature peut
également conduire à une loi uniforme pour la date d’un sinistre supposé unique.
Considérons en eﬀet un intervalle [0  ] et  le nombre de sinistres entre 0 et .
Si () est la densité de transition en  entre  et  + 1 sinistres (ou fonction de
hasard), et si Λ() = R 0 () est la fonction de hasard intégrée, on a
 [ = 1] =
Z 
0
exp(−Λ0())0() exp(Λ1()− Λ1( ))
où  est la date de l’accident unique. La densité de la loi de cette date est égale à
0()× exp(Λ1()−Λ0()), à une constante multiplicative près. La dérivée logarith-
mique de la densité est égale à
³
000
´
+ 1 − 0 L’hypothèse nulle (loi uniforme
pour la date du sinistre) correspond à un équilibre entre les composantes relatives
au temps et aux évènements de cette dérivée, soit
00
0 (temps); 1 − 0 (évènement) (2)
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Dans le cas du processus de Pólya, on a 000  0 et 1−0  0 Mais on peut
avoir des signes opposés pour les deux composantes si les modifications du risque par
l’historique individuel sont dues à des incitations financières dans un environnement
convexe. La loi uniforme de la date d’un sinistre supposé unique traduit alors un
équilibre entre l’eﬀet désincitatif du temps, et l’eﬀet incitatif créé par l’accident.
L’élimination de l’hétérogénéité inobservée est développée dans [5] et [6] dans
l’esprit de la contribution Bates-Neyman, à partir d’une analyse des données de
durée séparant les évènements. Une application est faite sur des données françaises
d’assurance automobile, et soumises aux règles de bonus-malus. Dans cet environ-
nement convexe, la pénalité suite à un accident croît avec la prime de base (elle
est ici proportionnelle à cette prime), et l’eﬃcacité de l’eﬀort augmente quand on
s’élève dans l’échelle bonus-malus. On s’attend donc à voir un individu augmenter
son eﬀort de conduite prudente après un accident. La fonction de hasard d’un risque
en fréquence d’accidents est modélisée sous la forme
() = × − × () ( ≥ 0)
Le paramètre  est individuel. Il suit une loi  sur la population qui reflète
une hétérogénéité explicable partiellement par des composantes de régression. Le
paramètre  traduit la modification du risque induite par l’historique individuel
(− est le nombre d’accidents de l’individu dans l’intervalle [0 [, et le risque est
donc multiplié par  après chaque accident). Le système bonus-malus français est
multiplicatif (25% de hausse de prime après un accident responsable), et le mod-
èle précédent retient la même logique au niveau de l’eﬃcacité de l’eﬀort optimal.
Dans [6], il est prouvé que l’eﬀort croît après chaque accident dans un contexte
de tarification suivant la logique du système bonus-malus français. La fonction 
représente l’eﬀet du temps calendaire sur le risque, qui peut traduire entre autres
des eﬀets incitatifs à temps continu. Les principaux résultats produits dans [6] sont
les suivants.
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• Si  = 1 (les accidents ne créent pas d’eﬀets incitatifs si l’on s’en tient à cette
explication des eﬀets de modification des lois par l’historique), la fonction 
est identifiable, à partir de l’égalité  [ = 1 | = 1] = Ψ()Ψ( ) (0 ≤  ≤
 Ψ primitive de  s’annulant en 0). La loi  sur le paramètre individuel est
également identifiable par sa transformée de Laplace, à partir de la fonction
de répartition empirique associée à la date du premier accident.
• Si  est constant,  est identifiable si la durée d’observation est infinie. Si 
est la date du ` accident, on a
 [1  2 − 1] = 
1 +   (3)
On a ainsi un estimateur convergent de  à partir de la fréquence empirique de
l’événement [1  2 − 1]. Mais si la durée d’observation est finie, le biais de
sélection (seuls les contrats avec deux accidents et plus peuvent être retenus
dans l’analyse) ne permet plus en général d’identifier . Par contre un test
d’hypothèse nulle  = 1 est possible dans tous les cas. Ce test prolonge
l’approche Bates-Neyman en considérant sur un intervalle de temps la fonction
de répartition empiriquec2 de la date du deuxième accident pour les contrats
en ayant eu deux, et en la comparant au carré de la fonction c1 associée aux
contrats avec un accident. A l’hypothèse nulle, c2−c12 a une espérance nulle
en toute date et pour toute valeur de la fonction calendaire . Sur les données,
l’hypothèse nulle n’est pas rejetée.
Le modèle propose ainsi des avancées notables par rapport à la littérature exis-
tante, mais une identification simultanée des deux composantes de la dynamique sur
les données (ici,  et ) reste hors de portée. On peut compléter le modèle proposé
en [6] de la manière suivante. L’équation (3) peut également être obtenue avec une
formulation du type
() = × − × (− − ) (0 = 0) (4)
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Dans cette formulation, c’est l’ancienneté du dernier sinistre (s’il existe) qui déter-
mine l’eﬀet temporel, et non plus le temps calendaire. Il est aisé de montrer que le
résultat donné en (3) reste valable pour toute valeur de  et , ce qui étend la possi-
bilité d’estimer  en éliminant non seulement l’hétérogénéité individuelle mais aussi
la fonction du temps  et donc les eﬀets incitatifs que celle-ci pourrait représenter.
On utilise pour cela la propriété de "hasards proportionnels" qu’a l’équation (4) par
rapport au nombre de sinistres passés. La limite d’utilisation du modèle est la même
que dans [6]: la durée d’observation doit être infinie pour ne pas avoir un biais de
sélection.
Pour conclure, analysons le système bonus-malus français qui sous-tend le travail
empirique. La fréquence moyenne des accidents fait que l’eﬀet bonus l’emporte
en moyenne sur le malus (les conducteurs ont en moyenne 40% de bonus, alors
qu’un débutant n’en a pas). L’incitation à une conduite prudente diminuant avec le
coeﬃcient, les eﬀets désincitatifs s’exerçant à temps continu l’emportent en moyenne
sur les eﬀets incitatifs créés à chaque accident, ce qui s’interprète dans l’équation (2).
Il faut signaler que la fonction des systèmes bonus-malus a changé en France comme
ailleurs en Europe. Le système bonus-malus n’a plus de caractère contraignant sur
la tarification depuis 1994,13 comme c’était le cas à l’époque de l’observation des
données (qui ont été extraites en 1988). En application d’une directive européenne,
la tarification doit être non contrainte et le coeﬃcient bonus-malus s’applique donc
sur une prime qui peut intégrer l’expérience individuelle. La Commission européenne
a voulu supprimer ensuite les systèmes bonus-malus, mais n’y est pas parvenue. Les
défenseurs de ces systèmes ont mis en avant le fait que le maintien d’un coeﬃcient
bonus-malus sur le contrat créait une information commune à tous les acteurs du
marché et diminuait les rentes d’information détenues par les assureurs (cf. [28]
pour une quantification).14
13La liberté tarifaire a été instaurée par la troisième directive européenne en assurance non-vie.
14Le conflit entre la Commission européenne et la France à ce sujet a commencé en 2002 et s’est
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3.3 Eﬃcacité des mécanismes monétaires et non monétaires
incitant à une conduite prudente
Le coût financier et social des accidents de la route est en constante augmentation
au niveau mondial. Une étude menée par la Harvard School of Public Health prévoit
qu’à l’horizon 2020, les accidents de la route seront la troisième cause d’années en
bonne santé perdues, après les maladies cardiaques et les cancers (Murray et Lopez
(1997)). Les résultats par pays montrent une nette divergence entre les pays de
l’OCDE pour lesquels les résultats sont en amélioration régulière depuis plus de
30 ans, et les autres qui connaissent pour la plupart une dégradation rapide des
indicateurs associés à la violence routière. Les pays les plus riches ont sans doute de
meilleures infrastructures routières que les autres15, mais la baisse observée depuis
les années 70 est concomitante à la mise en place de systèmes de contrôle et de
sanction des infractions aux règles de conduite. Les mécanismes décrits ci-après ont
modifié en profondeur les comportements au volant (cf. Boyer et Dionne (1987)).
Les amendes et les permis à points sont des mécanismes incitant à une conduite
prudente et basés sur les infractions. Dans le cas du permis à points, la sanction
est non monétaire, le permis de conduire étant annulé si le total des points dépasse
un certain seuil. Les primes d’assurance peuvent aussi dépendre de l’historique
des infractions, comme c’est le cas au Québec pour l’assurance des dommages cor-
porels. L’évolution du système incitatif au Québec et des résultats obtenus en termes
d’accidents et d’infractions est analysée dans [1]. L’article analyse les propriétés in-
citatives des permis à points, en fonction de leurs caractéristiques. Ces propriétés
dépendent d’abord de la manière dont les points associés aux infractions sont am-
nistiés. L’amnistie peut être soit totale après une durée donnée de conduite sans
conclu en 2004 par une décision de justice favorable à la France.
15L’amélioration de la sécurité des véhicules et des routes est une voie de progrès en sécurité
routière, mais elle peut aussi induire un accroissement de la prise de risque par les conducteurs
(eﬀet d’ "homéostasie"). Ce point est discuté par Gossner et Picard (2005).
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infraction (c’est le cas en France pour les infractions à plus de un point, et en Es-
pagne), ou être attachée à l’infraction après une durée donnée comme au Québec
et aux Etats-Unis. Les propriétés incitatives des systèmes avec amnistie totale sont
étudiées dans [26]. Le niveau incitatif est déterminé par la variation d’une utilité
de continuation entre la situation présente et celle qui suit l’infraction (on suppose
toutes les infractions à un point pour simplifier). La pénalité associée au retrait
de permis est assimilée à la privation d’une utilité de conduite durant une durée
aléatoire, à la suite de laquelle le compteur des points est remis à zéro. Les modèles
présentés dans le papier sont une extension de ceux utilisés par Bourgeon et Picard
(2007), un niveau d’eﬀort continu remplaçant un eﬀort binaire. Dans tous les sys-
tèmes à points, l’utilité augmente avec le temps en présence d’amnisties. Dans le cas
d’une amnistie totale, le compteur temps est remis à zéro après une infraction, et
l’utilité suivant l’infraction est donc constante pour un nombre donné d’infractions
non amnistiées. Le niveau incitatif est alors croissant avec le temps, car il est défini
comme la diﬀérence entre utilité courante et utilité suite à infraction. On en dé-
duit que le risque d’infraction diminue avec le temps. Par contre, le saut du niveau
incitatif suite à une infraction n’est pas de signe constant. L’incitation augmente
suite à une infraction si cette dernière est assez proche de la précédente. Si l’horizon
de l’amnistie totale est assez proche de l’infraction, le niveau incitatif décroît au
moment de l’infraction. Pour résumer, les eﬀets incitatifs vont dans le même sens
que ceux créés par la révélation de l’hétérogénéité inobservée dans la dimension tem-
porelle, au contraire de ceux créés par un système bonus-malus. Il existe une clause
dans le système bonus-malus français, dite "de retour rapide" vers la situation ini-
tiale (ni bonus, ni malus) pour les conducteurs avec malus qui ont deux années sans
sinistre responsable. Les propriétés incitatives de cette clause sont similaires à celles
du type de permis à points que nous venons d’analyser.
Les propriétés incitatives d’un système où chaque infraction est amnistiée après
une durée donnée (deux ans au Québec) sont plus complexes car toutes les anci-
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ennetés des infractions non amnistiées sont des variables déterminant l’utilité de
continuation et le niveau d’eﬀort optimal. On peut faire l’analyse qualitative suiv-
ante. Si les amnisties se font sur chaque infraction, l’utilité atteinte après infrac-
tion croît avec le temps de même que l’utilité d’avant l’infraction. L’eﬀet temporel
d’amélioration de l’utilité de continuation devrait être plus élevé dans une situa-
tion plus médiocre. Si l’utilité croît plus vite après l’infraction, le niveau incitatif
décroît avec le temps car il s’exprime comme diﬀérence des utilités avant et après
l’infraction. On peut prouver que ce niveau incitatif est continu au moment de
l’amnistie d’une infraction. Le niveau incitatif doit croître après une infraction pour
compenser l’eﬀet négatif du temps. C’est par ailleurs le résultat qu’on obtient pour
un permis à points sans amnistie. Les permis à points avec amnistie par infraction
ont des propriétés incitatives proches du système bonus-malus français, ou d’une
tarification convexe.16 L’analyse empirique de [1] porte dans un premier temps sur
une période où les incitations à une conduite prudente sont le permis à points et un
système d’amendes associées aux infractions. D’après la théorie, l’eﬀort doit être
croissant avec le nombre de points non amnistiés. Son eﬀet doit alors contrecar-
rer celui de la révélation de l’hétérogénéité inobservée. Un renversement de l’eﬀet
de révélation (croissance du risque à chaque infraction) prouve l’existence d’eﬀets
incitatifs, et c’est eﬀectivement ce qu’on observe. Alors que le permis est annulé
au-delà de douze points, le risque d’infraction croît jusqu’à sept points puis décroît
ensuite. On peut faire un parallèle avec les mesures incitatives qui ont pour objet
de faire diminuer la délinquance. Une exemple un peu extrême a été étudié par les
économistes, qui est la règle du "three strikes and you’re out" établie en Californie
pour dissuader la récidive des délits graves ou des crimes. Ceux-ci remplacent les
infractions dans l’analyse précédente, et le retrait de permis est remplacé par rien
moins qu’une peine de prison allant de vingt cinq ans à la perpétuité. Helland
16Les eﬀets sur le risque sont également de même nature que les biais psychologiques à la Tversky-
Kahneman.
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et Tabarrok (2007) montrent que l’eﬀet dissuasif augmente entre la première et la
seconde condamnation.
La baisse de la fréquence d’infractions n’a d’intérêt en terme de sécurité routière
que si elle est suivie d’une baisse de la fréquence d’accidents. Sur l’ensemble de
la période d’étude (de 1983 à 1996) la fréquence d’accidents baisse régulièrement,
alors que celle des infractions est globalement stationnaire. L’explication la plus
probable est que la hausse des contrôles radar a augmenté le taux d’enregistrement
des infractions. Ainsi la stationnarité de la fréquence des infractions enregistrées
dans le fichier indique une baisse de la fréquence des infractions commises, ce qui
peut expliquer le résultat obtenu sur les accidents.
L’introduction en 1992 au Québec d’une prime d’assurance indexée sur les points
a créé un troisième niveau d’incitation à la prudence au volant, complétant les
amendes et le permis à points. Une baisse de 15% de la fréquence des infractions
a été constatée suite à cette réforme. Nous avons relié l’eﬃcacité de cette réforme
aux variations qu’elle induit dans les niveaux incitatifs.17 Cette baisse de 15% est
à rapporter à une hausse moyenne de 9 à 10% de l’eﬀet incitatif suite à la réforme.
L’élasticité entre eﬃcacité et niveau des incitations est associée dans l’article à la
forme de la fonction  reliant l’eﬃcacité de l’eﬀort à sa désutilité. Si l’eﬀort est
strictement positif pour un conducteur supposé représentatif, nous montrons que
l’élasticité inférieure à -1 que nous observons est associée à une concavité de log().
Enfin l’eﬃcacité incitative estimée des infractions, jointe aux résultats précédents,
nous permet de calculer des équivalents monétaires pour les infractions et les retraits
de permis.
17Les résultats sont sujets à caution dans la mesure où il n’y a pas de population de contrôle
(l’assureur étant en situation de monopole) permettant d’éliminer les eﬀets calendaires avec des
"diﬀerence in diﬀerences".
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4 Recherches en cours
4.1 Contrats de long terme et assurance dépendance
Ce thème de recherches s’inscrit dans la chaire "Assurance et risques majeurs" fi-
nancée par la compagnie d’assurances Axa et portée par l’Ecole Polytechnique, Paris
IX-Dauphine et l’ENSAE. Il a pu être développé grâce à une collaboration avec
Montserrat Guillén, de l’université de Barcelone. Nous avons eu accès à une base
de données espagnole de contrats de long terme, couvrant des risques de décès, de
maladie et de dépendance. Comme on l’a rappelé en section 1, les contrats de long
terme se caractérisent par un engagement unilatéral de l’assureur à prolonger la
couverture jusqu’à un horizon qui est ici le décès de l’assuré. Par ailleurs, la prime
ne peut pas dépendre de l’historique individuel des épisodes de maladie. Ces car-
actéristiques du contrat permettent l’assurance contre le risque de reclassification,
justifié par l’existence d’un capital santé dont la dégradation est en grande part ir-
réversible. Dans une publication récente ([2]), nous avons analysé le comportement
d’achat en l’expliquant par un modèle de cycle de vie à la Yaari (1965). Mais il est
en fait diﬃcile de rendre rationnel l’achat à 30 ans en moyenne de trois couvertures
jointes (décès, maladie et dépendance) alors que la dernière d’entre elles est souscrite
d’habitude par des personnes nettement plus âgées. Dans un travail en cours ([25]),
nous analysons la structure de tarification et les comportements de résiliation des
assurés. Il n’y a pas d’engagement de l’assureur sur la tarification future dans ce
type de contrats, ce qui peut s’expliquer par l’incertitude sur les lois de risque alors
que les engagements sont non révisables.18 Mais cette absence d’engagement, si
elle permet d’éviter tout risque d’insolvabilité de l’assureur, peut conduire celui-ci
à abuser de sa situation de monopole. Le risque est déterminé en premier lieu par
l’âge, et les jeunes assurés subventionnent fortement les assurés plus âgés. Dans ce
18Cette incertitude est particulièrement élevée en dépendance, où les lois d’entrée et de durée en
dépendance ont connu des eﬀets de génération importants.
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contexte de "highballing" analysé en section 2.3, un assuré qui résilie son contrat
perd l’excédent entre les primes versées et le risque couvert, car il n’y a pas de
valeur de rachat sur les garanties maladie et dépendance.19 Les contrats de long
terme fonctionnent donc essentiellement en répartition, et nous constatons sur les
données une grande stabilité du rapport entre prestations et primes. Cette logique
de répartition rapproche ces contrats des systèmes de sécurité sociale, et d’ailleurs
le produit analysé dans nos travaux était vu à sa création comme un complément à
la sécurité sociale espagnole. Mais ce contrat privé est très diﬀérent de l’assurance
sociale du fait de la liberté laissée à l’entrée en portefeuille (pour l’assuré comme
pour l’assureur) et à la sortie pour l’assuré. Si les assurés ont choisi librement cette
couverture, l’assureur n’est de son côté pas tenu de laisser le portefeuille ouvert à
l’entrée. Ce portefeuille a d’ailleurs été fermé à l’entrée en 1997 et la tarification a
ensuite augmenté rapidement, suivant ainsi le vieillissement des assurés du porte-
feuille. Une telle situation devrait entraîner une "spirale de la mort", c’est-à-dire
une extinction progressive du portefeuille créée par le départ continu des plus jeunes,
qui n’ont plus la perspective d’être subventionnés ultérieurement par les nouveaux
entrants. On observe une hausse modérée des résiliations suite à la clôture du porte-
feuille, mais celles-ci se stabilisent ensuite. On peut imaginer que les assurés n’ont
pas réellement conscience de la situation du portefeuille, et la lisibilité est un prob-
lème majeur des contrats de long terme. On en a une confirmation avec un pic de
résiliation à 65 ans: les assurés qui résilient pensent sans doute que la couverture
maladie est de type incapacité de travail, alors que la garantie est la même, que
l’assuré soit actif ou retraité. L’amplitude des subventions croisées entre classes
d’âge donne un pouvoir redistributif considérable aux résiliations des contrats de
long terme (cf. Brown et Finkelstein (2007) s’agissant de l’assurance dépendance).
Dans nos travaux en cours, nous essayons de relier le niveau des résiliations à ses
19Seule la garantie décès inclut une valeur de rachat quand elle est de type "vie entière". Dans
le portefeuille étudié, seule une composante de la garantie décès était de ce type.
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diﬀérentes causes. La modification du risque réel ou perçu peut être une cause de
résiliation, et nous observons en eﬀet un taux de résiliation accru pour les assurés
avec un bon historique sur le risque maladie. Les résiliations peuvent être subies dans
le cas de contraintes de liquidité, mais cette cause devrait être de peu de poids dans
notre étude car les primes (comme les garanties) sont faibles. Enfin, la cause ma-
jeure de résiliation est une baisse de motivation d’assurance ou une modification de
la perception du produit. Les personnes âgées peuvent par exemple ne plus vouloir
être assurées contre le risque de dépendance pour inciter leurs enfants à substituer
l’aide familiale à des services du secteur marchand à la personne âgée. Surtout, le
taux de résiliation élevé des jeunes assurés (8% par an) s’explique d’abord par une
compréhension progressive du produit qui les pousse à en changer (pourquoi par
exemple avoir acheté de l’assurance dépendance aussi jeune?).
Nos recherches vont s’orienter ensuite vers le partage public-privé, sujet d’actualité
pour l’assurance dépendance.
4.2 Demande d’assurance et prévention des risques majeurs:
l’exemple du National Flood Insurance Program aux
Etats-Unis
Ces travaux sont menés avec Pierre Picard, ErwannMichel-Kerjan et Sabine Lemoyne.
Ils ont commencé il y a peu et vont utiliser la base des contrats d’assurance individu-
els couverts par le National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) aux Etats-Unis. Cette
base contient plusieurs millions de contrats suivis sur la décennie 2000. Elle contient
les caractéristiques individuelles des contrats, et des variables résumant l’activité de
prévention des risques au niveau de "communautés". Celles-ci sont de petites en-
tités géographiques notées régulièrement par le NFIP sur la base de leurs activités
de prévention. La note détermine alors un rabais sur une prime d’assurance sensée
être calculée de manière actuarielle. Nous avons privilégié l’analyse de la demande
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d’assurance comme première piste de recherches. Des articles dans cette veine ont
déjà été proposés par Browne et Hoyt (2000), et par Zahran et al. (2009). Nous
comptons étendre la contribution des auteurs en analysant la manière dont la de-
mande est influencée par les historiques dans les dimensions spatiales et temporelles,
et en écrivant des modèles de choix basés sur la perception des risques.
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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this paper is to make allowance for cost of claims in experience ra- 
ting. We design here a bonus-malus system for the pure premium of insurance con- 
tracts, from a rating based on their individual characteristics Empmcal results are 
presented, that are drawn from a French data base of automobde insurance contracts. 
KEYWORDS 
Bayesian and heterogeneous models Number and cost residuals. Bonus-malus for 
frequency of claims, average cost per claim, and pure premmm, 
INTRODUCTION 
Bayesian models lead to a postenon ratemakmg of insurance contracts (Buhlmann 
(I 967)) Suppose that the number of claims follows a Polsson dlsmbutlon. A bonus- 
malus system for the frequency of claims is obtained if we consider that the parameter 
follows a gamma distrzbuuon (see Lemalre (1985, 1995)) This model may include a 
ratemakmg of policyholders on an mdwidual basis, the parameter of the Polsson dis- 
tributlon depending then on rating factors (see D)onne et al (1989, 1992)). 
The allowance for severity of claims m experience rating can be achieved by consl- 
denng the dichotomy between claims with material damage only, and claims including 
bodily injury (see Lemaire (1995)) In this model, the number of claims that caused 
bodily inJury follows a binomial distribution, the parameter of which follows a beta 
distribution. 
In this paper, the severity of claims will be taken into account by using their cost. 
The analysis of cost of clanns makes clearly appear a positive correlation between the 
average cost per clam1 and the frequency risk (see Renshaw (1994), Pmquet et al 
(1992)) An a priori ratemakmg will therefore be influenced by the allowance for 
costs Concerning the third party liability guaranty, it can be noted that. 
• The settlement of claims with material damage is pertbrmed partly through fixed 
amount compensations from an insurance company to the third party 
Thanks to Georges Dionne for motlvam~g this work, as well a~ Chr~stran Gour16roux, Eric Renshaw and 
two anonymous referees for comments This research received financial ~upport from the F6d6railon 
Fran~al~e des Socl6t6~ d'A,,surance 
AS'FIN BULLETIN Vol 27, No I, 1997, pp 33-57 
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• The amount of compensatzons related to clanms including boddy injury depends on 
the socml posntion of the vnctzm 
Hence, it ~s difficult to explain the cost of these claims by the rating factors, and we 
shall mvestngate he damage guaranty m the empnncal part of the paper 
Allowing for cost of clanms m bonus-malus systems can be achieved m the follo- 
wing way. starting from a rating model based on the analysis of number and cost of 
claims, two heterogeneity components are added They represent unobserved factors, 
that are relevant for the explanation of the severity variables Later on, we shall rel~r 
to any variable explained by a rating model (nuraber, cost of claun, total cost of 
claims, and so on) as a "seventy variable". These unobserved factors are, for instance, 
annual mileage for number distributions, and speed (and the driver's behavlour m 
general) for number and cost distributions. A bonus-malus coefficient can be related to 
the credibility estimation of a heterogeneity component 
In this paper, costs of claims are supposed to follow gamma or log-normal distribu- 
tions The rating factors, as well as the heterogeneity component, are included m the 
scale parameter of the distribution Considering that the heterogeneity component also 
follows a gamma or log-normal distribution, a crednbnlnty expressnon us obtained, 
which provides a predictor of the average cost per claim for the following period. For 
instance, a cost-bonus will appear after the first claxm if nts cost ns inferior to the esti- 
mation made by the rating model 
Experience rating with a bayesian model ns possible only zf there Js enough hetero- 
geneity in the data For instance, m the negatzve binomial model without covarlates, 
the estimated variance of the heterogeneity component xs equal to zero if the variance 
of the number of claims us inferior to their mean (see Pmquet et al (1992)) In that 
case, a priori and a posteriorl tariff structures are the same, and the bayesian model 
fads. 
A sufficient condltson for the existence of a bonus-malus system derived from a 
bayesian model is provided in section 2 3 The existence is equivalent to an overd~s- 
persaon of residuals related to the severity varmble. Thas approach allows one to test 
for the presence of a h~dden Information. that is relevant for the explanatnon of the 
seventy varmbles. 
The heterogeneity on dzstribut~ons for seventy variables, that ~s not explained by 
the rating factors, is revealed through experience on policyholders The paper mvestl- 
gates the rate of this revelation, which ~s found to be lower for average cost per claim 
than for the frequency 
For the sample considered here, the unexplained heterogeneity related to costs ts 
stronger for gamma than for log-normal dnstnbut~ons Besides, the latter family gives a 
better fit to the data. 
If the heterogeneity components on number and cost distributions are independent, 
the bonus-malus coefficient for pure premmm us the product of the coefficients related 
to frequency and expected cost per claim. But one may think that the behawor of the 
policyholder influences the two heterogeneity components in a similar way, and so 
that they are posztwely correlated 
Lastly, this paper proposes a bonus-malus ystem for the pure premium of insu- 
rance contracts, that admits a correlation between the two components Although thc 
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likelihood of a model based on number and costs of claims is not analytically tractable 
m the presence of such a correlation, consistent estm~ators for the parameters exist. 
The correlation between the number and cost heterogeneity components appears to be 
very low for the sample investigated here 
1 A PRIORI RATEMAKING 
Let us suppose a sample of pohcyholders indexed by 1, the pohcyholder t bemg obser- 
ved dunng T, periods The analysis of the correlauon between the number and cost 
heterogeneity components shows the necessity of considering a non constant number 
of periods for each policyholder. The working sample is presented tn 1 3 
1.1 Frequency of claims 
We write 
N,t~P(•,,),=,. ,L ,A,t = exp(w. O0 
to represent the Polsson model where n.. the outcome of N., is the number of claims 
reported by the pohcyholder t in period t The parameter ~,, is a multlphcatwe function 
of the explanatory variables, the line-vector w. represents their values, and c~ is the 
column-vector f the related parameters. 
The frequency-premium (esnmauon of the expectation of N,,) is denoted as 
~,, = exp(w, t~). and nre% = n, - ~,, ,s the number-residual for the pohcyholder t 
and period t. The maxmmm hkehhood estimator of a ~s the solutton to the equanon: 
E /trestt wtt = 0, 
t ,t  
which is an orthogonahty relation between the explanatory variables and the residuals 
The rating factors have in general a fimte number of levels, and the explanatory varia- 
bles are then indicators of these levels The preceding equation means that, for every 
sub-sample associated to a given level, the sum of the frequency premiums is equal to 
the total number of clanns This property means that the preceding model provides the 
multlphcatlve tariff structure that does not mutuahze the frequency-risk. 
One may think of replacing n,, by to,,, the total cost of claims (pure premium rate- 
making) m the hkehhood equauon. When applied to the working sample, this non 
probablhstzc model shows that the elasuclty of the pure prenmlm risk with respect o 
the frequency risk is greater than one (see section 1.4.1 ). 
1.2 Models for average cost per claim and pure premium 
1.2.1 Gamma distributions 
Let c,,: be the cost of thej 'h claim reported by the pohcyholder i in period t (1 <_j_< n,,, 
/f n,, >_ 1). We shall suppose m the paper that the costs are strictly posmve. This as- 
sumpuon gives another eason to discard the third party hablhty guaranty" owing to 
fixed amount compensations, a policyholder involved in a claim caused by the third 
party can make his insurance company earn money. 
36 JEAN PINQUET 
Consldenng amma distributions, we write 
C,,j ~ ~'(d,b,t),b,, = exp(z,t]3), 
or b,,C,j ~T(d) .  The coefficzent b,, is a scale parameter, a mult lphcatwe 
function of the covariates, that are represented by the hne-vector z,. 
Let 2,, = d//~,, = d/exp(z , t~)  be the estmlauon of the average cost for each clama 
reported by the pohcyholder t m period t. If we suppose that the costs are independent, 
the maximum likelihood esumator of ~ is the solution of the following equation. 
(n,, - (tc,,/~,, )) ztt = ~ cres,t z, = 0 
I , f  i , I  
The term ntt --(tC a /C,t) IS the sum, for the claims reported by the policyholder t m 
period t, of their cost residual I - (c ,o /~, t ) .  it is written cres,, The likelihood equa- 
tion in ,/3 can hence be interpreted as an orthogonahty relation between the explanato- 
ry variables and cost-residuals. 
The average cost per claim increases with the frequency risk (see 1 4.2), which con- 
firms the previous conclusions about he risks related to frequency and pure premium 
1.2.2 Log-normal distributions 
The other distribution famdy considered in this paper is the normal distribution family 
for the logarithms of costs 
l°g C, tj ~ N(z,t] 3,cr2) ¢=~ I°g C,1~ = z,,]3+E,tj, ~,tj ~ N(0,°'2) •
The hkehhood equation giving /~ is 
This equation is also an orthogonahty relation between explanatory variables and 
residuals. 
1.2.3 Pure premium model 
The total cost of claims reported by the pohcyholder t m period t may be written as' 
N a 
TC, t = ~ Cio 
j=l 
It is a sum of N,, i.~ d outcomes from a variable that we denote as C,,. The pure pre- 
mium IS" E(TCs, ) = E(N,t) E(C~,). 
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1.3 Presentation of the working sample 
The sample investigated m the paper is part of the automobde policyholders portfolio 
of a French insurance company It is composed of more than a hundred thousand poli- 
cyholders The damage guaranty being considered here, only the contracts with that 
kind of guaranty were kept Policyholders can be observed over two years, and each 
anniversary date, changing of vehicle or coverage level entails a new period. Only 
claims concerning the damage guaranty and closed at the date of obtentlon of the data 
base were kept Reserved costs were thus avoided The rating factors retained for the 
estimation of number and cost dlstrlbuuons are 
• The characteristics of the vehicle, group, class, age 
• The characteristics of the insurance contract" type of use, level of the deductible, 
geographic zone 
Other rating factors are the pohcyholder's occupation, as well as the year when the 
period began (in order to allow for a generation effect) These eight rating factors have 
a finite number of levels, the total number of which is 44 The explanatory variables 
are binary, and indicate the levels for the policyholders' in order to avoid colhnearlty, 
one level is suppressed for each rating factor, the intercept being kept anyway. There- 
fore, we shall consider (44-8)+1=37 covanates. With the notations of the paper, we 
obtain: 0~,]3 ~ ~37. ,Wtt,Ztt E {0,1} 37 
The estimated coefficients derived from the rating model depend on the level sup- 
pressed for each rating factor. Results that are independent from the suppressions are 
obtained by dividing the coefficients by their mean in the multiphcatlve rnodel. These 
standardized coefficients can be compared with the relative seventy of the levels 
The periods having not the same duration, the paralneter of the Poisson distribution 
must be proportional to the duration. The results given on the frequencies remain 
unchanged if, d,, being the duration of period t for the policyholder i, we write' 
)q, =d,, exp(w,, o~), and A,, =d,, exp(w,t &) 
The working sample includes 38772 policyholders and 71126 policyholders- 
periods These pohcyholders reported 3493 claims The average duration of the 
periods is nine months, and the annual frequency of the claims is 6 7%. 
1.4 Empirical results 
1.4.1 A priori rating for frequency and pure premium 
When apphed to the number of claims or their total cost, the Polsson models provide 
standardized coefficients, that can he compared with the relative seventy of the levels 
For almost each rating factor, the variance of the coefficients related to the levels is 
inferior to the variance of the relative sevent.~ For instance, for the "type of use" 
rating factor, one gets 
frequency relative severity standardized coefficient 
professional use 1.623 I 278 
standard use 0 982 0 992 
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pure premium relative seventy standardized coefficient 
professional use 1 747 I. 177 
standard use 0.979 0 995 
The distnbuuons of the policyholders anaong the levels of the different rating fac- 
tors are not independent from one another Policyholders with a professional use have, 
for the other rating factors, more nsky levels than the other pohcyholders The Poisson 
model does not mutuahze the risk: hence these pohcyholders have, with respect o 
other rating factors, a level of relatwe seventy equal to (1.747/1 177) - 1 = 48 4% 
more than the average, m term of pure premmm. 
The elast~clty of the pure premmm with respect o the frequency risk is equal to 
1 52 on the sample, and the difference from I is s~gmficant (the related Student staus- 
tic is equal to 5.93) Hence, if the frequency risk is multiplied by two, the average cost 
per claim mcreases by 2052 - 1 = 43.5%, and the pure premium increases by 187%. 
This posmve correlation between the risks on frequency and average cost per claim 
,s observed on each rating factor, except for the geographical zone 
1.4.2 A priori rating for average cost per claim 
On the sample of clamls, the gamma model leads to the following results (rating fac- 
tor: type of use) 
average cost relative seventy standardized coefficient 
professional use 1.076 0 933 
standard use 0 996 1 003 
The estimated elasticity of the average cost per claim with respect o the frequency ~s 
equal to 0 51, which confirms the results obtained m the preceding section. 
2 EXPERIENCE RATING FOR FREQUENCY AND AVERAGE COST PER CLAIM 
2.1 Heterogeneous models 
In a bayesian framework, the allowance for a hidden information, relevant for the 
rating of risks, can be performed m the following way 
• the starting point is an a priori rating model If 3' represents he severity variable(s), 
the likelihood ofy  will be written fo(y/Oi,x), where x is the vector of explanatory 
variables, and 0j the vector of parameters elated to them 
• A heterogeneity component (scalar, or vector) is added to the model, which measu- 
res the influence that unobserved variables have on the severity distribution. If u ts 
this component, a distribution of ~, conditional on u and the explanatory variables ~s 
defined, and we denote its hkehhood as fi.(y/Oi,.r,u) In practice, the a priori dis- 
tribution ~s equal to the distribution defined conditionally on u, for some value u ° 
o fu  f.(y/Oi,x, uO)=fo(Y/Oi,x)VOi,x,y l fu l sasca la r ,  u °=0 or l ,accordmg 
to the fact that u ~s included additively or multlpllcatlvely in the conditional distri- 
bution 
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• The credibility estmaatlon of u,, the heterogenmty component for the policyholder 
t, leads to a bonus-malus system. It rests on a heterogeneous model, m whmh u, is 
the outcome of a random varmble U,, the (U,),=i. .p being i i d. and thmr dlstnbu- 
uon being parametenzed by 0 2. The hkehhood of y, m the model with heteroge- 
nmty ~s obtained by integrating the condmonal hkehhood over U,, that ~s to say 
f (y , /O ,x , )  = Eo2l f . (y  , / Oi ,x, ,U,)] ,  
with 0 = (01,02). The heterogeneity component vector on number and cost d~stnbu- 
uons wdl be denoted, for the policyholder 
where n stands for the numbers and c for the costs The hnk between heterogeneous 
and bayesian models is made clear m the example that follows 
2.2 Examples of heterogeneous models 
2.2.1 Number  of claims 
With the notations of I I, the dlsmbutlons defined conditionally on u,. are 
N.  ~ P(~.,tUn,), with U,,, ~ y (a ,a )  
m the heterogeneous model The expectation of U,,, is equal to one, and its variance IS 
l /a On a period, the number of clamls dlstrtbuuon is negative bmonual m the hetero- 
geneous model 
The negauve bmomml model can be considered as a Polsson model with a random 
component, ff we write A.,,U,,, = ~,, If the intercept is the first of k explanatory varia- 
bles, and if e I is the first vector of the canonical base of ~ ,  we have 
A. = exp(%, a + Iog(U., )) = exp(w. (a  + log(U. , )e t )) = exp(w,, &,) 
In the last expressmn of k.,,. the parameter &, = ce + Iog(Un,)e I ~s random, and the 
formulation is bayesmn But tt ~s less tractable than that of the heterogeneous model. 
as well for bonus-malus computauons as for staUsucal reference. 
2.2.2 Gamma distributions for costs of claims 
The heterogeneous models that follow, which allow us to design bonus-malus systems 
for average cost per clmm, suppose the independence of heterogeneity components on 
the number and costs dJstrlbuuons The empirical results presented later will make th~s 
assumption plausible. 
For the gamma model and with the notations of 1.2 I, the distributions condluonal 
on Ucl a re  
G,j ~ 1'(d,b,,G,). with Uc, ~ t ' (6 ,6)  
m the heterogeneous model The heterogenmty component ~s included, as the rating 
factors, m the scale parameter of the distribution 
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In the heterogeneous model,  one can write" C.j=D, t j/(b,,Uc, ). with 
D~j -7 (d) .  U o -y (6 .6) ,  D.j and Uc, being independent The variable C.j follows a 
GB2 dlstnbunon (see Cummins et al (1990)). and D,t J represents the relative severity 
of the claim. 
2.2.3 Log-normal distributions for costs of claims 
With the notations of 1.2 2, the heterogeneous model is 
log C,,j = z,tfl + e,,j + U~,, Ucc , ~ N(O, 0-~ ). 
where the e,u and U o are independent. The variable e.j represents the relative se- 
verity of the claim 
The heterogeneous model used to design a bonus-malus system for pure premium 
will be presented after the empirical results related to the preceding models. 
2.3 A sufficient condition for the existence of a bonus-malus system derived 
from a bayesian model 
Experience rating with a bayesian model is possible only if there exists enough hete- 
rogeneity on the data Considering for instance the negative binomial model without 
covarlates, the estimated variance of the heterogeneity component is equal to zero if 
the variance of the number of claims is lower than their mean (see Pmquet et al. 
(1992)). In that case, a priori and a posterlorl tariff structures do not differ, and the 
bayesian model fails. 
A sufficient condition for the existence of a bonus-malus ystem derived from a 
bayesian model is provided here: ~t will be applied later on to the models for number 
and cost of claims 
Let us start from a heterogeneous model, as defined in 2 1 The heterogeneity com- 
ponent is supposed to be scalar, and its distribution is parameterlzed by the variance 
0 -2 The parameters of the model are 0 = (0,, o 2 )  and we shall write b ° = (0°,0), ~o 
being the maximum hkehhood estimator of 01 m the a priori rating model. 
If the right-derivative, with respect to 0 "2, of the log-l ikelihood is positive in 
^0 ^'~ 0 , 0-" will be positive in the heterogeneous model. The existence of a bonus-malus 
system is hence related to the sign of a lagranglan, which is part of the score test for 
nullity of 0-z (see Rao (1948), Silvey (1959)). With the notations of 2 I, and denoting 
the lagrangian as/.., one can prove: 
logf(y,/O, , or', x , ) -  Z l°g f ° (Y ' /0° '  x,)= L0- z + o(0-'), with Z ^0 ~ 9 
C=i2(re4-s,); 
2 
l 
i o: res, = logf.(y,/Ol °, x,,u) 1 " s, - logf.(y, /(gl°,x, ,u)]  
Ju=u ° ---- ~ }u=u o 
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See Pmquet (1996b) for a proof, and references to a recent hterature. The term res, is 
a residual, which Is related to those encountered m the hkehhood equations for nuln- 
bets and costs• The condmon for exIstence of a bonus-malus system is 
L>o  Zr s,' >Zs, 
• I ! 
It can be interpreted as an overd~sperslon cond~tlon on residuals. 
2.4 Prediction with heterogeneous models and bonus-malus ystems 
Let us suppose a pohcyholder observed on T periods' YT = (Yl, ,Y7 ) IS the sequence 
of seventy variables, and X" T = (x I . . . .  xT) that of the covanates The sequences A" r 
and YT take the place of x, and y, m the preceding secnons The date of forecast T 
must be explicated here. and the individual index can be suppressed, since the policy- 
holder can be considered separately Besides, belonging to the working sample is not 
mandatory for this pohcyholder 
We want to predict a risk for the period T+I, by means of a heterogeneous model 
For the period t, this risk R, is the expectation of a funcuon of Y~ (y, is the outcome 
of Yt) For instance, Yt is the sequence of both number and costs of claims m period t, 
and R,, the pure premmm, Is the expectation of the total cost. 
We now include a heterogeneKy component u, as defined in 2 I The dlStrlbunon of 
Yt condmonal on u depends on 0 l ,x  r and u. This apphes to R t, and we can write 
R, = ho, (x,)g(u), for the three types of risk dealt with later (frequency of clmms, 
average cost per clmm, pure premmm), g being a real-valued funcnon 
" T+I " T+I 
A pre&ctor for the risk m period T+I can be written as ho, (x;+ I) g(u), with g(u) a 
credlbdlty estimator of g(u), defined from: 
^ T+I 
g(u) = arg m,n Eo, [(g(U)-a) 2 f.(Yr/Oi ,XT,U) ] , 
T 
J'(YT O~,Xr,U)= ~'~ L(Y, O~,x,,U). 
t=l 
The expectallon ~s taken with respect to U, and one obtains 
^ T+I Eoz [g(U) f,(Yr/Oi ,XT,U)J 
g (u) = Eo[g(U)/X T ,Y,; ] - 
Eo2 [ f*(YT /O1,XT ,U)] 
the expectation of g(U) for the posterior dlsmbution of U. Replacing 01 and 0 2 by 
their esnmat~ons m the heterogeneous model, we obtain the a posterion premmm 
~T+I  
Y+l = h66 ' (X r+l )EbIg(U)/ XT, Yr ], 
computed for period T+I It can be written as 
( ) ~[g(U)/x,  .... XT;y , .... YT] 
hi, (XT+ ~)EO: [g(U)] x E~, [g(U)] 
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The first term is an a priori prelnlum, based on the rating factors of the current period. 
The second one ~s a bonus-malus coefficient it appears as the ratio of two expecta- 
tions of the same variable, computed for prior and posterlol d~smbut~ons Owing to the 
equahty Eo[Eo(g(U)/X r ,Yr)] = Eo[g(U)] = Eo. [g(U)]. the rating is balanced. 
2.5 Bonus-malus for frequency of claims 
2.5.1 Theoretical results 
With the notanons of 2 2.1 and 2.4, we Wllte' Yt = nt, -rt = wt,  OI = f f  , 
R t = E(N,) = Atu, ho, (x,) = A t, g(u) = u; X r = (wt, • Wr), Yr = (hi.- , nr) .  The pos- 
terior distribution of U is a y(a+En, .a+EA, )  (see Dionne et al (1989. 1992)) 
Hence: 
T 
a+Ent  
Eo[U/wi,.. , wr.nl ..... nr I = ~r+l _ ,=IT (1) 
a+EAt  
t=l 
Replacing A t by ~t = exp(wt~) and a by t~ in equation (I) leads to the bonus-malus 
coefficient. There will be a frequency-bonus ff the estimator of ~r+l _ ! IS negative, or 
~t (n , -  ~,) is negam, e if the number-residual 
Considering in equation ( l)  that N, follows a Polsson dlsmbutlon, with a parame- 
ter A,u, /~' +' converges towards u when T goes to +~ The heterogeneity on number 
dlsmbutlons, which is not explained by the rating factors, IS hence revealed comple- 
tely with time. It may be interesting to investigate the distribution of bonus-malus 
coefficients on a portfoho of policyholders, as well as ItS tune evolunon (see secnon 
2 5.2 for empirical results) 
We exphc~t now the condition for existence of a bonus-malus system for frequen- 
cies On the working sample, and with the notanons in 2 2. I, one can write 
^ 0 . ^ Iogfo(y,/O, ..~,.u)-- E [n , , ( log  A,, + Iogu) -  ~, ,u-  ,og(n, ')] .  
! 
with A, = exp(w,&ll).  ~0 being the estimator of a m the a priori rating model With 
the notanons of 2 3. and wl lh  u ° = I ,  we obtain 
, es , :Z (n , , -~t , ) . s ,=En, , . L>O¢=~Enres~>En, ,  
? I I I 
nres, = ~.,,(n,, -~ , , )  IS the number-residual for policyholder ,, and n, = ~., ,i,, where 
is the number of clamas reported by this pohcyholder on all periods This condmon 
means that, considering the total number of clmms, its variance ~s superior to ~ts mean, 
the varmnce being calculated condmonally on the explanatory variables. This empiri- 
cal overd~sperston condition can be related to the theoretical overdlsperslon of Ihe 
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negauve bmomml model" if N, ~ P(X,U,),U, ~y(a,a)(wlth a=1/0.2) ,  one gets. 
V(N,) = A, + ~20.z >/l, = E(N,) 
A score test for nulhty of 0 .2 can be preformed from the Lagrange muhlpher 
L = (112)Z,(nres ~ -n, ) The prevmus remarks allow us to reject the nulhty of 0 .2 if 
'S large enough If the number of pohcyholders goes to infinity, {L = L / -~-(L)  
converges towards a N(O, 1) d,stnbut,on. One can prove that V(£)= I /2.~. , .~,  w,th 
.~, = Z ,~.  If ul_ a is the quantfle at the level I -e  of a N(O,I) d,strlbutlon, the null 
hypothe,qs 0.2 = 0 will be rejected at the level g ,f {c _> ul-e. 
Besides. the lagrangmn provides an esumator of the parameters. Starting from &o 
AO 
and 0.2 = 0 m the algorithm of the hkelihood maxHmsauon, one gets at the following 
Znres~-n, Z [(n, -,~,)'2 - n,] 
&l ^ .~ l  L =a°;0 .  2 - -=- - -  ' ' (2) 
I I 
step 
AI  
The estmnators ~ and 0.2 can be shown to be consistent for the negauve bmomml 
model (see Pmquet (1996b) for demonstrauons) 
2.5.2 Empi r i ca l  results 
From the sample described m 1.3, we obtain 
Z nres~ =Z (n , -  ~,)2 = 3709.24; Zn ,  = n = 3493, 
I I i 
and expm mnce rating is possible for frequencms Without explanatory variables (apart 
from total duratmn of observation for each policyholder), one obta,ns: 
~nres~ =3746 25 The sum of square of residuals decreases when explanatory 
variables are added, and the condmon for existence of a bonus-malus system ~s more 
restncuve when they are present. This ~s logical because they are a cause of heteroge- 
nmty on a pnon &stributmns 
Besides, £ j ,2  = 389 48, and the esumator of 0.2 gwen in (2) ts 
I 
Znres~-£n, 
6.2= L = , , ___216'24=0.555. 
~'(L) ~ ,~ 38948 
I 
As a comparison, the maxnnum hkehhood esnmauon for the negatwe bmomml model 
i~ 6 .2 = 0 576. The score test for nulhty of 0.2 ~s based on the ,,tausuc 
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Znres~-Zn,  
~t, = L _ , , 216.24 
and the null hypothesis is rejected Examples of bonus-malus coefficients derived 
from the credibility formula are developped m actuarial and econometric literature 
(see Lerndlre (1985), Dlonne et al (1989,1992)) 
Evolution throughout time of bonus-malus coefficients, as well as a postenorl pre- 
miums related to them, will be investigated for the risks related to frequency and 
average cost per claun We consider here a smmlated portfolio, derived from the wor- 
king sample In this portfolio, the characteristics of each policyholder m the sample 
are those of the first period, and we suppose that they remain unchanged If this as- 
sumptmn does not hold individually, it Is however plausible on the whole population 
Investigating the distribution of bonus-malus coefficients m the heterogeneous model, 
one can measure their d~spersmn on the portfoho by estimating thmr coeff|cmnt of 
varlauon after T years (see Pmquet (1996a)) Considering the frequencies, with the 
tariff structure obtained m 1.4 1 and ~.2 = 0 576, we obtain: 
TABLE l 
RFVF[ A I ION THROUGHOU I TIME OF HETEROGIzNIEITY RELATED TO NUMBER DISTRIBU I IONS 
Coefficients ofvarmnon (fiequency ofclaims) 
a pnon premmm 0372 
T= l T=5 T= I0 T=20 T=+~ 
bonus-malus coelficmnt 0 144 0 300 0 392 0 494 0 759 
a postenon prcmmm 0 41 I 0 515 0 590 0 673 0 891 
The coefficient of variation is a measure of the relative dispersion of bonus-malus 
coefficients and premiums Apart from the a priori premium, the elements of the pre- 
ceding table are an estimation of the expectation m the heterogeneous model. After 
nine years, the relative dispersion of the bonus-lnalus coeffmmnts exceeds that of the a 
priori premium. This means that, after nine years, the heterogeneity revealed by the 
observation of policyholders becomes more .nportant than that explained by the rating 
factors. 
2.6 Bonus-malus for average cost per claim (gamma distributions) 
2.6.1 Theoretical results 
With the notations in 2 .22 and 2.4, we can write: yt=(ctj)y=l, n,xt=z.t; 
R, =/:'(C~j) = d/(htu); 01 = (fl, d);he, (x,) = d/b, ;g(u) = l/u. The bonus-malus coeffi- 
cient on average cost per claim for period T+ / Is derived from the credlbdlty estimator 
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of IA¢ Since the a priori distribution of U is a )'(S,~), with a density proportional to 
#6 (u) = exp( -&0 u a-I , one gets: 
d(~n, )+S- I  
fa(u)x f.(YrlOi,XT,U)=exp((S + Z b,%)u)u , 
t,I 
nines a coefficient independent of u The posterior distribution of U is therefore a 
r(6 + a+ and: 
! I,J 
We have 
+ E btcq 
17 7 +' o u ,YT 
t 
Eo: (I / U) = ~ 1(6 - I) (we suppose # > I, a necessary condition for I/U to 
have a finite expectation) Omfinng the period index, and writing S T for the set of 
clanns reported by the policyholder during the first T periods, the bonus-malus coeffi- 
cient is 
E I .ms~ 
E I 
where we wrote: r /=(6 -1) /d .  E0(C j )=E02(d / (b ;U) )=(d /b j ) (S / (#- I ) ) .  The 
rating structure derived from (3) is obviously balanced. Writing E~(Ci )=~; ,  and 
cres 7 = E jeSr ( I -  (c;/g;)) the cost-residual for the policyholder, there wdl be a 
cost-bonus if the cost-residual is positive The bonus is then equal to 
4+ 2",#, 
l "t~-Sr - -  crew7 
;7 + ls,.I ;7 + lsTI 
The time evolution of the distribution of bonus-malus coefficients is investigated in
2 6 2 Considering the simulated portfoho defined ,n 2 5.2, the heterogeneity unex- 
plained by the rating factors is revealed more slowly for cost than for number distri- 
butions This is not surpr.smg, as far as no claim means no information on the cost 
distribut,on - -  if there is no correlation between the two heterogeneity components - -
whereas no claim generates frequency-bonus. 
Let us apply to this model the condition allowing experience rating. For the wor- 
king sample, we denote S, as the set of claims reported by the pohcyholder over the 
T, periods. One can write 
logf , (y , / /} ° x , ,u )= E(d° log  ^o + . , u -b , ;%u)  z , ,  
JeS, 
where z, does not depend on u With the notations of 2 3 and with u ° = I, we obtain: 
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l~cres~> 1 res, = ~ (~o _ bl j^ Oc~j ),"s, = n,d° ; L > O ¢::.~ - --~o 
j cS ,  n i d 
The total number of claims over the sample Is n, and crew, as the cost-residual for 
the policyholder t This residual is equal to 0 without claims, and otherwise. 
cres ,=~ jes, (l-(c~j/c,~))=~.z,,,,,,,,~les, crea,.~ , where ^ ° = d° //~,~ is the estimator for t h e c ~ ;  
of C O Now, we have'  E( I - (Co /E(Cu) ) )2=V(Co) /Ez (C , j )=  expectat ion 
CV2 ( CO ) = l / d, if C U - ~/( d,b~j ) The condition for existence of a bonus-malus sys- 
tem is hence related to the square of coefficients of variation 
2.6.2 Empi r i ca l  results 
Consldenng the working sample, one obtains' 
~ ores) = 1.092; ~0 = 0 82 I. 
n 7 
and experience rating for average cost of claims Is possible For the sample of policy- 
holders that reported claims, the maximum hkehhood estimators for the GB2 model 
are, 
~=3.620,  d=1 807 ,~=(6- I ) /d :1  45. 
The bonus (negative m case of malus) related to average cost pet claim is equal to 
cres , / (0  + ISrl) It remains equal to zero as long as there are no claims. After the first 
clama, ff we consider the cases where the ratio actual cost-predicted cost is equal, 
either to 0.5 or to 2, the related cost-residuals are equal to 0 5 and - I respectively The 
multlphcat|ve coefficient 1/(1 + ~) being equal to 0.408, we obtain a cost-bonus of 
20.4% in the first case. and a cost-malus of 40.8% m the second case This coefficient 
is mdependent of the period during which the claim occurs 
The distributions of bonus-malus coefficients and a postenorl premiums can be in- 
vestigated on the simulated portfolio defined m 2 5 2 With the tariff structures obtai- 
ned m I 4 I and 1 4.2 and ~ = 3 62, wc obtain (see Pmquet (1996a)) 
TABLE 2 
RI VELA rlCIN I t IROUGHOUT FIME Ob HETEROGIENEI I Y RFEI A FED TO COS [ DIS I RIB U I IONS 
Coefficients ofvarmtlon (expected cost per clam1) 
aprtonpremlum 0401 
T= l '1"=5 T= l0 T=20 T=+oo 
bonus-malus cocfficlcnl 0 128 0 268 0 356 0 453 0 786 
a postenort prcnuun~ () 42'7 0 504 0 568 0 648 () 937 
The relative dispersion of the bonus-malus coefficients exceeds the dispersion of the a 
priori premium after fourteen years Unexplained heterogeneity on cost distributions i
revealed more slowly than it was for numbers 
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2.7 Bonus-malus  for average cost per c la im ( log-normal  d istr ibut ions)  
2.7.1 Theoret ica l  results  
With  the notat ions in 2.2.2 and 2.4, we write y,=(Iogc,s)j= , ..... ;~ ,=z , ,  
logCts - N(ztfl+u,0" 2) ~ R, = E(Ctj) = exp(z, f l+u+(0"  2 /2) ) ,  0, = (fl,0"2), 
ho, (x~) = exp(ztfl  + (0 "2/2)); g(u) = exp(u).  The bonus-malus coeff ic ient is der ived 
from the credibi l ity estimator of exp(u). Now 
fa~(u)xf.(YT/O,,~,u)=exp-~ ~-+ u . . . .  ,,,, +<0"-s-~-/0"O) J J 
,ndependent from u We wrote "w =EL""  times a coeff icient 
Eo, (TLCT)= Z jess Eo, ( l °gC j ) ;$7  is the sel of c laims reported by the pohcyholder  
daring the T periods (Iazl = '"T), and the period ,ndex is omitted Hence, the poster,or 
distribution of U is 
(tlCT -- Eo, (TLCT ) I "~ 
U / ( XT , Y7 ) - N I - -  - - -  ¢ - Z~ - " 
J t, m/+(0" /0"u)  ( I /0"~)+(mT 10"2) 
The bonus-malus coefficient for period T+I is equal to 
[ Ic,'es T - ( tnTa~j  / 2) t E°Iexp(U)/XT'YTI-exp 7-7T-7=-~1----- , 
EO [exp(U)] (0''/0"[j)+tn T J 
writing lcres T = Zj~s, lores,, lcre.,j = logcs - EO, ( log%) .  
The condmon for existence of a bonus-malus ytem is easi ly interpretable with the 
log-normal model We have 
log f,~( y, lO l° ,x , ,u)  =-Z  ( l c re~"2;02  
j~S, 2 0"2 
plus terms that do not depend on u, with lcres,j = log(%) -  z,fl~ °. With u ° = 0 (see 
2 3), the existence condition is' 
JES, '1 I 
...'-,-o.2 .~o  - J.~o ~ Ic're~ u -n 0"2 > 0 
, ( 0",2 ) 0"2 ( 0"2 )" L ' k,~s, j 
AO AO 
= ~ lores,J, with a 2 the maximum hkeh- Now, m the a prior, rating model, no" 2 ,.J 
hood estnnator of 0"2. Experience rating is possible if 
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( )2 
2,  Zj~s, lcres,j - 2,.glcres,~ is positive, that is to say ,f 
Z ~lcres'glcre~'~>O 
i I n, >2 g,k~S, ,g~& 
This condition means that, for clmms related to policyholders having reported several 
of them, cost-resxduals have rather the same sign. If the first claim has a cost greater 
than its predlcUon, it will be the same on average for the following ones. 
One can prove that, if L ~s the lagranglan with respect o o 2 ,  we have 
Zn , (n ,  - I )  Z Zlc"es'j lores'' 
~.1  
^ ~ ' 
2( 0 .2 ) V(L) n,(n, - 1) 
1 
J '~- I  
and that o-u z IS an consistent estimator of o-t~ (see Pinquet (1996a)). It appears to be 
the average, for the pohcyholders having reported several clmms, of the product of 
residuals associated to couples of different claims 
2.7.2 Empirical results 
From the working sample, we obtain Z , /~ ,~2Zj  ~eS,4~lcres'j lcres,~ = 100 80, and 
experience rating is possible Hence 
A,  Z Z Icres,j lcres,, 
a~ ,/n,_>2j,~S, j~k _ 100 8_____..._0. _ 0. 171. 
2n , (n ,  - 1) 590 
! 
The nulhty of 0" 2 .s tested for with eL= L/~/-O(~= 2.86 The crlt,cal value for a 
one-sided test at a level of 5% is 1.645, and the null hypothesis is rejected The maxi- 
mum l ikel ihood estimators of o-2 and cr 2 m the heterogeneous model are: 
6.~ = 0 172, 6 .2 = 0.855. 
Bonus-malus coefficients can be computed from the examples considered with the 
gamma d~strlbut~ons (one clmm, and a ratio actual cost-expected cost equal to 0 5 or 
2) The residual associated to a claim is the logarithm of the latter ratio In the first 
case, the bonus-malus coefficient is equal to 
FlcresT-(t,,T6. ~/2)l F - Iog2-0 .086  
exp 7-:-3 ~ . . . .  exp . . . . .  l 
and ~s associated to a cost-bonus of 12 2% In the second case, the bonus-malus coef- 
ficient is equal to 1 107, and unphes a cost-malus of 10 7% These results can be com- 
pared with 20 4% and 40.8%, the bonl and mah derived from the gamma distributions, 
although the ratios actual cost-expected cost are different m the two models. They 
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must be different, smce the cost-residuals in the gamma and log-normal models are 
equal to 1 - (% " ^  s,~,n,n~, :2,: Iog-,,o,,,,,,t ) /c,: ) and Iog(c v / respectively, whereas they fulfill 
the same orthogonahty relatmns with respect o the covarlates. 
Considering the simulated portfolio defined in 2.5.2, the heterogeneity on cost 
distributions that is unexplained by the a priori rating model as more tmportant for 
gamma than for log-normal dasmbutaons This can be seen by comparmg the llmats of 
the coefficients of varlat~on for the bonus-malus coefficients, as we did m sections 
2 5 2 and 2 6 2 For the GB2 model, this limit is the coefficient of variation 
of 1/U,U-7(6.6)  (see Pinquet (1996a)) With ~=3.62 ,  it is equal to 
I /x /~-  2 = 0 786 Considermg the log-normal model, the hmH is the coefficient of 
varaatlon ofexp (U), U - N(0,o-~) 
With O't~ : 0.172. ,t Is equal to ~exp(OZu) - 1 = 0 433. 
This result can be related to a comparison between the two a prtori rating models 
If Fo,..r~ is the contmuous dlsti lbunon functmn of Y: (here equal to the cost of 
the clmm j, or ats logarithm) ej =Fo,., (Yj) is uniformly distributed on [0,11 
= (Yj) and rearranging ej in the mcreaslng Computing the residuals ej, ej l~,,.b , 
order ,  by ec~ )<.  <el,,), we der ive the Komolgorov-Sm~rnov  statastlc 
KS = ~n max izj_<,, I ( j /n ) -  e(:)l We obtam KS=2 83 (resp KS= 1.04) for the gamma 
(resp log-normal) d~strabut,on famdy. The latter famdy seems to fit the data better 
than the gamma family, and wall be retamed for the bonus-malus ystem on pure 
prem|um 
The two last results can be related to each other, there as more unexplained hetero- 
geneity for gamma than for log-normal d~smbuuons, and the latter provide a better fit 
to the data Thts fact r i ses  a question: ~s apparent heterogeneity only explamed by 
h~dden reformation, or can it be also explained by the fact that the model does not 
make the best use of observable mformat~on'~ 
3 BONUS-MALUS FOR PURE PREMIUM 
3.1 The heterogeneous model 
From the preceding results, we shall retam log-normal rather than gamma &strlbutlons 
for costs Besides, they are better integrated in a heterogeneous model with a jomt 
dlstrlbutmn for the two heterogeneaty components related to the number and cost dls- 
mbutJons We retam here a bivanate normal distribution The parameters of the rela- 
ted heterogeneous model can be eStllnated consastently, although the likelihood is not 
analytically tractable 
A way to derive consistent estimators for heterogeneous models is proposed in Pan- 
quet (1996b) It is based on the properties of extremal estimators, the maxnnum hkeh- 
hood estimator bemg of this type. The estlmators of the parameters of the a priori 
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rating model have a hmlt ~f the actual d~stnbut~ons include heterogeneity, and this 
hm~t is tractable m the model investigated here Consistent estimators are then obtm- 
ned from a method of moments using the scores w~th respect o the varmnces and the 
covanances ol the heterogeneity components 
The heterogeneous model ~s hence composed of Pmsson d~stnbutlons on numbers, 
log-normal d~strlbuttons on costs, and of bwarlate normal distributions for the two 
heterogeneHy components. The notations are the following. 
• The distr ibutions condmonal  on tin, and u,, ,  the heterogeneity components for 
number and cost distributions of the pohcyholder t, are 
N,t - P(  ~,t exp(u,,,  )), log C,t J = z,tfl  + e, j  + u,.,, with 
~,, = exp(w,,a), e,/ ~ N(0,cy2), t = 1 . . . .  T , ' j  = I, ,n,, 
• In the heterogeneous model, U,,, and U,, follow a bwarlate normal distribution 
with a null expectation and a varmnce qual to 
The parameters of the model are 
01= ,02= V~n 
0.2 Vc c 
Bonus-malus coefficients are computed m the heterogeneous model from the ex- 
presslon given m section 2.4 
E~lg(U) / .~ , YT I 
Eb " [g(U)l 
We can write. 
_ (4) 
• g(u, , ,u, . )  = exp(u,,) for frequency 
• g(u, , .u~) = exp(u, ) for average cost per claun 
• g(u, , ,u,  ) = exp(u,, + u, ) for pure premmm, 
because the expectahons of N r, Crj and TC t are re~pectwely proporuonal to exp(u,, ), 
exp(u, ) and exp(u,, + u, ), ff computed condmonal ly  on it,, and u, The mathemahcal 
expectations that lead to the bonus-malus coefficients (see equation (4)) can be esti- 
mated ff we can write U = fo,  (S) ,  where the d~stnbuuon of S is independent from 0 2 
it ~s enough to s~mulate outcomes of S Such an expressmn can be obtained by wrmng 
the Choleskl decomposmon of the varmnces-covanances matrix, i e. 
. . . .  
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One can write for the pohcyholder 
(/ U,,, = T~oS, ; S, = S, ~ N(O, 12), U, = Uc, Sc ' . 
and we have U, = J02($1). q9 being related to V, hence to 0 2. The hkehhood used m 
the bonus-malus expression (see equation (4)) is obtained as the product of the hkell- 
hoods related to numnbers and costs With the notations of 2 4, we have 
Iogf.(YT /O] .~ ,U)= 
X/  = (x  i , . ,  x T); X, = (w, ,  Z, ), Yr = (Yi .... Y r),  Y, = (n, ,  (%)s : l ,  ,,, ), 
plus terms that do not depend on the heterogeneity components Replacing 01 by O i . 
we obtam 
f~(Yr/Oi ,X  t ,U) = exp(Vr) xterms independent from U, with 
VT=_l~t ft,)exp(U,,)+tnTU,, tnrU~-2U, lcre"T 
26_2 (5) 
A bonus-malus coefficient for a policyholder and for the period T+I depends then on: 
• Z '~1, which is proportional to the frequency premmm of the pohcyholder on all 
I 
periods This premium is equal to 
E(TNT)= Z~t  L'[exp(U,)]= A.t exp = X, exp . 
t 
• m T, the number of clauns reported by the policyholder dunng the T periods 
• lcres I , the sum of residuals on the logarithm of costs of clamls reported by the 
policyholder it represents their lelauve seventy. 
From equation (4), bonus-malus coefficients on frequency, expected cost per claim. 
and pure premmm are respecttvely equal to 
~;[exp(U,, + V# )] ~'[exp(U,. + V/)l E[exp(U,,+U, +VT)I 
E[exp(U,,)]/:[exp(Vr)]'  Elexp(U, )l EIexp(V7 )1" L'[exp(U,, +U, )] E[exp(VT)]" 
The coefficients are estmlated by smaulations of outcomes of S,, and S,. For instance, 
we refer that the estimated covariance 
Co1"~(exp(U,,) exp(V,! '1 
Elexp(U,,)l ' E[exp(V t )l) 
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is a frequency-malus The existence of born and mall for the different risks can be 
interpreted through the sign of estimated covariances 
The a postenon premium is obtained by the expression given in section 2 4 
E~[g( U) / XT,YT ] 
The first term is the a priori premium It is an estimation of 
~T+iexp(zT+lfl,E[exp(U,,+U,)l=exp(wT+lO~+ZT+l/3+(q)'"'+q)c")2+Cp'2~ 1 
2 
because U ,, + U, = ( q~ ,,,, + q~ ,,, ) S,, + ¢Pc, S~ . 
Bes,des. (~o,,,, "F~0~n) 2 +q22c = Vnn +2gtn + gcc. 
We should have consistent estimators for the parameters, m older to derive bonus- 
malus coefficients. A method to obtain such esumators was quoted m the introduction. 
When applied to the preceding model, it leads to the following results 
We write &0 flo, 0. 2 the estmmtors of the paratneters In the a priori rating model, and 
: : Z ,  >.  rLc, = = Z,,,,,.,,,D o 
The variances and covarlances of the two heterogeneity components are consls- 
tently estimated by: 
V,,,, = log(l + V~,,). V,I,, = 
t 
tic, - t ic ,  )2 -n ,  0 .2 
(6) 
Consistent esumators of ~p.,,. ~0c, , and (p,, are given by the solutions of the equation 
T~T~ = V 
The estimators of ~0 are used in the computation of bonus-malus coefficients, remem- 
ber that U, = T¢S, (S, - N(O, / 2)), and that the coefficients are estimated through ~l- 
mulations of outcomes of S,. As for the parameters of the a prion rating model, they 
are consistently estimated by 
=d~ ° V'"' e k ° ~ t-.o ^ - -~-  n.,. D : - ~ , ,e~. .  0-- : G 2 -V .  (7) 
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The intercepts are supposed to be the first of the k,, and k C explanatory variables for 
the number and cost distributions, and e, L (resp enl) are the first vectors of the ca- 
nonical base of N~" (resp IR ~) 
3.2 Empirical results 
The numer,cal results Z ,  (n, - ~,)2 _ n, = 216.24; Z ,  ~'~ = 389 48. already used for 
bonus-malus on frequencies, lead to. 
( . ,  _ ~,  )2 _ ,,, 
I),,l, , - ' : 0.555.1),,,, : l og( l+  ~],,) :0  442 ::::* ~b,,,, =~, , ,  :0665  
i 
In this paper, two dlstnbutmn famihes are considered for the heterogeneity component 
related to numbers We first took into account he gamma, and now the log-normal 
family (writing the heterogeneity component m a muluplicauve way) 
Considering an insurance contract without clmms, we can compare the born derived 
from the two models The sum Z , i ,  being the cumulated frequency premmm in the 
negauve bmonllal model, the bonus for the pohcyholder ]sequal to 
a C,Z,,i, 
- 
a+Z,x, a+,y..,i, i+(<,,y..,x,) 
For the log-normal tamdy, the bonus can be written as 
-Co"'v( exp(U,,) exp(V r) ),U,=q),,,,S,,,Vr=_Z ~,exp(U,,) ' 
L E[exp(U,,)] ' E[exp(V 7)l 
with S,, ~ N(O,I) With the values ol q],, and (b,,,, computed precendently, one ob- 
tains for example 
TABLE 3 
COMPARISON OF FREQUENCY-BONUS COEFFICIENTS 1 OR I ',~, O DIS I RIBUTIONS ON THE 
HETEROGLNLI'I Y COMPONENT (CONTRAC'I S WITIIOUT CLAIMS RI.POR [ ED) 
f requency premium 0.05 0.l  0.2 0.5 1 2 
bonus (c~, gamma dlstrtbutmns) 2 7 5 3 10 21 7 35 7 52 6 
bonus, (~,  Iog-nonlml dJ~,lrlbutlon~) 2 6 5 I 9 4 19 3 30 "~ 43 6 
The born derived from log-normal dlstnbuuons on the heterogeneity component are 
Iowm than those derived from the gamma distributions. The difference Is all the more 
mlportant since the frequency prennunl is high 
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Let us estimate the covanance between the two heterogeneity components' 
0,, - ~, )~tlc, - t ic,  ) 
--~(n, - -it,)(tic, -tie,) = 7.96 ~ ~,, - ' = 0 013. 
One can think of relating a positive or negahve sign of the covarmnce to the fact that 
the average cost per clmm increases or decreases with the number of clmms reported 
by the policyholder To see this, suppose that the duration of observation is the same 
for all the policyholders, and that the intercept is the only explanatory variable for 
number and cost dlstnbutlons We would then have 
~, = fi, tic, = n, logc ~ Z(n,-~,)(tlc,-t[c,)= £(n ,  - f i )n , ( I - -~ '  - logc) = 
I I 
- i ) , ,  - c ) .  because  , ,  - l og  , )  = O. 
I /n j>2 I 
We wrote logc' for the logarithms of costs of claims reported by the pohcyholder i, 
computed on average. The estimator of the covariance would be positive if the average 
of the logarithms of costs of claims related to the policyholders that reported several of 
them was superior to the global mean 
On the working sample, the number of clam~s reported by the policyholder had lit- 
tle influence on the average cost 
The preceding results justify the allowance for a non constant number of periods 
related to the observation of pohcyholders To see th,s, we relnark that the more seve- 
re ~s a clmm, the greater ~s the plobablhty to change the vehlcule afterwards. Hence, 
there is less severity on average for several clmms reported on the same car If pohcy- 
holders were not kept ]n the sample after changing cars, a negative bias would appear 
m the estmmuon of the correlation coefficient between the heterogeneity components. 
Now, keep,rig the pol,cyholder ,n the salnple as long as possible leads us to consider a
non constant numbei of periods. 
When computing bonus-malus coefficients for average cost per clmm, we used (see 
272)  
-I1, ~2 = Z Z&re% Icres'~ 100 80 
t I1,,I, )2  j I~S , . j# I  
A bonus-malus system for average cost per clmm can be considered if the observation 
of the ratm actual cost-expected cost |or a clmm brings mformatmn for the following 
claims. If the last expression is posmve, the cost residuals of claims related to pohcy- 
holders having reported several of them have rather the same s~gn The relative se- 
verity of a claim is assocmted to the sign of the residual, and it may be interesting to 
compare the sign of residuals for claims related to pohcyholders having reported two 
of them. 
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Considering the working sample, we obtain 
number of pohcyholders negative residual posmve residual 
having reported two clmms (second claim) (second clmm) 
negative resIdual 
(first clmm) 74 46 
posmve residual 
(first claun) 36 70 
The sign of the residual does not change for 64% of pohcyholders having reported two 
clmms 
From eqmmon (6), we infer 
7~ At l  
Z (tic,-tic,) ~ -n, (y2 
VLc - -  t 
^ 
~2,, = 0 166, and ;,,, = V,,, _ = 0 048 
The correlatmn coeffioent between the heterogeneity components i posmve, but 
close to zero Hence 
,, = tp,,,,~,, ::~ q3o, = 0.020, q,. = q3,~,, + ~ :::> q3,~ = 0 407 
The born for average cost per clmm and pure premmm for the contracts without claims 
can be computed, and results can be compared to those obtained ['or frequency. From 
the expressions 
E[exp(U,.)] E[exp(VT)l ' I E[exp(U,,+U,.)l'E[exp(Vr)l ) 
we obtam 
TABLE 4 
BONI FOR AVERAGE COST PER CLAIM AND PURl. PREMIUM (CON I RA( I S WITHOUT CLAIM REPORTED 
frequency premium 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 
averageco~tperelmmbonu~(~) 0 I 0 I 02 05 09 15 
pure premtum bonus (%) 27 5 3 97 19 9 31 2 44 7 
Because of the pos,tlve correlation between the two heterogeneity components, a cost- 
bonus appears m the absence of cla,ms, but ~t ~s very low. 
We now compute bonus-malus coefficients for policyholders that reported one 
claim They are a funcuon of the cost-residual Icres7 = log(q ) -  :1/3 ( cl Is the cost of 
the clam1, and z I represents the pollcyholder's characteristics when the claim oceu- 
red), and of the frequency premmm From equations (5) and (7), we have 
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U~ 2 - 2 Uc lc res  r 
V7 = -Z  A' exp(Un ) + Un 2d.2 
! 
E l c res~ 
^~ ~.0 ^ ,;  3588 
¢7-=cr  2 -Vcc  - '' j v c - 0.166=0.861 ( 
n 3493 
We recall that the bonus-malus coefflclents on frequency, expected cost per claim and 
pure premium are respectwely equal to 
Elexp(U n + VT)] E[exp(U( + V 7 )1 E[exp(U n + U c + Vr) ] 
• ^ 
E[exp(U,,)] ~:[exp(Vr)] ' E[exp(Uc)] E[exp(Vr) ] ' E'[exp(U,, + Uc)] E[exp(Vr)] " 
We obtain for example (the bonus-malus coefficients are given in percentage) 
TABLE 5 
BONUS-MALUS COEFrICIEN'TS (POLICYHOLDERS HAVING REPORTED ONE CLAIM) 
frequency coefficient frequency premium 
l o res  7 0.05 O. I 0.2 0.5 1 2 
-I 1474 142 I 133 1 1139 945 734 
-0 5 148 4 143 133 8 114 5 95 73 7 
0 149 3 143 7 134 6 115 95 3 74 
05 150 I 1446 1353 1156 957 743 
I 151 145 6 136 116 I 96 2 74 6 
average  cost  per  claim coefficient frequency premium 
l c res  T 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 I 2 
- I 84 8 84 7 84 6 84 3 84 83 5 
-05 92 919 91 7 914 91 905 
0 997 99 6 99 5 99 I 98 7 98 I 
0 5 108 I 108 107 8 107 5 107 106 4 
I 117 I 117 1169 1165 116 1154 
pure  premium coefficien! frequency premium 
I c re  s 7 0.05 O. i 0.2 0.5 1 2 
-I 1246 120 1122 956 789 609 
-05 136 1 131 1223 1042 86 663 
0 1484 1427 1333 1135 935 722 
0 5 161 8 155 7 145 4 123 7 101 9 78 5 
I 1766 170 1584 1347 II I  854 
Because of the positive correlauon between the two heterogeneity components, the 
frequency coefficients increase with the cost-residual, which is related to the severity 
of the claim In the same way, the coefficients related to average cost per clmm decre- 
ase with the frequency premmm, but these variatmns are very low Because of the 
correlation, the coefficients related to pure premmm are not equal to the product of the 
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coeff ic ients for frequency and expected cost per clatm. Here also, di f ferences are very 
low 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We recall the mare results obtained m this paper 
• The unexpla ined heterogenei ty  with respect to the cost d lstr ibuttons depends  
strongly on the choice of  the distribution famdy. 
• Besides, it is revealed more slowly throughout ttme than for number distributions 
• On the working sample, the correlanon between the heterogeneity components  on 
the number and cost distributions i very low. 
In the long run, It would be destrable to relax the assumption of  lnvanance of  the hete- 
rogeneity components  with respect o t ime Because of this, mvariance,  the age of  
claims has no influence on the bonus-malus coeff ic ients Now, the fact that an ancient 
claim has the same influence on the coeff ic ients that a recent one is questionable. The 
al lowance for an mnovatton at each period for the heterogeneity components  would 
raise new problems, and would make ~t necessary to observe pohcyholders on many 
periods. 
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ALLOWANCE FOR THE AGE OF CLAIMS 
IN BONUS-MALUS SYSTEMS* 
BY 
JEAN PINQUET 1, MONTSERRAT GUILLl~N 2, CATALINA BOLANCI~ 2 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the paper is to use the age of claims in the prediction of risks. 
A dynamic random effects model on longitudinal count data is presen- 
ted, and estimated on the portfolio of a major Spanish insurance company. 
The estimated autocorrelation coefficients of stationary random effects are 
decreasing. A consequence is that the predictive ability of a claim decreases 
with the lag between the period of risk prediction and the period of occur- 
rence. There is a wide gap between the long term properties of actuarial and 
real-world experience rating schemes. This gap can be partly filled if the age 
of claims is taken into account in the actuarial model. 
KEYWORDS 
Time-independent and dynamic random effects. Autocorrelation function for 
stationary random effects. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of the paper is to use the age of claims in the prediction of risks. 
This issue has already been addressed in the actuarial iterature. Solutions 
are obtained from credibility models which can be updated (Gerber, Jones 
(1975)), and from credibility estimators with geometric weights (Sundt 
(1988)). 
The rating models presented in this paper are obtained ~tfter statistical 
inference on longitudinal count data. Let us first clarify the reasons which 
lead to question the assumption of time-independence for the random effects. 
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Hidden features of risk distributions vary with time, as do rating factors. 
The random effects added in an a priori rating model on longitudinal data 
should then be dynamic. Variations of rating factors between two dates 
should increase with the related lag, and the same result is expected for 
hidden features in risk distributions. Hence the predictive ability of a claim 
should decrease with the lag between the period of risk prediction and the 
period of occurrence. A stationary process for the random effects will relate 
the predictive power of claims to this lag. If the preceding intuition is veri- 
fied, the estimated autocorrelation function of the random effects should be 
decreasing, a point already mentioned by Sundt (1988). 
In Section 2, we present different Poisson models with random effects. 
The variance of a time-independent random effect can be estimated from 
disaggregated data or from numbers of claims and frequency premiums which 
are summed across the periods. If the estimated variance obtained from dis- 
aggregated data is greater than the second one, the estimation of distributions 
for dynamic random effects can be considered. This condition is verified on 
our data set, which is drawn from the portfolio of a major Spanish insurance 
company. 
An unconstrained autocorrelation function for dynamic random effects is 
then estimated from a Poisson model with regression components. For each 
lag, the corresponding autocorrelation is estimated from paired off products 
of lagged number-residuals and frequency-premiums. The autocorrelation 
function obtained in the empirical study decreases, but more slowly than a 
geometric one. 
Optimal bonus-malus systems designed from a linear credibility approach 
are presented in Section 3 from the random effects models developed in 
Section 2. 
In Section 4, we assess the consequences of a varying autocorrelation 
specification for the random effects on the dynamic of bonus-malus coeffi- 
cients. An optimal bonus-malus system (later referred to as BMS) designed 
from a model with dynamic random effects and a decreasing autocorrelation 
function will behave in the following way. The no-claim discounts induced 
by a claimless year are lower than those obtained from the usual credibility 
model for a policyholder with a faultless history, but they are higher if claims 
were reported recently. The explanation is the same in both cases. The credi- 
bility granted to a given period of the past decreases rapidly as time goes 
by, due to the increase of risk exposure but mostly to the decrease in the auto- 
correlation coefficients. 
Actuarial and real-world BMS differ with respect o the dynamic of bonus- 
malus coefficients. For example, the duration of a claimless history needed 
to offset the malus induced by a claim at fault is longer for actuarial than for 
real-life BMS. The aforementioned properties of the BMS with dynamic ran- 
dom effects allow us to reduce this difference. 
Increases in premiums induced by claims from the different BMS are 
not very different in the empirical study. On the whole, an optimal BMS 
derived from a Poisson model with dynamic random effects eems acceptable 
to policyholders, if the estimated correlogram is decreasing. Besides, it would 
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entail strong incentives to careful driving for the drivers who reported a claim 
recently. 
Another difference is that an optimal BMS designed from rating models 
with dynamic random effects reaches its limit faster than the usual ones. 
Besides, total credibility does not converge towards one, which entails a lower 
dispersion for the bonus-malus coefficients. In real-life situations, the disper- 
sion of bonus-malus coefficients is much lower than what is obtained from 
actuarial models. Allowing for the age of claims in an optimal BMS reduces 
the dispersion of the bonus-malus coefficients. 
Finally, the applicability of the results obtained in the paper is briefly dis- 
cussed in Section 5. A possibly useful result for practitioners i the following. 
An optimal BMS estimated from short histories and applied to a longer dura- 
tion will overestimate he individual credibilities. This result occurs if the auto- 
correlation function of the random effects decreases with the lag. Hence, 
attention should be paid to the link between the length of the histories used 
in risk assessment and the duration of application of the BMS. 
2. MOMENT-BASED ESTIMATORS FOR LONGITUDINAL COUNT DATA 
2.1. Two estimators for the variance of a time-independent random effect 
Let us consider a portfolio composed of p policyholders. If we have an unbal- 
anced panel data set, the policyholder i is observed uring 7",. periods, with 
1 < T~ < Tmax. If n~.t is the number of claims reported by the policyholder i in 
period t, the distributions retained for the frequency risk model are mixtures 
of Poisson distributions. Their likelihood is equal to 
L(ni, t)l<~<r, = E P,~,.,vi(ni, t) , withP~(n) = exp(-2) -n- T . 
The expectation is taken with respect o the random effect Ui, and the coeffi- 
cients 2i. t depend on regression components (represented by a line-vector xi, t) 
and on the duration of the period d,, t. We write 
2i, t = di, t exp(xi, ta); a ~ R k, 
where a is a column-vector of parameters and where k is the number of 
regression components. The random effects (Ui)i=l,...p are assumed i.i.d., 
and the two first moments are 
E(U i )  = 1; V(Ui)  = a 2. 
Within a semiparametric approach, we do not completely specify the distri- 
butions of the random effects. Estimators and predictors are obtained from 
second order moments of the random effects and from the maximum like- 
lihood estimation of the Poisson model with regression components and 
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without random effects. Let us denote the cumulated number of claims and 
frequency risk for the policyholder i as n; = ~F' 1 rti t and 2g T, : , =~-]t=l,~i,t. TWO 
2 consistent estimators of at: can be retained, which are 
"~1 i~t [(ni ' t -~i 't)2-Fl i ' t  ] "~2 2 ~ai(l'li--~i)2--1"li 
at: = ^~ ; at: = , (1) 
l, l 
where "2i. t and ~i are the frequency-premiums computed from likelihood max- 
imization in the Poisson model without random effects. These two estima- 
tors are unbiased, and the second estimator should be preferred because its 
variance is lower. The intuition is that this estimator uses more information. 
Besides, a/: reflects a short term predictive ability of the claims. It should be 
greater than an estimator based on longer durations if the predictive ability of 
claims decreases with their age. The inequality 
0<a~ <a~ 
is fulfilled on our data set (see Section 4). It is a necessary condition for the esti- 
mation of simple dynamic random effects pecifications ( ee Pinquet, Guill6n, 
Bolanc6 (2000)). 
2.2. A Poisson model with dynamic random effects 
We now replace the time-independent random effect U~ by a dynamic random 
effect Ui.t. The likelihood of the random effects model is equal to 
L(ni, t)l<_t<_T,=E ,,,u,,,(ni, t • 
As mentioned in the introduction, the time-dependence assumption for the 
random effects is natural. Two assumptions are retained on the random 
effects, which are the following. 
The distribution of vec (Ui t) depends only on T/. 
l<_t<_T~ . 
If the distribution of vec (U i t )  is that of vec (Ut )  the distribution of 
l<t<_T, " l<t~T, 
vec (Ut )  is supposed to be stationary. This invariance assumption with 
l_<t <Tmax 
respect o time translations means that the predictive ability of a claim 
will depend on the lag between the period of risk prediction and the 
period of occurrence. We suppose that the squared random effects are inte- 
grable. 
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The covariances and autocorrelation coefficients for the random effects are 
denoted as 
Cov(Ut, Ut_h)= pu(h)~r2; O <-h < t < Tmax, 
with: -1 _< pv(h) <- 1;pu(O) = 1. 
From the moment equations derived in the random effects model 
E (Ni.t-2i, t )a-Ni , , - i . t%l=O; 
El ~ Z (Ni, t-~i,t)(Ni, t-h-l~i,t-h)-I~i, tl~i,t-hcT2pu(h)l:O, 
[ilTi h T~>_t>h (O<h<Tmax) 
(2) 
we obtain consistent moment-based stimators for a, o -2 and (pv(h))0<h<Tma, 
The empirical counterpart of the moment equation related to a leads to 
Z (n,,t- "2i.,) 'xi,, = 0,2i, t = di,, exp(xi, t'a). (3) 
i.t 
Hence, the maximum likelihood estimator of a in the Poisson model without 
random effects (i.e. the a priori rating model) is a consistent estimator of a in 
the model with random effects. From the second moment equation, a consis- 
-21 
tent estimator of o-~ is av (see (1)). Finally, the estimated correlogram of U is 
obtained from 
Z Z (ni, t-'~i,t)(ni, t-h-~i,t-h) 
"~ I i l r ,>h  r ,>_t>h ^ ^ (4) 
a U pu(h)- Z Z /~i,t~i,t-h 
iIT~>h Ti>-t>h 
for 0 < h < Tma x. All these estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal. 
They are given in Zeger (1988), along with modified estimators which use 
weights related to overdispersion and autocorrelation i  the regression in order 
to reduce the asymptotic variance. 
3. LINEAR CREDIBILITY PREDICTORS DERIVED 
FROM THE PRECEDING MODELS 
Let (nt) 1_< t_< r_< Tmax be the history of claims recorded on an insurance contract 
(we suppress the individual index in order to simplify the notations). A linear 
credibility predictor (Bfihlmann (1967)) for period T+ 1 is obtained from a 
342 J EAN P INQUET.  MONTSERRAT GUILLEN AND CATAL INA BOLANCE 
regression derived in the model with random effects. The predictor is equal to 
"d + ~7r,=1 "btnt, with 
(a, bl,.-.,br) =arg min E Ur+l -a -  b,N, 
a,(b, )t=l, ..., r ' 
where the expectation is estimated in the random effects model. 
A linear predictor of the type ff + b (~,  nt)is obtained from an expected value 
principle with the negative binomial m~del (see Lemaire (1985), and Dionne, 
Vanasse (1989)). The purpose of the paper is to obtain time-dependent coef- 
ficients in the linear combination. The intuition is that b t should decrease with 
the age of the period t. 
Since E(UT+1) = 1, we have a+ ~.T=l'btff,(Nt)= 1. Now 2t, the frequency 
premium derived from likelihood maximization i  the a priori rating model, 
converges towards the frequency risk E(Nt) computed in the model with ran- 
dom effects (see the comments following equation (3)). Then we have 
T A T 
a + ~,,btnt : l + ~,,bt(nt-'2t ), with 
t= l  t= l  
(bt)t:l ..... w=arg min ~" UT+l-~,,btNt : [~r (N) ] - I~ov(N,  UT+I ) .  
(be)t:l, .., T t= l  
We write N= vec (Nt). From the consistent estimators given in Section 2.2, 
l<t<_T 
the estimators of the individual moments of interest are 
h 1 
~'(N,) ~+¢y2 "2~;C~v(Nt,Nr) ^ ^  A2'A ' = = 2, 2,,, % pv  ( I t -  t [) (t :/: t'); 
^ ~'-2 1 
Cov(Nt, UT+I) = 2ta v pv(T+l-t) .  
The bonus-malus coefficient can be written as 
1- credt + ~, credt nt 
= tM A t 
A 
where (cred,= b,2t)t= i ..... v are the credibility coefficients, which are the solu- 
tions of the linear system with t = 1 ..... T equations 
cred,+ Xt ~-],a v pv(]t-t'J)credr=Rt~r U pv(T+ l-t). (5) 
t'#t 
This linear credibility system can be used with the unconstrained correlogram 
estimated in Section 2.2. 
ALLOWANCE FOR THE AGE OF CLA IMS IN BONUS-MALUS SYSTEMS 343 
Properties of the credibility coefficients derived from equation (5) are not 
simple to obtain in a general setting. If the frequency premiums are negligible 
with respect o one, we infer from this equation 
A ~'-2 1 ~ 
credt ~ 2ta v p~(T+l - t )  
A sequence of credibility coefficients should have the same shape as that of a 
correlogram with the same length and a reversed index. 
Total credibility does not converge to one when T goes to infinity if the 
autocorrelation function decreases rapidly, and the limit can be very inferior 
to one. Let us consider for example a Gaussian AR(1) process for the additive 
random effects Wt--log(Ut). With our data base, we obtain ~w(h) = 0.79 h 
(see Pinquet, Guill6n, Bolanc6 (2000) for details related to the estimation). 
The total credibility for an average risk (~, --0.09 Vt) converges towards 0.214 
when T converges towards infinity. This limit is obtained in round figures after 
twenty years. It corresponds to the maximum bonus applied to the a priori 
frequency premium of a policyholder with a claimless history. 
Simple updating formulas do not seem to be available for the credibility 
coefficients. Gerber and Jones (1975) prove that linear updating formulas exist 
under conditions which differ from the stationarity assumption retained in 
this paper for the random effects. 
4. EMPIR ICAL  RESULTS 
4.1. The data set 
The working sample represents en per cent of the portfolio of a major Span- 
ish insurance company. We selected only policies covering cars for private use. 
The durations of individual histories range from one to seven years, hence 
Tma x --- 7 with the notations of the paper. Policyholders were observed between 
1991 and 1997, and indicators of the calendar years are part of the regression 
components in order to allow for a trend in the past (see Besson, Partrat 
(1992) for optimal BMS with a trend). The other rating factors retained in the 
regression are the gender, the geographical rea, the age of the driving licence, 
the seniority and age of the policyholder, the coverage level and the power of 
the vehicle. 
In order to have similar rates of arrival and attrition in the working sam- 
ple and in the portfolio, we selected the policyholders in the following way. 
Ten per cent of the policyholders present in 1991 were selected at random, 
and kept in the working sample as long as possible. Ten per cent of the new- 
comers in 1992 were included in the working sample, and so on. The size of 
the working sample increases from 120000 in 1991 to 200000 in 1997 (in round 
figures). The attrition rate varies between 8.5% and 10%. The working sample 
is an unbalanced panel data set which is composed of 269388 policyholders 
and of 1172701 periods. The average frequency of claims at fault per year is 
equal to 0.09. All the period durations are equal to one year, which means 
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that the characteristics of the policyholders are known only at each anniver- 
sary date. This inaccuracy in the observation of the regression components i  
of no consequence in our opinion. 
4.2. Estimators for the correlogram of the random effects 
The two consistent estimators quoted in Section 2.1 for the variance of a time- 
independent random effect are respectively 
A 2 1 Z i ,  t(I'li, t--~i, t) 2-?li't 118554.78--105655 
= = 1.269. 
° 'v -  /,X--~ i ~ 10167.12 
,t i,t 
"$2 Y~,i(ni-2i)2-ni _ 144879.33-105655 
- = 0.779. (6) 
O'U = Xi  X~2i 50359.14 
A2 "~1 
As expected in Section 2.1, we have o-~ < o- v . 
The correlogram of (Ut)l<t_< 6is estimated from equations (1) and (4). We obtain 
TABLE 1 
AUTOCORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
h (lag) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
P'v (h) 0.632 0.485 0.462 0.436 0.360 0.348 
The difference between Pv (1) and p v (0)= 1 reflects the loss of predictive abil- 
ity related to a claim after one year. Owing to the shape of the correlogram, 
the predictive ability of claims decreases with their age. The consequences are 
assessed in the following section. 
The moment-based estimators retained in this paper are unconstrained. 
For instance, the estimated autocorrelation coefficients are not bound to 
belong to [-1, 1]. This constraint is fulfilled by the preceding estimators, and 
a multivariate log-normal distribution for the (Ut) lzt<_ 6 can be matched with 
the values of Table 1 (see PinqueL Guill6n, Bolanc6 (2000) for more details 
and further discussion in case of misspecification). 
4.3. Experience rating from the different models 
In the following tables, credibility coefficients for the different periods are 
computed for an insurance contract with an average frequency premium, 
which is equal to 0.09 per year. Within a linear credibility approach, we use 
the Poisson models with random effects presented in Section 2. The next table 
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provides credibility coefficients computed from time-independent and dynamic 
random effects. The coefficients are computed for histories ranging from one 
to six years. We used the usual credibility formula for time-independent ran- 
dom effects, and the linear credibility system given in Section 3 for the other 
model. We estimated the variance of the time-independent random effect from 
the number of claims and frequency-premiums summed across the periods. 
"~2 "~1 
Hence, we retained av = 0.779 instead of a v = 1.269 (see equation (6)). 
Remember that a credibility coefficient is a bonus if no claim is reported. 
TABLE 2 
CREDIBILITY COEFFICIENTS FOR AN AVERAGE RISK (PERCENTAGE) 
DYNAMIC VS. TIME-INDEPENDENT RANDOM EFFECTS 
Duration Credibility per year (%) Total credibility (%) 
of histories dynamic random effects dynamic time-independent 
t=l t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 random effects random effects 
1 year 6.47 0 0 0 0 0 6.47 6.55 
2 years 4.57 6.17 0 0 0 0 10.74 12.29 
3 years 4.15 4.32 5.98 0 0 0 14.45 17.37 
4 years 3.74 3.94 4.14 5.83 0 0 17.65 21.89 
5 years 2.83 3.57 3.82 4.03 5.72 0 19.97 25.95 
6 years 2.66 2.68 3.46 3.71 3.94 5.65 22.10 29.60 
For a given duration of the individual history, the credibility coefficients of 
the last table decrease with the lag between the prediction period and the 
current period, as do the autocorrelation coefficients. For example, the cre- 
dibility given in Table 2 for the last year of a six years history outweighs 
the credibility of the two first years. Besides, total credibility (and hence the 
bonus applied to a claimless history) is lower if dynamic random effects are 
used in the rating model. 
Let us now perform an impulse-response analysis of the evolution of the 
bonus-malus coefficient if one claim is reported during the first year, and 
none during the years that follow. We compare the two BMS for a car with 
the average frequency premium. Bonus-malus coefficients are expressed as 
percentages. 
TABLE 3 
IMPULSE-RESPONSE ANALYSIS OF BONUS-COEFFICIENTS AFTER ONE CLAIM 
Years 1 2 3 4 5 6 
time-independent random effects 166.2 156 147 139 131.7 125.2 
dynamic random effects 165.5 140 131.7 123.8 111.4 107.5 
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The no-claim discounts are higher for the rating model with dynamic random 
effects. For instance, the discounts from period 1 to period 2 are equal to 6 
and 15 per cent in the two models. This important difference is due to the 
fact that claimless periods increase risk exposure but also the age of claims 
reported in the past. This property of the rating model with dynamic random 
effects can be related to some clauses found in real-life BMS, which provide 
important discounts for bad drivers with recent good behaviour. In France for 
instance, a driver with a bonus-malus coefficient greater than the coefficient 
applied to beginners (less than three percent of the drivers are concerned) is 
rated according to this coefficient after two consecutive claimless years. This 
feature of real-life or optimal BMS entails strong incentives to drive carefully 
for policyholders with a bad accident record. Notice that economic analysis 
suggests that optimal insurance contracts with moral hazard should penalize 
recent claims more than older ones (Henriet, Rochet (1986)). 
As shown in Table 3, the duration of a claimless history needed to offset the 
malus induced by a claim at fault is longer for an actuarial BMS designed from 
time-independent random effects than for the other BMS. If the frequency pre- 
mium per year is equal to 0.09, ten clairnless years are needed to offset he malus 
with the usual BMS. On the other hand, five claimless years are almost enough 
to obtain the same result if the other BMS is used. This duration is closer to 
those derived from real-life BMS, which range from three to five years in most 
cases (see Lemaire (1995) for a thorough description of compulsory BMS). 
Let us compare total credibility for longer durations. We need to extend 
the correlogram for higher values of the lag. A possible extension is derived 
from the Yule-Walker equations applied to the additive random effects Wt = 
log(Ut). If we assume that the past is summarized by the last six years for 
the random effects process, we obtain an AR(6) specification for the additive 
random effects. In that case, a parametric specification is needed in order to 
link the second order moments of the Wt with the corresponding moments of 
Ut. A multivariate Gaussian distribution for the additive random effects can 
be considered (see Pinquet, Guill6n, Bolanc6 (2000) for more details). With an 
average risk and from the correlogram given in Table 1, we obtain 
TABLE 4 
LONG-TERM BEHAVIOUR OF TOTAL CREDIBILITY (PERCENTAGE) 
Duration of time-independent dynamic 
histories random effects random effects 
10 years 41.2 27.7 
20 years 58.4 32.6 
40 years 73.7 34.1 
The result obtained in the last column is striking. After almost a full life as a 
car driver, a policyholder with a claimless history obtains a frequency-bonus of 
only 34 per cent, which is about five times the bonus after the first year. 
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In the last table, we compare the dispersion of the bonus-malus coefficients 
derived from the two models. We derive the standard deviation of bonus- 
malus coefficients for different durations of the histories. Computations are 
performed in the two different random effects models for an individual with 
an average frequency risk. The autocorrelation function of the dynamic random 
effects is extended as indicated before Table 4. The variance of the bonus- 
malus coefficients are those of the linear regression which defines the linear 
credibility predictor, that is to say 
+ ) -1C-Tv(N, ) 
with the notations of Section 3. For different durations of the history, we obtain 
TABLE 5 
STANDARD DEVIATION OF BONUS-MALUS COEFFICIENTS 
duration of the history (years) 1 5 10 20 40 
time-independent random effects 0.226 0.450 0.567 0.674 0.758 
dynamic random effects 0.228 0.355 0.389 0.398 0.399 
In real-life situations, the dispersion of bonus-malus coefficients is much 
lower than what is obtained from actuarial models. For instance, the coeffi- 
cient of variation of the bonus-malus coefficients in Belgium was equal to 
0.154 in 1992 (see Lemaire (1995) for the distribution of bonus-malus coeffi- 
cients at that time). The standard eviation of bonus-malus coefficients in an 
actuarial BMS is also the coefficient of variation, due to the fairness property 
of these systems. The differences between actuarial and real-life BMS are lower 
if the age of claims is allowed for in the statistical model. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The main features of an optimal BMS derived from stationary random effects 
with a decreasing correlogram seem acceptable to policyholders. The no-claim 
discounts are lower for claimless drivers than those derived from the usual 
optimal BMS. On the other hand, they can be much higher for policyholders 
who reported claims recently. Such systems would entail strong incentives for 
these drivers to drive carefully. 
A useful result for the application of actuarial models is the following. If 
the autocorrelation between stationary random effects decreases with the lag, 
the variance of a time-independent random effect (estimated from aggregated 
numbers and frequency-premiums) will decrease with the average duration 
of the histories used in the estimation. For instance, the variance estimated 
from the observations of the first period is equal to 1.09, whereas the variance 
---2 2 
obtained from the full histories is equal to a U = 0.78 (see Section 4.2). In this 
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f ramework ,  an opt ima l  BMS est imated f rom short  histor ies and appl ied to a 
longer  durat ion  will overest imate the ind iv idual  credibi l it ies. This result  pro-  
vides a supp lementary  reason to use the whole h is tory  o f  the po l icyho lders  in 
the stat ist ical  analysis. 
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Abstract
This paper estimates and tests autoregressive specifications for dynamic random effects in a frequency risk model. Linear
credibility predictors are derived from the estimators. Examples are provided from the automobile portfolio of a Spanish
insurance company.
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1. Introduction
Real-world experience rating schemes in property-liability insurance mostly depend on numbers of events, which
are usually claims at fault. Only in a few publications (Gerber, 1975; Sundt, 1988; Pinquet et al., 2001) do frequency
risk models take into account the age of events. These contributions use the intuition that the predictive ability
for a period of the policyholder’s history should decrease with the age. If a stationary specification is retained for
time-varying random effects in a Poisson model, the estimated autocorrelation coefficients should be decreasing.
This shape is indeed obtained from our data.
As durations of histories in insurance portfolios do not usually exceed a few years (7 at most in our working
sample), only a short correlogram can be estimated from the data. Long-term computations of derived credibility
models require correlation coefficients for higher lag values. The purpose of this paper is to provide extensions of
the correlogram which are based on autoregressive specifications. Statistical inference is performed on the order
p of an AR(p) process applied to additive random effects. Estimators and tests are given in Section 2. Section 3
details advantages and possible limits of the linear credibility approach in a context where an intricate correlation
structure is allowed for the random effects.
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Empirical results are shown in Section 4. First, we investigate the link between the order of the autoregressive
process and the credibility coefficients. Then, we derive bonus-malus coefficients from duration distributions on the
policyholder–company relationship. This type of computation is motivated by the fact that real-life rating structures
in non-life insurance implicitly take into account an expected loyalty of the policyholder to the company.1 The
risk period in actuarial models is usually the year to come, and ends with the renegotiation date of the contract. A
time-varying credibility model used together with duration distributions on the policyholder–company relationship
provides credibility coefficients which decrease with expected loyalty.
Lastly, concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
2. Poisson models with dynamic and stationary random effects
Let us consider a portfolio composed ofp policyholders. If we have an unbalanced panel data set, the policyholder
i is observed for Ti periods with 1 ≤ Ti ≤ Tmax. If ni,t is the number of claims reported by the policyholder i in period
t, the distributions retained for the frequency risk model are mixtures of Poisson distributions. Hidden features of
risk distributions vary with time, as do rating factors. The random effects added to an a priori rating model with
longitudinal data should then be time-dependent.
LetUi,t be the random effect related to the distribution ofNi,t . Conditionally onUi,t = u,Ni,t is supposed to follow
a Poisson distribution with an expectation equal to λi,tu. The coefficients λi,t depend on regression components
(represented by a line-vector xi,t) and on the duration of the period di,t . We write λi,t = di,t exp(xi,tβ); β ∈ Rk,
where β is a column-vector of parameters and where k is the number of regression components. Besides, the
independence of the (Ni,t)t=1,...,Ti is assumed if we condition by the random effects. In the model with random
effects, the likelihood of the individual history of policyholder i within a parametric specification is equal to
L[(ni,t)1≤t≤Ti ] = E
[
Ti∏
t=1
Pλi,tUi,t (ni,t)
]
, Pλ(n) = exp(−λ)λ
n
n!
. (1)
Expectation is taken with respect to the random effects.
The likelihood of a Poisson model with a complex correlation structure for random effects is not tractable, as
is the case for linear models (see Frees et al. (1999) for a survey of linear models on panel data with applications
to credibility predictors). However, second-order moments remain tractable and we will follow a semiparametric
approach.
We assume equidistribution and stationarity at the second-order in the following way. The first- and second-order
moments of vec1≤t≤Ti(Ui,t) are those of vec1≤t≤Ti(Ut), and the moments of vec1≤t≤Tmax(Ut) are supposed to be
stationary at the second-order. This invariance assumption with respect to time translations means that the predictive
ability of a claim will depend on the lag between the period of risk prediction and the period of occurrence, but not
on calendar time. We suppose that the squared random effects are integrable, and thatE(Ut) = 1 ∀t = 1, . . . , Tmax.
The second-order moments of the random effects are denoted as
Cov(Ut, Ut−h) = σ2UρU(h), 0 ≤ h < t ≤ Tmax (2)
with −1 ≤ ρU(h) ≤ 1, ρU(0) = 1.
The random effects model is parameterized by θ ∈ Rk+Tmax with
θ =
(
α
β
)
, α = vec
0≤h<Tmax
(σ2UρU(h)). (3)
1 For instance, insurance companies undercharge new cars and overcharge older ones. Since automobile risk decreases with the age of the car,
commercial premiums implicitly use a more remote horizon than the year to come.
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From the identity
Eθ[Mθ,xi(Ni)] = 0, 0 ∈ Rk+Tmax (4)
with
Mθ,xi(Ni) =

∑
1≤t≤Ti(Ni,t − λi,t) txi,t∑
1≤t≤Ti [(Ni,t − λi,t)2 −Ni,t − λ2i,tσ2U ]
vec1≤h<Tmax
(∑
h<t≤Ti [(Ni,t − λi,t)(Ni,t−h − λi,t−h)− λi,tλi,t−hσ2UρU(h)]
)
 , (5)
we obtain a moment-based estimator θˆ0 which nullifies the empirical counterpart of Eq. (4). Hence
(Mθ)θ=θˆ0 = 0, Mθ =
1
p
p∑
i=1
Mθ,xi(Ni). (6)
Let us interpret the components of θˆ0. The estimator βˆ0 is the m.l.e. in the Poisson model without random
effects. Then αˆ0 is derived from frequency premiums and number-residuals computed from βˆ0 and the regression
components. A frequency premium is the estimated expectation of a number of claims in the Poisson model, and a
number-residual is the difference between a number of claims and the related frequency premium. The unconstrained
estimator of the variance is positive if and only if there is overdispersion of number-residuals (i.e. the variance of
the number-residuals is greater than the mean of the claim numbers). The autocovariance and autocorrelation
coefficients are estimated for the lags h = 1, . . . , Tmax − 1, the number of which depends on the maximal length of
the individual histories. These coefficients are estimated from paired-off products of lagged number-residuals and
frequency premiums.
Some points concerning these estimators are worth developing.
• The estimators for second-order moments of the random effects are unconstrained, which means that they are not
bound to belong to the parameter space. For instance, the estimated variance is negative if there is underdispersion
of number-residuals. Likewise, the estimated autocorrelation coefficients are not bound to belong to the interval
[−1,+1]. Even if the preceding conditions are fulfilled, the estimated variance–covariance matrix of the random
effects might not be positive semidefinite. In this case, the distribution family must be simplified in order to obtain
estimators inside the parameter space.
• The unconstrained nature of the estimators cannot be seen as a drawback. The parameter space for a semiparametric
or parametric specification of the random effects distribution admits a boundary.2 If an unconstrained estimator
is outside the parameter space, a restricted estimator derived from likelihood maximization belongs most often
to the boundary. In this case, the distribution family of the random effects must be simplified, which leads to the
conclusion reached with an unconstrained estimation strategy.
• Moment-based estimators can be improved in terms of asymptotic variance. The idea is to use the estimated
moments of the random effects in the regression equation. This is the Generalized Estimating Equations approach,
later referred to as GEE (see Liang and Zeger (1986), Zeger (1988), Brännäs and Johanson (1995) for an application
to longitudinal count data).
Let us detail this estimation strategy. With the notations given above, we write
ni = vec
1≤t≤Ti
(ni,t), E(Ni) = vec
1≤t≤Ti
(λi,t) = Ei(β), λi,t = di,t exp(xi,tβ). (7)
2 Distributions for a time-independent random effect are parameterized by the variance, in which case the parameter space is R+ and the
boundary is zero. Consider now dynamic random effects related to a 2-year history. The parameters of a stationary distribution family are a
variance and a covariance (say, V11 and V12). The parameter space is defined by the constraints V11 ≥ 0 and −V11 ≤ V12 ≤ V11. The boundary
is composed of the two half-lines V12 = ±V11 with V11 ≥ 0. For instance the random effects are time-independent if V12 = V11, which entails
a simplified correlation structure.
276 C. Bolance´ et al. / Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 33 (2003) 273–282
The m.l.e. of β in the Poisson model is the solution βˆ0 of the equation:∑
i,t
(ni,t − λi,t) txi,t =
∑
i
t
(
∂Ei
∂β
)
[V0i(β)]−1(ni − Ei(β)) = 0, 0 ∈ Rk, (8)
where V0i(β) = V0(Ni) = diag1≤t≤Ti(λit) is the variances–covariances matrix of Ni in the Poisson model. On the
other hand, the moment-based estimator of α is an explicit function of βˆ0, and we write αˆ0 = α∗(βˆ0).
Let us denote
V(Ni) = V0(Ni)+ V0(Ni)V(Ui)V0(Ni) = Vi(α, β) (9)
the variances–covariances matrix of Ni in the Poisson model with random effects. Note that the expectation of Ni
in this model does not depend on α. Including this specification of the variance in the Poisson regression given in
(8) and using the map α∗, we obtain an improved estimator of β which is the solution βˆ to the equation:∑
i
t
(
∂Ei
∂β
)
[Vi(α∗(β), β)]−1(ni − Ei(β)) = 0. (10)
An estimation algorithm is detailed in Liang and Zeger (1986).
Eq. (10) expresses an orthogonality between number-residuals and the space spanned by the regression com-
ponents. The metric retained in the equation (i.e. the inverse of the variance) is shown to be optimal in the afore-
mentioned reference. Hence any estimator of this type, including the m.l.e. in the Poisson model, has a greater
asymptotic variance matrix than that of βˆ in the Poisson model with random effects. Finally, we obtain a new
estimator αˆ = α∗(βˆ) for the second-order moments of the random effects.
Extending the estimated correlogram is of interest if we want to investigate the long-term properties of the derived
bonus-malus systems. Autoregressive specifications for real-valued random effects provide such extensions.3 Since
the (Ut)t≥1 are greater than zero, an AR(p) process should apply to additive random effects of the type (Wt =
log(Ut))t≥1. From the Tmax−1 autocorrelation coefficients estimated on the data, we can fit autoregressive processes
of orderpwithp ranging from one to Tmax−1. A parametric specification is needed in order to link the second-order
moments of the (Wt)t≥1 with the corresponding moments of (Ut)t≥1. We will use a multivariate Gaussian distribution
for the (Wt)t≥1. Since we assumed E(Ut) = 1, we obtain the following link:
Ut = exp(Wt)
E[exp(Wt)]
, Wt ∼ N(0, σ2W)⇒ σ2W = log(1+ σ2U). (11)
The same identity holds for covariances. Hence we have
γh = Cov(Wt,Wt−h) = log(1+ Cov(Ut, Ut−h)) ∀h, 0 ≤ h < t ≤ Tmax. (12)
From the correlogram estimated in Section 4, we can fit a log-normal distribution for (Ut)1≤t≤6=Tmax−1. Poisson
models with log-normal random effects are investigated by Aitchison and Ho (1989) and Purcaru and Denuit (2003).
A suitable value for the order p of the autoregressive process can be derived from the partial autocorrelation
coefficients (rW(h))h=1,... ,Tmax−1. For a given lag h, rW(h) is the coefficient of Wt−h in the probabilistic regression
of Wt with respect to Wt−1, . . . ,Wt−h.4 If W follows an AR(p), then rW(h) = 0 if h > p. Rejecting rW(h) = 0
implies that an AR(h) specification for (Wt)t≥1 significantly outperforms an AR(h−1)model on the data. A reference
on stationary time series is Hamilton (1994).
The partial autocovariance coefficient rW(h) is the last component of ah (ah ∈ Rh), the solution of the linear
system: V [vec1≤k≤h(Wt−k)]ah = vec1≤k≤h(Cov(Wt,Wt−k)). We have for instance
rW(h) = 0 ⇔ gh(γ) = 0, (13)
3 Moving average processes would not be realistic on our data, since the autocorrelation coefficients are all significantly greater than zero.
4 This coefficient is the correlation between Wt −W∗t and Wt−h−W∗t−h, where W∗t and W∗t−h are the probabilistic regressions of Wt and Wt−h
with respect to Wt−1, . . . ,Wt−h+1. Hence the terminology ‘partial correlation coefficient’, which supposes that Wt = W∗t .
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where γ = vec0≤k<Tmax(γk) (see (12)) is derived from the autocovariance function of W , and
g1(γ) = γ1, g2(γ) = γ0γ2 − γ21 , g3(γ) = γ20γ3 + γ22γ1 + γ31 − γ21γ3 − 2γ0γ1γ2. (14)
Tests for the nullity of the partial autocorrelation coefficients are derived from the moment-based estimator θˆ0
defined by Eq. (6). Its asymptotic variance is estimated by
Vˆ (θˆ0) = 1
p
(tJθ(Mθ tMθ)
−1Jθ)−1
θ=θˆ0 , Jθ =
∂Mθ
∂θ
. (15)
Together with the asymptotic normality of the estimator, this equation means that the following convergence in
distribution holds:
[Vˆ (θˆ0)]−1/2(θˆ0 − θ) −→
D
N(0, Ik+Tmax). (16)
A proof is given in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). The asymptotic variance of the GEE estimator θˆ could also
be obtained from Eq. (15). However, the derivation of the variances and covariances involving the components of
α would imply very intricate computations.
A test for the nullity of rW(h) is based on the statistic gh(γˆ)/
√
Vˆ (gh(γˆ)), which follows asymptotically a N(0, 1)
distribution. Since γˆ = f(αˆ0) (with f defined from (12)), the estimated variance of gh(γˆ) is equal to
Vˆ (gh(γˆ)) = Jgh(γˆ)Jf (αˆ0)Vˆ (αˆ0) tJf (αˆ0) tJgh(γˆ), (17)
where Jf and Jgh are the Jacobians of the maps f and gh.
3. Linear credibility predictors for the frequency of claims
Let (nt)1≤t≤T be the history of claims recorded on an insurance contract (we suppress the individual index in
order to simplify the notations). A linear credibility predictor Bühlmann (1967) for period T + 1 is obtained from
an affine regression of UT+1 with respect to N1, . . . , NT in the model with random effects. This predictor is a
bonus-malus coefficient for period T + 1. Since E(UT+1) = 1, this predictor is equal to 1+ tb(n− λˆ) with
n = vec
1≤t≤T
(nt), λˆ = vec
1≤t≤T
(λˆt), b = [Vˆ (N)]−1Ĉov(N,UT+1). (18)
All the estimations are taken in the random effects model, so we can use either the moment-based estimators or
those derived from the GEE approach. The experience-rated frequency premium for period T + 1 is the product of
the bonus-malus coefficient and of the a priori frequency premium λˆT+1. The former coefficient is equal to
1+
T∑
t=1
credt
(
nt
λ̂t
− 1
)
with credt = λˆtbt . (19)
Let us use the second-order moments computed in the preceding section. If we write ρ̂U(0) = 1, the credibility
coefficients are the solutions of the linear system
credt +
(
λˆt σ̂
2
U
T∑
t′=1
ρ̂U(|t′ − t|) credt′
)
= λˆt σ̂2Uρ̂U(T + 1− t) ∀t = 1, . . . , T. (20)
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If T ≥ Tmax, this linear system uses an extension of the estimated correlogram, which is the main topic addressed
by the paper.
If the frequency premiums are negligible with respect to one, we infer from the last equation: credt ∼ λˆt σ̂2Uρ̂U(T+
1 − t). A sequence of credibility coefficients should have the same shape as that of a correlogram with the same
length and a reversed index.
The linear credibility approach outperforms the expected value principle in terms of computing time and readabil-
ity of the experience rating schemes. There is a drawback however with this approach if we use intricate covariance
structures for the random effects. The predictor can be negative even if the random effects model can be estimated
on the data. Suppose for instance that the first estimated autocorrelation coefficient belongs to ] − 1, 0[. This un-
realistic assumption would entail a financial penalty after a claim-free period. The bonus-malus coefficient and the
experience-rated premium for the second period would then be negative if the number of claims reported in the first
period was large enough.
On our data, correlation coefficients are greater than zero and decreasing. Let us give an upper bound for total
credibility in this framework. We also suppose that credibility coefficients are positive, which is the case in our
examples. We have ρ̂U(|t′ − t|) ≥ ρ̂U(T + 1 − t) ∀t, t′ = 1, . . . , T since ρ̂U is decreasing. If we add the linear
credibility equations (20) with respect to t, we obtain the following inequality:
T∑
t=1
credt ≤
∑T
t=1 λˆt σ̂2Uρ̂U(T + 1− t)
1+∑Tt=1 λˆt σ̂2Uρ̂U(T + 1− t) . (21)
This upper bound is reached if the random effects are time-independent. If the frequency premiums per year are
bounded and if
∑+∞
h=1 ρ̂U(h) < +∞, total credibility will not converge towards one. Credibility is the discount
granted to a claim-free history, and experience-rated premiums do not converge towards zero for such a history in
real-world rating structures.
Prediction through an expected value principle is not subject to the criticism given above. With a parametric
distribution family for the random effects (e.g. log-normal), prior and posterior expectations do not have a closed
form, but can be approximated by numerical integration or by simulation. We did not retain this approach in the
empirical study, since we would have to compute integrals of high dimension which are difficult to approximate.
Moreover, there is no statistic of low dimension which summarizes the history in the expression of the bonus-malus
coefficients, such as the sum of claims and the cumulative frequency premium in the model with constant random
effects. The description of an experience rating scheme would then be very intricate.
4. Empirical results
4.1. The data set
The working sample of 80,994 policyholders represents 10% of the portfolio of a major Spanish insurance
company. We selected only policies covering cars for private use and retained a balanced panel data set. Hence the
individual histories have the same duration, which is equal to 7 years. We made this restriction because the GEE
estimators are much easier to derive in this context.
Policyholders were observed between 1991 and 1997. Indicators of the calendar years are part of the regression
components in order to allow for a trend in the past (see Besson and Partrat (1992) for optimal BMS with a trend).
The other rating factors retained in the regression are gender, geographical area, the age of the driving license, the
seniority and age of the policyholder, coverage level and the power of the vehicle. The average frequency of claims
at fault per year is equal to 0.07. All the period durations are equal to 1 year, which means that the characteristics
of the policyholders are known only at each anniversary date. In our view, this inaccuracy in the observation of
regression components is of no consequence.
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Table 1
Estimated autocorrelation coefficients
h (lag)
1 2 3 4 5 6
ρˆ0U(h) 0.733 0.524 0.504 0.483 0.425 0.401
4.2. Estimators for the correlogram of the random effects
The correlogram of (Ut)1≤t≤6 is estimated from the moment equations (5) and (6). The estimated variance of the
process is equal to σ̂2U
0 = 1.364 and the autocorrelation coefficients are given in Table 1.
The estimated correlogram exhibits a decreasing shape, and there is less memory in the claim process if the panel
data set under consideration is not balanced (see Pinquet et al., 2001).
In the Poisson model with random effects, the GEE estimator βˆ defined in Eq. (10) has a lower variance–covariance
matrix than βˆ0, the m.l.e. in the Poisson model. The decrease in variance of an estimated linear form of the parameters
ranges between 2 and 55% if GEE are used instead of the initial estimators.
The GEE estimators obtained from the 7-year histories are almost equal to those obtained from the simple moment
equations. Slight differences are observed for the two following estimators:
σ̂2U = 1.366, ρˆU(5) = 0.424. (22)
The five other estimated autocorrelation coefficients have the same first three decimals. There is nothing odd about
this result because the portfolio is very large. Even if the initial estimators are not optimal in terms of asymptotic
variance, they are very accurate. The estimated coefficients of the regression are also very close, and the differences
in premiums are always less than 2%.
From Table 1, we obtain the following values for the correlation and partial autocorrelation coefficients of the
additive random effects (Table 2).
Tests for the nullity of partial autocorrelation coefficients enable the order of the autoregressive specification
for random effects to be chosen. These tests were detailed at the end of Section 2 for h = 1, 2, 3. The estimated
autocovariances γh = Cov(Wt,Wt−h) of W are the following:
Vˆ

γ̂0
γ̂1
γ̂2
γ̂3
 = 10−4 ×

3.794 0.542 0.395 0.536
0.542 2.964 0.784 0.683
0.395 0.784 4.172 1.080
0.536 0.683 1.080 4.929
 .
Then the tests related to the null assumption rW(h) = 0 ⇔ gh(γ) = 0 are performed from the statistics
g1(γˆ)
σˆg1(γˆ)
= γ̂1
σˆγˆ1
= 40.27, g2(γˆ)
σˆg2(γˆ)
= −0.604, g3(γˆ)
σˆg3(γˆ)
= 2.74. (23)
Table 2
Estimated autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation coefficients
h (lag)
1 2 3 4 5 6
ρˆW (h) 0.806 0.627 0.608 0.588 0.531 0.507
rˆW (h) 0.806 −0.064 0.350 −0.002 0.053 0.089
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On our data, the partial autocorrelation coefficients rW(1) and rW(3) are different from zero at the level α = 5%.
We do not reject the nullity of rW(2). Hence an AR(2) process for W does not significantly improve an AR(1)
specification, whereas an AR(3) does.
4.3. Experience rating from the different models
In our preceding paper (Pinquet et al., 2001), we focused on the dynamic of bonus-malus coefficients. The main
difference with credibility models based on time-independent random effects is the following. No-claim discounts
caused by a claim-free year are lower than those obtained from the usual credibility model for a policyholder with
a claim-free history, but they are higher if claims were reported recently. The explanation is the same in both cases.
The credibility granted to a given period of the past decreases rapidly as time goes by, due partly to the increase of
risk exposure but mostly to the decrease in the autocorrelation coefficients.
In this section, we first investigate the long-term behaviour of total credibility for different orders of the autore-
gressive process on the additive random effects. Let us consider a 40-year history and an average risk. Hence all
the frequency premiums (λ̂t)t=1,...,40 are equal to 0.07 in the linear credibility system given in (20). We use the
link given in (12) between the multiplicative and additive Gaussian random effects. We compare credibility models
derived from time-invariant random effects and from AR(p) specifications for additive Gaussian random effects
with p = 1, 3, and 6. Autocorrelation coefficients for the additive Gaussian random effects are extended from the
correlogram with the Yule–Walker equations, i.e.:
ρˆW(h) =
p∑
k=1
ϕkρˆW(h− k) ∀h ≥ p. (24)
In this linear recurrence equation on the autocorrelation coefficients, the (ϕk)1≤k≤p are the solutions of the linear
system:
Vˆ
[
vec
1≤k≤p
(Wt−k)
]
vec
1≤k≤p
(ϕk) = vec
1≤k≤p
(Ĉov(Wt,Wt−k)) (25)
which does not depend on t because of the stationarity assumption on (Wt)t≥1. Then the correlogram of the
multiplicative random effects results from the link given in Eq. (12).
The following table gives the credibilities granted to the first year, to the last year and to the whole history
(Table 3).
Credibility coefficients decrease rapidly with the age of periods if random effects are dynamic. For instance, the
last 2 (resp. 4, 5.5) years contribute to half the total credibility if an AR(1) (resp. AR(3), AR(6)) specification is used
for the additive Gaussian random effects. Results are thus very different from the 20-year duration derived from
time-independent random effects models.
We now derive bonus-malus coefficients from duration distributions on the policyholder–company relation-
ship. Such distributions are assessed on an individual basis by Guillén et al. (2003). Actuarial models in non-life
insurance usually estimate risks for the year to come, and the horizon is the renegotiation date of the contract. How-
ever, real-life rating structures create cross-subsidies between periods and implicitly refer to a more remote horizon.
Table 3
Long-term behaviour of credibility coefficients (40-year history)
Credibility coefficients (%) AR(1) specification for Wt AR(3) specification for Wt AR(6) specification for Wt
First year 10−4 0.01 0.05
Last year 5.83 5.51 5.37
Total credibility 20.3 30.6 35.6
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Table 4
Malus as a function of the attrition rate and of the order of the autoregressive process (H = 30 years)
Malus (%) (T = 1, H = 30)
r = 5% r = 20%
AR(1) 19.1 41.6
AR(3) 29.7 50.8
AR(6) 34.4 53.1
A rating model which allows for the age of periods can take into account an expected loyalty of the policyholder in
the following way.
Let us denote a bonus-malus coefficient for period T + 1 as Eˆ(UT+1|IT ), where UT+1 is the multiplicative
random effect and where IT is the information provided by periods 1, . . . , T . In the linear credibility approach, the
expectation refers to a linear probabilistic regression and not to a conditional expectation. If pT,h is the probability
that a policyholder in the portfolio during period T is still a customer of the insurance company at period T + h,
we retain∑H
h=1 pT,hEˆ(UT+h|IT )∑H
h=1 pT,h
(26)
as a bonus-malus coefficient for period T + 1. In Eq. (26), H is the maximum number of years to consider in the
future. This equation still provides a linear credibility predictor, which takes into account the duration distribution
of the relationship between the policyholder and its insurance company.
If we suppose a constant attrition rate r (i.e. a constant probability of leaving the insurance company), we have
pT,h = (1− r)h. Bonus-malus scales for Markovian bonus-malus systems are computed with H = 10 years and at
a null attrition rate by Brouhns et al. (2002).
For an average risk, the following table computes the increase in frequency premium after one claim reported
during the first period for two attrition rates and different orders of the autoregressive process (Table 4).
A 5% attrition rate is roughly the average for a mutual insurance society in France; and 20% corresponds to
a private insurance company. The results (which could be expressed in terms of credibility coefficients) are then
strongly influenced by the expected loyalty of the policyholder to the insurance company.
5. Concluding remarks
Autoregressive specifications for time-dependent random effects provide a natural extension of the estimated
correlation structure if the predictive ability of the periods decreases with their age. The purpose of the paper was
to provide tools in order to determine the right order for the autoregressive process. The empirical results show that
time-varying credibility models which use both retrospective and prospective points of view are strongly influenced
by statistical modelling and by expectations concerning the loyalty of the policyholder.
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Standard actuarial models assume that the random effects
used in the distributions of the number of claims are identically
distributed. In this framework, the credibility granted to the
history of the policyholder increases with the frequency premium.
Credibility is the no claims discount for a claimless history and
the increasing relationship between an actuarial bonus and an
estimated risk level is quoted in various papers (e.g. Dionne and
Vanasse (1989)).
There is however empirical evidence of a decreasing link
between the variance of the random effect and the frequency risk
for automobile insurance data (see Sections 3 and 4 with results
obtained from a Spanish portfolio). In other words, the residual
relative heterogeneity on claims number distributions is more
important for low risks.
In this paper, the variance of the random effect applied
to Poisson distributions is conditioned on frequency risk and
hence on the rating factors. First, we retain a local estimation
approach of a nonparametric link between the variance and the
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +33 169333423; fax: +33 169333427.
E-mail addresses: bolance@ub.edu (C. Bolancé), mguillen@ub.edu (M. Guillén),
jean.pinquet@polytechnique.edu (J. Pinquet).
0167-6687/$ – see front matter© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.insmatheco.2008.05.015frequency.1 Section 2 summarizes the main properties of kernel-
based estimators in generalized linear models. This approach is
used in Section 3 to estimate the nonparametric link. Second,
a parametric power link is specified and estimated in Section 4
from the negative binomial model. Consequences of the credibility
derivation are drawn in Section 5. Section 6 concludes and an
appendix contains some mathematical details.
The main empirical finding is that the link between credibility
(or no claims discount) and the frequency premium is lower
when the equidistribution assumption of the random effect is
relaxed than it is in the usualmodel. The opposite result is obtained
for the increase in premium after a claim.
2. Kernel estimators in generalized linear models: The index
model
Generalized linearmodels for a response variable Y and a vector
of regressors X(X ∈ Rk) assume that
E(Y | X = x) = f (x′β), β ∈ Rk. (1)
1 Local estimation techniques can also be used for prediction on time series (see
Qian (2000) for applications to insurance.
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between regressors and parameters) and the expectation of the
response variable. In the literature on generalized linear models,
the link usually refers to the reciprocal of f , but here we retain the
function which is estimated in the first place. For identifiability
purposes detailed later, we suppose that the intercept is not
included as a regressor in (1) and that the distribution of X is
nondegenerate inRk. For basic generalized linearmodels, f is given
and then an intercept must be included in the regression (see
McCullagh and Nelder (1989)). For a count data model, f is usually
the exponential function. If f is unknown in the specification so
that an estimation is required, Eq. (1) is referred to as an index
model (see Härdle et al. (1997)). In that case, there is an obvious
identifiability conflict between β and f in Eq. (1). Only the line Rβ
can be identified from the data. In other words, what is identified
is the conditional expectation, assumed to be constant on affine
hyperplanes of Rk which are orthogonal to a given vector. For a
given value of β , a nonparametric estimation of f (s) can be based
on local weighted averages of the response variable, with weights
which decrease with the distance between s and the individual
values of the index.
A first estimation of index models can be obtained from a para-
metric specification of the distribution of Y defined conditionally
on X . Let us assume that we have, in that case,
E(Y | X = x) = f0(c + x′b); c ∈ R, b ∈ Rk, (2)
with f0 a given link function. Let b̂ be the maximum likelihood es-
timator of b. The conditional expectation defined in (1) can be es-
timated with a kernel estimator.
In a samplingmodel on (X, Y )withn observations (xi, yi)i=1,...,n,
an estimator of E(Y | X) of the Nadaraya–Watson type is obtained
from a kernel K (usually an even probability density function) and
a bandwidth h in the following way:
Ê(Y | X) =
n∑
i=1
yi Kh
(
X ′̂b− x′îb
)
n∑
i=1
Kh
(
X ′̂b− x′îb
) , Kh (u) = K
( u
h
)
h
. (3)
The bandwidth is a smoothing parameter. The closer it is to zero,
the more estimation is performed on a local basis. The estimation
given in (3) exhibits an invariance property as it only depends
on b̂/h.
A suitable value of h can be derived from a cross-validation
method similar to that proposed in Härdle (1990) for the
Nadaraya–Watson kernel estimator. It is equal to
argmin
h
CV (̂b, h) =
n∑
i=1
(yi − Eˆ−i(Yi))2, (4)
where Eˆ−i(Yi) is the leave-one-out estimator2 defined by
Eˆ−i(Yi) =
∑
j6=i
yjKh
(
x
′
îb− x′ĵb
)
∑
j6=i
Kh
(
x′îb− x′ĵb
) =
∑
j6=i
yjK
((
xi − xj
)′ b̂
h
)
∑
j6=i
K
((
xi − xj
)′ b̂
h
) . (5)
This estimation of the conditional expectation E(Y | X) is not
necessarily consistent since it is derived fromawrong link function
(f0 instead of f ). Two results on this issue are worth mentioning.
2 The individual for which the non parametric expectation is derived must
be withdrawn from the computation, otherwise the bandwidth would converge
towards zero in the minimization of the cross-validation criterion.• On one hand, a consistent estimator of the conditional
expectation can be obtained from the cross-validation criterion
defined in (4) and (5). Replacing b̂ by b in (4) defines a function
CV (b, h) which can be minimized with respect to b and h. The
optimal values of b and h are plugged into the expression for
the estimated conditional expectation given in (3). Sufficient
conditions for the consistency of the estimation are given in
Härdle et al. (1993). However the minimization of the cross-
validation criterion is cumbersome, since it necessitates a
double sum on individuals, also, Eq. (5) shows that only b/h is
identified. Hence an identifying constraint needs to be added in
the estimation.
• On the other hand, the maximum likelihood estimation of a
parametric model given in the first place can lead to consistent
estimation of the conditional expectation under conditions
which are first related to the distribution of the regressor X
(see Li and Duan (1989), and the Appendix). Owing to the
identification issue mentioned above, consistency means that
b̂ converges towards a limit b0 which belongs to the line Rβ .
3. Kernel estimators for the variance of the random effect in a
Poisson model
Let us consider cross-section data. The policyholders in the
portfolio are indexed by i = 1, . . . , p. All the risk exposure
durations are supposed equal (they are equal to one year in our
empirical study). Frequency risk must be expressed for a time unit,
otherwise the results on the link investigated in this paper would
not be coherent with respect to period aggregation. We denote ni
as the number of claims reported by policyholder i, Ni the related
random variable and xi as the vector of regression components. If
Ui is the random effect, the distribution of Ni in the Poisson model
with random effects is obtained from an expectation taken with
respect to the random effect Ui
P[Ni = ni] = E
[
PλiUi(ni)
] ; λi = exp(c + x′ib);
Pλ(n) = exp(−λ)λ
n
n! .
If the equidistribution assumption of the random effects is relaxed,
we can link their variance and frequency risk andwrite for instance
E(Ui) = 1; V (Ui) = σ 2(λi), λi = E(Ni). (6)
The function σ 2 must have nonnegative values.Wewill investigate
a power link in Section 4 but we first let the data speak from a
nonparametric estimation of σ 2. The starting point is the usual
moment-based estimator
V (Ui) = V (Ni)− E(Ni)E2(Ni) =
E(N2i )− E2(Ni)− E(Ni)
E2(Ni)
. (7)
The nonparametric link is then obtained with an index
model strategy described in Section 2. First, an estimation is
performed from themaximum likelihood estimation of the Poisson
model with regression components
Ni ∼ P(λi), λi = exp(c + x′ib).
For each policyholder i, we obtain the index si = ĉ + x′îb and
the parametric frequency premium Ê0(Ni) = exp(si). Then the
variance of the random effect is estimated from Eq. (7) and from
nonparametric estimators Ê(Nmi ), m = 1, 2. These estimators are
derived from Eq. (3), with Y = Nm, m = 1, 2. In what follows,
we retain a Gaussian kernel. Hence Kh is the density of a N(0, h2)
distribution. The bandwidth hm retained for the estimation of
E(Nmi ) (m = 1, 2) is obtained with the leave-one-out approach
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frequency premium as a function of the parametric frequency premium.
(see Eqs. (4) and (5)). From Eqs. (7) and (3), a nonparametric
estimator of V (Ui) is
V̂ (Ui) = Ê(N
2
i )− Ê2(Ni)− Ê(Ni)
Ê2(Ni)
.
The estimated variance of the random effect is then a nonparamet-
ric function of the frequency premium Ê0(Ni), since this property
holds for the estimated moments Ê(Nmi ), m = 1, 2.
Fig. 1 presents the non parametric estimations V̂ (U) and Ê(N)
as functions of Ê0(N) for a Spanish portfolio containing 80,994
policyholders observed during one year.3 The working sample of
80,994 policyholders represents 10% of the portfolio of a major
Spanish insurance company. The response variable is the number
of claims at fault with respect to a third party. We selected
only policies covering cars for private use in 1991. The average
frequency of claims per year is equal to 0.07, and the average
cost of claims is about 550 euros. More details on this data set
can be found in Bolancé et al. (2003). The selected contracts
do not include a deductible for third party liability claims. The
rating factors are the gender, the geographical area, the age of
the driving licence, the age of the policyholder and her seniority
as a customer of the insurance company, the coverage level and
the power of the vehicle. Fig. 1 is obtained with the two step
estimation approach described after Eq. (7). A direct estimation
of the regression parameters jointly with the bandwidth from the
cross-validation criterion led to very similar results. For instance,
the cosine between the two estimations linked to the regressors
is equal to 0.9996, which indicates almost perfect colinearity. As
only b/h is identified (see Eq. (5) and the following comments),
this means that the estimations are almost equivalent. This result
was not obvious ex ante, as consistency with link misspecification
holds under assumptions on the distribution of regressors which
are not necessarily fulfilled with the qualitative variables used in
our regressions (see the Appendix). Fig. 1 exhibits a decreasing link
between the local estimation for the variance of the random effect
and the frequency premium. This result was confirmed on other
data bases. The peak in the estimated variance between 0.04 and
0.06 can be explained by the effect of boundary bias that occurs in
kernal estimations near the extremes of the domain interval (see
Wand and Jones (1995)). We did not correct for this effect because
the main focus is on the overall decreasing trend.
A power link between the variance of the random effect and
frequency risk is estimated in the following section.
3 The bandwidths retained for the first and second order moments of the
response variable from the cross-validation criterion given in (4) are equal to h1 =
h2 = 0.009. Notice that the two estimations of the frequency are close to each other
around the average value (equal to 0.07), whereas the kernel-based estimation is
lower than the fully parametric estimation for large values of the frequency.Fig. 2. Kernel-based vs. power link parametric estimation for the variance of the
random effect as a function of the parametric frequency premium.
4. Negative binomial model with a power link between the
variance of the random effect and frequency risk
In this section, we use a modified version of the negative
binomial model with regression components, in which we include
a power link between the variance of the random effect and
frequency risk. Hence we have a parametric model which can
reflect the decreasing link observed in Fig. 1. This model was
proposed by Winkelmann and Zimmermann (1991).
We keep the notations of Section 3, and we suppose that the
random effect follows a gamma distribution. We write
Ui ∼ γ (ai, ai); ai = aλ−ei , λi = E(Ni) = exp(c + x
′
ib).
The gamma distribution is indexed by a shape and a scale
parameter. We have
E(Ui) = 1; V (Ui) = 1ai =
λei
a
, (8)
and the parameter e is the elasticity of V (Ui) with respect to
frequency risk. The equidistribution assumption for the random
effects means that this elasticity is null.
The variance of the random effect specified by (8) is an
exponential function of the index x
′
ib. Such a link was investigated
for a linear model by Harvey (1976).
The likelihood is the usual one for the negative binomial model,
hence
P[Ni = ni] = E
[
PλiUi(ni)
] = aaii λnii
(λi + ai)ni+ai
0(ni + ai)
0(ai)0(ni + 1) .
The maximum likelihood estimators for the Spanish portfolio are
the following.
â = 8.05; ê = −0.839; ê
σ̂̂e
= −2.141. (9)
The estimated elasticity ê is negative, a result in accordance with
the expected decreasing link between the estimated variance
of the random effect and the frequency premium. The usual
semiparametric estimator for a constant variance of the random
effect is equal to
σ̂ 2 = V̂ (U) =
∑
i
(ni − λ̂i)2 − ni∑
i
λ̂i
2 = 0.985.
Fig. 2 plots two estimated variances of the random effects,
defined as a power or a kernel-based function of the parametric
frequency premium, together with the constant estimation. The
estimated variances of the random effect that are linked with the
frequency premium (in a parametric or nonparametric way) are
greater than the constant estimation if the frequency premium is
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the annual frequency premium, which is roughly equal to 0.07.We
estimated this model on other data bases and always found this
decreasing link, but no stable discrepancy between the parametric
and nonparametric estimation.
5. Applications to credibility predictors
Linking the variance of the randomeffect and the frequency risk
raises a difficulty in a longitudinal data analysis. Since frequency
risk varies with time, the random effect cannot be supposed time-
independent in the prediction. A solution is to derive the random
effects from a stochastic process defined in continuous time, and
to link the time index of the process with the frequency risk. Let us
detail an example from a gamma process.
If the data are longitudinal, we simply replace i by the pair
i, t (where t indexes the periods) in the preceding equations. For
instance, the random effects are defined as follows
Ui,t ∼ γ (ai,t , ai,t) ⇔ ai,tUi,t ∼ γ (ai,t). (10)
We obtain the random effects Ui,t from a gamma process
(
Gi,a
)
a≥0,
which is defined by three properties:
(1) Gi,0 ≡ 0; (2) The process has independent increments;
(3) The increments follow gamma distributions, with a parameter
equal to the difference in dates (i.e. Gi,a2 − Gi,a1 ∼ γ (a2 −
a1) ∀a1, a2, a2 > a1 ≥ 0). For instance, we have Gi,a ∼ γ (a).
We have a particular type of Levy process with indefinitely
divisible distributions. This process exists from the well known
property on gamma distributions
γ (a1) ∗ γ (a2) = γ (a1 + a2) (a1, a2 ≥ 0)
and from Kolmogorov’s theorem. The gamma process can also be
seen as a limit of compound Poisson processes (see Dufresne et al.
(1991), for definitions and applications to ruin theory).
Suppose thatwe have the link V (Ui,t) = σ 2(λi,t) given in Eq. (6)
between the variance of the random effect and the frequency risk.
For the distributions given in Eq. (10), we have V (Ui,t) = 1/ai,t .
This leads us to define the random effects as follows
Ui,t = σ 2(λi,t)× Gi,1/σ 2(λi,t ). (11)
Then we have
λi,t1 = λi,t2 ⇒ Ui,t1 = Ui,t2 .
We can consider for instance the power link σ 2(λi,t) = a × λ−ei,t
retained in Section 4.
Let us predict frequency risks with a linear credibility approach
(Bühlmann, 1967). The bonus-malus coefficient for the second
period of the policyholder i is derived from an affine probabilistic
regression of Ui2 with respect to Ni1. We have
ûi2 = 1+ Ĉov(Ui2,Ni1)
V̂ (Ni1)
(ni1 − λ̂i1),
with
Ĉov(Ui2,Ni1) = λ̂i1Ĉov(Ui2,Ui1); V̂ (Ni1) = λ̂i1 + λ̂i12V̂ (Ui1).
Since the gammaprocessGi,t has independent increments,wehave
that
Cov(Gi,a1 ,Gi,a2) = V (Gi,min(a1,a2)) = min(a1, a2).
From (11) and the last equation, we obtain
Ĉov(Ui2,Ui1) = σ̂
2(λ̂i1)× σ̂ 2(λ̂i2)
max
(
σ̂ 2(λ̂i1), σ̂ 2(λ̂i2)
) .Fig. 3. Credibility as a function of the frequency premium (with a constant variance
for the random effect and with a power link between frequency risk and the
variance).
The linear credibility predictor is equal to
ûi2 = 1+ credi
(
ni1
λ̂i1
− 1
)
= (1− credi)+
(
credi × ni1
λ̂i1
)
.
The credibility credi granted to the first period is equal to
credi = λ̂i1 × Ĉov(Ui2,Ni1)
V̂ (Ni1)
= λ̂i1 × σ̂
2(λ̂i1)
1+
(
λ̂i1 × σ̂ 2(λ̂i1)
) × σ̂ 2(λ̂i2)
max
(
σ̂ 2(λ̂i1), σ̂ 2(λ̂i2)
) . (12)
Let us now consider Eq. (12). The first component of the product
which defines the credibility is the usual formula, with a variance
of the randomeffect σ̂ 2 which depends on the frequency premium.
As the function σ̂ 2 decreases with the frequency premium on our
data, this component of the credibility increases less than with the
usual formula. It might even decrease if the estimated elasticity
between the variance of the random effect and frequency risk
(defined globally with a power link function or locally with a
nonparametric link) was less than −1. The second component of
the credibility in Eq. (12) is less than one. Frequency premiums
do not vary much for a given policyholder from one period to
the following,4 and this component remains close to one. All the
policyholders of our sample stay in the portfolio at the second
period.5 On our data, the average of the second component of (12)
derived from the power link estimated in (9) is equal to 0.99. In
Fig. 3, we plot two derivations of the credibility as a function of
the frequency premium λ̂i1. First, credibility is obtained from the
usual formulawith a constant variance for the randomeffect (σ̂ 2 =
0.985). The second derivation follows from Eq. (9) and (12). The
credibility is not a deterministic function of λ̂i1, due to the second
component in Eq. (12). We averaged it with a Gaussian kernel. The
optimal bandwidth is small (h = 0.001) because the variations
around the average are very low.
As expected, the credibility is almost constant with the power
link between the variance of the random effect and the frequency
premium because the estimated elasticity is close to−1.
6. Conclusions
The relative variations after each year for coefficients of
real-world bonus-malus scales do not depend on the frequency
4 A thorough analysis of stochasticmigration between risk levels during different
periods is given in Brouhns et al. (2003).
5 They are actually present during seven years. See Bolancé et al. (2003) for an
investigation of the whole panel data set.
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see (Lemaire, 1995), for a review). Relaxing the equidistribution
assumption on the random effects may allow actuarial models to
get closer to real-world rating structures concerning the bonus, if
the estimated link between the variance of the random effect and
frequency risk is decreasing. As an actuarial malus is close to the
variance of the random effect if risk exposure is low, the malus
also decreases with the frequency premium if the aforementioned
link is decreasing. Hence a real-world bonus-malus scale is close
to a usual actuarial model on the malus side, whereas on the
bonus side it can be closer to the models developed in this
paper.
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Appendix. Consistency of the estimation under link violation
This appendix gives the conditions which provide a consistent
estimation of the conditional expectation E(Y | X) in a missp-
ecification context on the link between the index and E(Y ). The
reference is Li and Duan (1989).
Suppose that we have a sampling model on the pair (x, y), with
the nonparametric link E(Y | X = x) = f (x′β). Notations
are those of Section 2. In the aforementioned reference, the
distribution of Y given X = x is supposed to be that of g(x′β, ε),
where ε is a given random variable and g a given function. This
implicitly assumes that the distribution of Y is determined by
the expectation E(Y ), which is the case for binary or Poisson
distributions.
In addition, a parametric model with a scalar parameter m
and a likelihood Lm is estimated on the data (observations are
(xi, yi)i=1,...,n). The scalar parameter is linked to the index x′b by
a given function f0. We write
mi = f0(c + x′ib); − log Lmi(yi) = h(c + x′ib, yi).
For instance, in a Poisson model the parameter is the expectation
and the exponential link is usually retained for f0. In that case we
have: h(s, y) = exp(s)− ys+ log(y!).
Let ĉ, b̂ = argmin
c,b
∑
i h(c+x′ib, yi) be themaximum likelihood
estimators in the parametric model. If data are generated by
the sampling model given in the first place, this estimator
converges towards a limit c0, b0 usually called a pseudo-true value
(Gouriéroux et al., 1984). We have that
b0 ∈ Rβ ( i.e. b0 = λβ, λ ∈ R) (13)
under the following assumptions.
1. The maps h(•, y) : s → h(s, y) are convex for every
value of y. This assumption implies that the map c, b →
E
[
h(c + X ′b, Y )
]
= R(c, b) is convex.
2. The minimum of the map R defined in Assumption 1 is
reached for only one pair c0, b0.3. We have the following property
∀b ∈ Rk, ∃d, λ ∈ R, E(X ′b | X ′β) = d+ (λ X ′β). (14)
Commenting now on the result and the assumptions: since we
have the property b̂
a.e.−→ b0 = λβ , the estimation of E(Y | X)
obtained from (3) and (4) will be consistent. Indeed, it is the line
Rβ which must be identified in an index model, as discussed in
Section 2 and hence the multiplicative constant λ is not important
in the estimation.
The first assumption relates to the concavity of the log-
likelihood and is usually fulfilled. The consistency property of the
maximum likelihood estimation and Assumption 2 lead to
ĉ, b̂ = argmin
c,b
1
n
n∑
i=1
h(c + x′ib, yi) a.e.−→ c0, b0
= argmin
c,b
R(c, b) = E
[
h(c + X ′b, Y )
]
.
From the strong law of large numbers, it is easily seen why
Assumption 2 is necessary.
The consistency result given in (13) is obtained from (14) with
Assumption 2 and Jensen’s inequality applied on the functions
h(•, y). Assumption 3 is generally not fulfilled for variables X
with discrete values, as is the case in our empirical analysis.
Eq. (14) is fulfilled if X follows a non degenerate Gaussian
distribution. Indeed, it is well known that in that case the
conditional expectation defined in (14) is obtained from the affine
probabilistic regression of X ′bwith respect to X ′β . Property (14) is
more generally fulfilled for elliptically symmetric distributions.
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Abstract
A standard problem of applied contracts theory is to empirically distinguish between adverse
selection and moral hazard.We show that dynamic insurance data allow to distinguishmoral
hazard from dynamic selection on unobservables.In the presence of moral hazard, experience
rating implies negative occurrence dependence: individual claim intensities decrease with the
number of past claims. We discuss econometric tests for the various types of data that are
typically available. Finally, we argue that dynamic data also allow to test for adverse
selection, even if it is based on asymmetric learning. (JEL: D82, G22, C41, C14)
1. Introduction
For two decades, contract theory has remained a predominantly theoretical  eld.
However, a number of papers have recently been devoted to empirical appli-
cations of the theory.1 It has been argued that insurance offers a particularly
promising  eld for empirical work on contracts. Individual (automobile, hous-
ing, health, life, etc.) insurance contracts are largely standardized. Researchers
have access to databases of insurance companies, which typically contain
several millions of such contracts. The information in these databases can
generally be summarized in a reasonably small number of quantitative and
qualitative indicators. The ‘outcome’ of the contract—be it the occurrence of an
accident, its cost, or some level of expenditure—is very precisely recorded in
the  rms’  les, together with a detailed history of the contractual relationship
(changes in coverage, etc.). Not surprisingly, several recent papers are aimed at
Acknowledgments: Support from the NSF (grant #0096516) is gratefully acknowledged. This
paper was written while Jaap Abbring was visiting the Department of Economics of University
College London. Abbring’s research is supported by a fellowship of the Royal Netherlands
Academy of Arts and Sciences.
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1. See Chiappori and Salanie´ (2003) for a recent survey.
testing for the existence and estimating the magnitude of asymmetric informa-
tion effects in competitive insurance markets.2
A popular strategy for studying asymmetric information is to test, condi-
tional on observables, for a correlation between the choice of a contract and the
occurrence or severity of an accident. Under adverse selection on risk, ‘high-
risk’ agents are, everything else equal, both more likely to choose a contract
with more complete coverage and more likely to have an accident. The basic
moral hazard story is very close to the adverse selection one, except for an
inverted causality. In a moral hazard context, agents  rst choose different
contracts. Then, an agent facing better coverage and, therefore, weaker incen-
tives will be less cautious and have more accidents. In both cases, the same
pattern emerges: controlling for observables, more comprehensive coverage
should be associated with higher realized risk—a property that can be tested
using appropriate parametric or non-parametric techniques.
The conditional correlation approach has several advantages. It is simple
and very robust, as argued by Chiappori et al. (2002). Furthermore, it can be
used on static, cross-sectional data that are relatively easy to obtain. However,
these qualities come at a cost. The past history of the relationship in uences
both the current contract (through experience rating) and the agent’s behavior,
and this effect is hard to take into account with cross-sectional data. More
importantly, the correlation is not informative on the direction of the causality,
which makes the two stories (moral hazard and adverse selection) very hard to
distinguish. Still, such a distinction is crucial, if only because the optimal form
of regulation of insurance markets varies considerably with the context.3
The research program summarized in the present paper relies on the insight
that the dynamic aspects of the relationship can help distinguishing between
adverse selection and moral hazard. Two approaches can be distinguished. First,
the form of optimal dynamic contracts differs considerably between the two
cases. Thus, the qualitative properties of observed contracts may provide useful
insights into the type of problem they are designed to address. The research
program described in this paper concentrates on a second approach, in which the
(possibly suboptimal) contracts are taken as given and we concentrate on their
implications for observed behavior. In particular, most ‘real life’ insurance
contracts exhibit some form of experience rating. A typical property of expe-
rience rating schemes is that the occurrence of an accident shifts the entire
incentive scheme the agent is facing. Under moral hazard, this results in a form
2. Pueltz and Snow (1994), Dionne and Vanasse (1992), Chiappori and Salanie´ (1997, 2000),
Dionne, Gourie´roux, and Vanasse (1997), Richaudeau (1999) and Dionne et al. (2001), to name
only a few, analyze automobile insurance contracts, while Holly et al. (1998), Chiappori, Durand,
and Geoffard (1998), Chiappori, Geoffard, and Kyriadizou (1998), Cardon and Hendel (1998) and
Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) use health or life insurance data, and Poterba and Finkelstein (2003)
consider annuity contracts.
3. For a review of various attempts to distinguish between moral hazard and adverse selection,
see Chiappori (2000).
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of autocorrelation in the accident process. Thus, an empirical analysis of this
process can be informative on the presence of moral hazard.
In addition, dynamic data allow to address the problem of asymmetric
learning. Conventional wisdom suggests that, in many cases, asymmetric infor-
mation may not be present at the beginning of the relationship (e.g., the relative
quality of a young driver is unknown to her and her insurer). Rather, it emerges
gradually as a consequence of different learning processes (say, the young driver
learns from near misses that are not even observed by the insurer). Then the
contractual changes that take place during the relationship may be informative
about the agent’s riskiness, even if the initial choice of a contract is uncorrelated
with residual risk (as found by most studies).
2. Dynamic Moral Hazard Under Experience Rating: Theory
The model is directly borrowed from Chiappori and Heckman (2000) and
Abbring et al. (forthcoming). We consider a dynamic version of an insurance
model a` la Mossin (1968). Time is discrete. In each period t, the agent receives
an income normalized to one and may with some probability (1 2 pt) incur a
 xed monetary loss L. She is covered by an insurance contract involving a  xed
deductible D and a premium Qt that depends on past experience. Speci cally,
the evolution of Qt is governed by the following ‘bonus-malus’ system:
Q t11 5 dQ t if no accident occurred in period t
5 gQ t if an accident occurred in period t
where d , 1 , g.4
The no-accident probability pt is subject to moral hazard. Speci cally, in
each period t the agent chooses an effort level et$ 0, resulting in a no accident
probability pt5 p(et) for some increasing, concave function p. The cost of effort
is assumed separable, i.e., the agent attaches utility
u~ x! 2 e
to income x if he exerts effort e, where u is increasing and strictly concave. The
horizon is in nite and agents maximize expected discounted utility.
According to the bonus-malus scheme, each accident shifts the incentive
scheme faced by the agent upward, thus modifying her incentives. It follows that
the ‘cost’ of an accident, in terms of higher future premia, depends on random
events (the sequence of future accidents) and endogenous decisions (the se-
4. Proportional bonus-malus schemes of this type are empirically frequent. The French system,
which is relevant for our empirical application, corresponds to d 5 .95 and g 5 1.25. In addition,
the French system imposes a  oor and a ceiling on ut, respectively equal to .5 and 3.5. In our
discussion of the French system, we ignore the fact that accidents occur continuously but premiums
are only updated annually. See Abbring et al. (forthcoming) for a formal discussion.
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quence of future efforts). Technically, the agent must solve a stochastic control
problem. Here, we simply summarize the main properties of the solution; the
reader is referred to Abbring et al. (forthcoming) for a precise analysis. A  rst
result is that past experience matters for the current decision only through the
current level of the premium; i.e., Qt is the only state variable of the control
problem. Secondly, the optimal effort is increasing in the premium, at least
when both the premium and the deductible are small relative to the agent’s
income. It follows that the accident probability process of any given agent will
exhibit a negative occurrence-dependence property. In the absence of an acci-
dent, the premium—hence, by our result, the agent’s incentives—decreases.
Effort is optimally reduced, resulting in a steady increase of the accident
probability. However, the occurrence of an accident generates a discrete jump in
the premium, which boosts incentives and ultimately results in a drop in the
accident probability. The main testable implication of the model is thus the
following:5
The accident process exhibits negative occurrence dependence, in the sense
that individual claim intensities decrease with the number of past claims.
This suggests that we can test for moral hazard by simply testing for
negative occurrence dependence in the raw data. One should however be careful
at this point. While moral hazard implies occurrence dependence effects at the
individual level, individual claim intensities also vary with observed character-
istics (such as age, driving experience, region, etc.) and, more importantly, with
unobserved individual heterogeneity factors. In automobile insurance, for ex-
ample, existing work strongly suggests that unobserved heterogeneity is para-
mount. It is well known that unobserved heterogeneity results in (spurious)
positive occurrence dependence in the data. The intuition is that those individ-
uals whose risk is persistently high for unobserved external reasons will be more
likely to have had accidents in the past and to have accidents in the future (in
other words, to the extent that ‘bad’ drivers remain bad for at least a while, we
should expect to  nd a positive correlation between past and future accident
rates). Of course, this effect, which is overwhelmingly con rmed by the data,
does not contradict the theoretical analysis sketched above: whatever the dis-
tribution of unobserved heterogeneity, it is still true that under moral hazard, the
accident probability of each individual decreases with the person’s number of
past claims. But any empirical investigation of this property must address the
problem of disentangling the ‘true,’ negative dependence induced by the dy-
namics of incentives from the ‘spurious,’ positive contagion generated by
unobserved heterogeneity.
5. An additional (and standard) dif culty comes from the fact that we observe claims, not
accidents, and that the decision to  le a claim is endogenous. See Chiappori and Salanie´ (1997) for
a precise discussion of this problem.
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This problem is a manifestation of a general question, namely distinguish-
ing heterogeneity and state dependence. This issue has been abundantly dis-
cussed in the labor literature since the seminal contribution of Heckman and
Borjas (1980). An interesting side aspect of our research, thus, is that it
establishes a link between an existing literature in labor economics and ques-
tions that arose recently in applications of contract theory.
3. Testing for Moral Hazard
In most empirical studies in insurance, data are drawn from the  les of one (or
more) insurance companies. Many relevant characteristics of the driver (age,
gender, place of residence, seniority, type of job) and the car (brand, model,
vintage, power) are used by companies for pricing purposes. All these are
available to the econometrician as well. The same is true for the characteristics
of the contract (type of coverage, premium, deductible, . . .). Finally, each
accident—or more precisely each claim—is recorded with all the relevant
background information.
The main differences between data sets can be traced back to the way past
history is recorded. Existing situations can be gathered in three broad cases:
 In the most favorable situation, the exact date of each accident is recorded.
Then the occurrence of an accident can be modelled in continuous time,
using event-history models.
 Many experience-rating schemes can be implemented with information on
the number of accidents in each contract year only. In such cases,
insurance companies will often only provide researchers with individual
counts of claims over the years. In some cases, information on whether at
least one accident has occurred or not in any year (rather than the exact
number of accidents in each year) is suf cient. Then, for each agent we
only observe a sequence of 0s (for years without accidents) and 1s (years
with accidents).
 Finally, the minimum information that is needed to implement a bonus-
malus scheme may be even poorer. If all past accidents are treated
symmetrically whatever their exact timing (as in our theoretical model), the
computation of a bonus-malus coef cient only requires information on the
total number of past accidents. In our model, an agent who has been
driving for t periods and has had n accidents will be charged a premium of
gndt2n times her initial premium, whatever the exact timing of each of the
accidents. In this case, a single draw from an insurance company’s  les
may only give a cross-section of total counts of accidents for a group of
clients that has been driving for periods of varying length. Dynamics can
only be studied by comparing across individuals of different (driving)
seniority.
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In each of these three cases, the dynamics of accidents can be used to test
for the presence of moral hazard, against the null that the accident probability
does not depend on the agent’s incentives and only evolves according to some
predetermined law (possibly depending on observables, such as age of the
driver, age of the car, and others).
3.1 Heterogeneity Versus Moral Hazard in Continuous-Time
Event-History Data
In the  rst case, the essence of the test is clear. Under moral hazard, the hazard
rate of an accident, conditional on observable and unobservable heterogeneity,
should be steadily increasing throughout any period without an accident and
drop discontinuously whenever an accident occurs. Under the null, however, the
hazard rate should not change after an accident. This can either be tested
parametrically or non-parametrically. Denote the number of claims up to and
including time t by N(t) and let X(t) be some vector of observable covariates
(age, gender, etc.) at time t. Abbring et al. (forthcoming) assume that the
intensity u of claims, conditional of the claim history {N(u); 0 # u , t} and the
covariate history {X(u); 0 # u # t} up to time t takes the form
u ~tul, $N~u!; 0 # u , t%, $X~u!; 0 # u # t%! 5 lbN~t2!c~t!eX~t!9g,
where c is a fully nonparametric baseline hazard function, b . 0 a scalar
parameter, l a nonnegative unobservable covariate re ecting unobserved het-
erogeneity, and g a vector of parameters. Note that N(t2) is the number of
claims up to, but not including, time t. Thus, the parameter b . 0 captures true
occurrence dependence effects. In the bonus-malus system described above,
moral hazard leads to a decline in the intensity of claims with the number of
previous claims (b , 1). Without moral hazard, we expect b 5 1. Distinguish-
ing these cases (testing), and estimating b, is the focus of the empirical analysis.
Statistical tests are developed and applied to a French sample of 79,684
contracts, of which 4,831 have one claim in the contract year and 287 have two
claims or more. The null (b 5 1) cannot be rejected at any conventional level,
suggesting that moral hazard is not a major problem in the data under consid-
eration.
3.2 Testing for Moral Hazard from Sequences of Accident Counts
When only the total numbers of accidents by year are known, we can develop
and apply similar methods for testing occurrence dependence in panel count
data. Here, we focus on the more challenging case in which we only observe an
annual sequence of 0s and 1s, corresponding to respectively years without and
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years with at least one accident, for each agent. Econometric procedures for
testing for occurrence dependence on such data have been developed by Heck-
man (1978, 1981a, 1981b), Honore´ (1993), Kyriazidou (1997), and Honore´ and
Kyriazidou (2000). They rely on the assumption that each agent’s accident
probability remains constant throughout the observation period (stationarity).6
To get the intuition in a simple way, assume the system is malus only (i.e., the
premium increases after each accident, but does not decrease subsequently), and
consider two sequences of 4 years, A 5 (1, 0, 0, 0) and B 5 (0, 0, 0, 1), where
a 1 (resp. 0) denotes the occurrence of an accident (resp. no accident) during the
corresponding year. In the absence of moral hazard, and assuming away learn-
ing phenomena, the probabilities of observing either of the two sequences
should be exactly the same; in both cases, the observed accident frequency is 25
percent. Under moral hazard, however, the  rst sequence is more probable than
the second: in A, the sequence of three years without accidents happens after an
accident, hence when the premium, and consequently the marginal cost of future
accidents and the incentives to take care are maximum. In other words, for a
given average frequency of accidents, the timing of the occurrences can provide
valuable information on the importance of incentives.
The test described here assumes stationarity. The analogy with the methods
for continuous-time data of Abbring et al. (forthcoming) discussed earlier
suggests that tests can be developed that are informative on moral hazard even
if individual accident probabilities may change over time for external reasons.
Richer panel-count data, that do not only record whether an accident has
occurred at all but also how many accidents have occurred in any year, may be
helpful here. This is on our research agenda.
3.3 Testing for Moral Hazard from Total Number of Accidents Only
Even in the case in which information is minimal—i.e., in which only the total
number of past accidents is known for each agent in the insurer’s database—it
is still possible to test for moral hazard. In this case, we essentially have a
cross-section of total accident counts over the periods that agents have been
driving (seniority). Under additional stationarity assumptions, one can exploit
the variation in seniority in the data set to test for moral hazard. Speci cally,
assume that (a) individual accident probabilities are constant over time, and (b)
the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in the population is identical across
cohorts (seniority levels). That is, conditionally on observables, the no accident
probability p is distributed among the drivers of any given seniority according
to some distribution m that is identical across seniorities. The idea of the test, as
developed by Chiappori and Heckman (2000), is the following. Under the null
of no moral hazard, for any driver with seniority t and no accident probability
6. In the duration model, this would correspond to a constant c.
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p, the probability of having no accident throughout the observation period is pt.
Hence the proportion of drivers with no accident throughout the period is, under
the null, equal to
m t5 E p tdm~ p!,
i.e., to the t-th moment of the distribution. It follows that the numbers m1,
m2, . . . must, under the null, be the successive moments of the same distribu-
tion, which generates a  rst set of restrictions (see Heckman 1978 and in a
different context Chiappori 1985). In addition, one can see that again under the
null, the proportion, within the subpopulation of seniority t, of agents with
exactly one accident is
m t
15 E tp t21~12 p!dm~p!
5 t~mt212 mt!.
This provides a set of simple, linear restrictions involving three statistics,
namely mt21, mt and mt
1. Additional restrictions can be derived involving higher
numbers of accidents. An analogous analysis for the moral hazard case is
required to judge the power of tests based on these restrictions. These are topics
for future research. Note that, in any case, these tests involve a comparison of
disjoint subpopulations and heavily exploit stationarity assumptions.
3.4 Testing for Adverse Selection
In the three cases considered, the null (no moral hazard) is consistent with the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity, whatever its type. Such heterogeneity
re ects the impact of any variable that is not observed by the insurance company
(and therefore the researcher), whether it is known by the insuree or not. In other
words, one does not, under the null, distinguish between adverse selection and
symmetrically imperfect information. Testing for adverse selection (and partic-
ularly asymmetric learning) requires analyzing the joint process followed by
accidents and contractual choices.
In a dynamic setting, adverse selection can be modelled in various ways.
One way is to assume that each agent is characterized by some constant
parameter re ecting her ‘quality’ as a driver, which is known by the agent but
not by the insurer at the beginning of the relationship. In this setting, adverse
selection can be tested using the simple, cross-sectional approach described in
the introduction. In the case of automobile insurance, most existing analyses fail
to  nd positive conditional correlation, at least on populations of young drivers.
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This suggests that adverse selection, if any, is not adequately described by the
‘ xed quality parameter’ story.
A more complex but also more convincing version relies on the asymmetric
learning argument sketched in the introduction. There, adverse selection grad-
ually emerges during the relationship. A natural empirical strategy is to study
the causal relationship between the sequences of accidents and contract choices
(or amendments). In particular, agents who learn their risk is above average are
more likely to switch to a contract entailing a more comprehensive coverage.
The previous (heterogeneity versus occurrence-dependence) perspective must
then be extended to a two-dimensional process. Again, this will be the topic of
future work.
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Abstract
This paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral
hazard. We first show that experience rating implies negative occurrence dependence under
moral hazard: individual claim intensities decrease with the number of past claims. We then
show that dynamic insurance data allow to distinguish this moral-hazard effect from dynamic
selection on unobservables. We develop nonparametric tests and estimate a flexible paramet-
ric model. We find no evidence of moral hazard in French car insurance. Our analysis
contributes to a recent literature based on static data that has problems distinguishing between
moral hazard and selection and dealing with dynamic features of actual insurance contracts.
Methodologically, this paper builds on and extends the literature on state dependence and
heterogeneity in event-history data. (JEL: D82, G22, C41, C14)
1. Introduction
Empirical tests of contract theory using insurance data have recently attracted
much attention. Several papers test for the existence and estimate the magnitude
of asymmetric-information effects in competitive insurance markets. Puelz and
Snow (1994), Dionne and Vanasse (1992), Chiappori and Salanie´ (1997, 2000),
Dionne, Gourie´roux, and Vanasse (1999, 2001), and Richaudeau (1999), to
name only a few, analyze car-insurance contracts, whereas Holly, Gardiol,
Domenighetti, and Bisig (1998), Chiappori, Durand, and Geoffard (1998),
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Chiappori, Geoffard, and Kyriadizou (1998), Cardon and Hendel (1998), and
Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) use health or life insurance data, and Finkelstein and
Poterba (2002) concentrate on annuities.
1.1 The “Conditional-Correlation” Approach
One popular empirical strategy focuses on the correlation between the contract
choice and the occurrence of an accident, conditional on observables. This
correlation is informative on asymmetric-information effects. Under adverse
selection, for instance, agents know whether their accident probability exceeds
the average in their risk class (as defined by the insurer in terms of the available
information). If it does, they are both more likely to choose a contract with more
complete coverage and more likely to have an accident, everything else equal.
It follows that, conditional on observables, the choice of full insurance should
coincide with a higher accident rate. This is a property that can be tested using
parametric or nonparametric techniques.
The conditional-correlation approach has several advantages. It is simple
and very robust, as argued by Chiappori and Salanie´ (1997) and Chiappori,
Jullien, Salanie´, and Salanie´ (2001). Furthermore, it can be used on static,
cross-sectional data that are relatively easy to obtain. However, these qualities
come at a cost. First, the effect of the past history of the relationship on the
current contract is both difficult to model and difficult to estimate. Nevertheless,
it can be of crucial importance, especially if experience rating plays a role.
Second, the conditional-correlation approach may not allow to identify the type
of information asymmetry involved (if any). Under adverse selection, accident-
prone agents choose to buy more insurance. Moral hazard, on the other hand,
suggests the opposite causality: agents who, for any reason, buy more insurance
become more risky because the extensive coverage has a negative effect on
incentives and discourages cautious behavior. To the extent that static data only
allow to identify correlations, these two mechanisms cannot be distinguished.1
1.2 Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and the Dynamics of Asymmetric
Information
The approach used in this paper relies on the idea that adverse selection and
moral hazard can be distinguished by analyzing the dynamic aspects of the
relationship (Chiappori 2000). This can be done in two different ways. One
possible strategy compares the features of existing contracts to theoretical
1. Several articles try to empirically disentangle adverse selection and moral hazard. For instance,
Holly et al. (1998) and Cardon and Hendel (1998) estimate structural models of health insurance,
while Chiappori, Durand, and Geoffard (1998) and Dionne, Maurice, Pinquet, and Vanasse (2001)
exploit “natural experiments” in which a new regulation exogenously changes incentives.
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predictions about the form of optimal contracts under adverse selection and
moral hazard. This approach exploits the fact that, in a dynamic setting,
optimality has different implications in each case. Hence, a careful empirical
investigation of the dynamic features of observed contracts may provide useful
insights in the type of problem they are designed to address.2 An alternative
strategy, which we adopt throughout the present paper, does not assume opti-
mality of existing contracts. Instead, it takes existing (and possibly suboptimal)
contracts as given and contrasts the behavior implied by theory under adverse
selection and moral hazard to observed behavior. The idea is that particular
features of existing contracts, whether optimal or not, have different theoretical
implications for observed behavior under adverse selection and moral hazard.
Thus, the two can be distinguished by a careful analysis of observed behavior.
The two strategies just described have their own advantages and disadvan-
tages. The first approach should in principle be very robust, to the extent that it
relies on simple, qualitative characteristics of optimal contracts. Another virtue
is that its implementation requires only data on contracts, which are in general
much easier to obtain than data on induced behavior.3 However, these qualities
come at a cost. First, the qualitative characteristics of optimal dynamic contracts
under asymmetric information may be very difficult to derive, except for very
specific cases. They may moreover involve complex schemes, such as random-
ized contracts or sophisticated revelation mechanisms, which are hardly ever
observed in real life.4 A second concern is that optimal contracts are typically
derived within a simplified framework (assuming for instance linear technolo-
gies, no loading, no transaction costs, etc.). The robustness of the corresponding
conclusions in a more realistic and therefore more complex setting is not
guaranteed. A particularly important issue is the presence of unobserved heter-
ogeneity in individual characteristics, notably risk aversion. Arguably, any
“realistic” model of optimal insurance contracts should not only consider the
particular feature under study (moral hazard or adverse selection on risk), but
should also take the paramount presence of adverse selection on preferences into
account. This in general requires a characterization of optimal contracts under
either adverse selection and moral hazard or multidimensional adverse selection.
These are very difficult problems, especially in a dynamic context, and little is
known about their solutions.5 Finally, even casual empiricism indicates that
actual insurance contracts are not always optimal (to say the least). For instance,
2. See Dionne and Doherty (1994) for an early example.
3. For instance, Hendel and Lizzeri (2001) find evidence of symmetric learning by comparing the
actuarial value of life insurance contracts in which future premia may or may not vary with the
agent’s future health status. Interestingly, their analysis does not require data on actual mortality.
4. For example, Chiappori, Macho, Rey, and Salanie´ (1994) show that, under moral hazard,
renegotiation-proof implementation of any effort level above the minimum is impossible without
randomized contracts if savings are not observable. This is true except for the special case of
monetary cost of effort and CARA preferences.
5. The reader is referred to Rochet and Stole (2000) for a survey of multidimensional adverse
selection, and to Chassagnon and Chiappori (2000), Jullien, Salanie´, and Salanie´ (1999), and
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theory suggests that the characteristics of an optimal experience-rating scheme
should be specific to each class of risk; that individuals, at least in the presence
of adverse selection, should be offered a menu of various experience-rating
schemes; and that not only the premium, but also the deductible (and more
generally the whole nonlinear reimbursement profile) should depend on past
experience. These features, however, are rarely observed in real life.6
For these reasons, we choose to adopt the second approach: we study the
behavior induced by existing contracts without necessarily assuming that those
contracts are optimal in any sense. Specifically, we exploit the fact that most
real-life insurance contracts exhibit some form of experience rating (although
not necessarily the optimal form predicted by theory). Under moral hazard,
experience rating has very interesting implications. The occurrence of an acci-
dent affects the whole schedule of future premia. This changes not only the
expected wealth of the agent and the expected average cost of insurance, but
also, more importantly, the (expected) discounted marginal cost of future
accidents. The cost of the next accident (in terms of, say, expected future premia
or the corresponding certainty-equivalent) thus depends on the current premium
and hence on the past accident history. It follows that the occurrence of an
accident changes the incentives faced by a driver and therefore, under moral
hazard, the future accident probability. This suggests that we can test for moral
hazard by testing for such dynamics in the agent’s accident process. A contri-
bution of this paper is to point out the close link between this idea and a problem
that has been studied at length in econometrics, the distinction between pure
heterogeneity and state dependence.
1.3 Heterogeneity Versus State Dependence
The problem of distinguishing heterogeneity and state dependence originally
appeared in economics in relation to unemployment and labor-supply issues (see
Heckman and Borjas 1980, and Heckman 1981).7 For example, it is well-known
that individuals who are unemployed now are more likely to be unemployed in
the future. There are two explanations for this empirical finding. One is that past
unemployment has a direct, negative impact on the worker’s future employment
prospects (because of e.g. stigma effects, decreased investments in human
capital, etc.). This is the state-dependence explanation, whereby unemployment
Araujo and Moreira (2002) for examples of models involving moral hazard and adverse selection.
These papers, however, only consider a static setting.
6. From a more technical point of view, the optimality assumption also leads to difficult
endogeneity issues. For instance, it is not possible, in general, to compare the performances of the
different schemes that coexist on the market without taking into account the inherent selection bias:
since each schedule is assumed optimal, the coexistence of different schemes must reflect
differences in the corresponding populations. Such bias can be very difficult to correct for.
7. The statistical problem of distinguishing between spurious and true state dependence has a
long history, with seminal contributions by Feller (1943) and Bates and Neyman (1952).
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spells have a genuine effect on the agent’s behavior in the sense that “an
otherwise identical individual who did not experience unemployment would
behave differently in the future than an individual who experienced unemploy-
ment” (Heckman and Borjas 1980, p. 247). Alternatively, the observed pattern
may simply reflect the dynamic selection effects of unobserved heterogeneity.
Assume that workers differ by some unobserved characteristics that affect their
employment probability. Suppose that these characteristics are positively related
over time and not affected by labor-market outcomes. Then, “less employable”
workers are more likely to be unemployed both now and in the future. This
results in a positive association between past and future unemployment, which
is spurious in the sense that past unemployment matters only as a proxy for their
unobservable employability (which, by assumption, is not affected by labor-
market outcomes). The literature has clarified this distinction between state
dependence and pure heterogeneity and has produced various methods for their
empirical analysis. In particular, panel-data methods have been developed that
exploit the fact that the two explanations have different implications for the
dynamics of employment.
In this paper, we will more formally develop the idea that moral hazard
leads to a particular form of state dependence in the accident process under
experience rating.8 We will then argue that testing for moral hazard boils down
to testing for this true state dependence in the presence of unobserved hetero-
geneity. We will follow the labor literature and exploit that true state depen-
dence, and therewith moral hazard, can be detected by analyzing the dynamics
of, in our case, accidents.9
1.4 The French “Bonus-Malus” Scheme and State Dependence
We consider a scheme used by French insurance companies, the so-called
“bonus-malus” mechanism. This mechanism is both simple and explicit, which
considerably simplifies the empirical investigation. Contracts are renewed and
premiums are revised annually. The premium is the product of two factors, the
“base premium” and the “bonus-malus coefficient” at the time of contract
renewal. The base premium is computed at the beginning of the relationship. It
can be defined freely, but can only depend on observables and must be uniform
over agents with identical characteristics. It cannot be modified during the
relationship unless some observable characteristic changes, and only in a pre-
defined way. Experience rating operates through the second component, the
8. Note that in the contract theory framework, the theoretical structure may moreover provide
specific predictions on the direction of state dependence effects. In our context, for instance, the
characteristics of the experience-rating scheme at stake imply that the occurrence an accident can
only increase prevention efforts.
9. For a similar approach on labor data in a learning framework see Chiappori, Salanie´, and
Valentin (1999).
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bonus-malus coefficient, on which we shall particularly concentrate in the
paper.10 An important feature of the French system is that the bonus-malus
coefficient “sticks” to the agent, in the sense that an agent switching insurers
will bring her old coefficient into the new contract. In particular, attrition cannot
be explained by an attempt to “escape” the current coefficient. This will be
important for the empirical analysis.
The evolution of the bonus-malus coefficient only depends on accidents for
which the insuree is fully or partly responsible (accidents entirely caused by a
third party are fully covered, in general by the third party’s insurance and at no
cost for the victim). Each year without such an accident (or, more appropriately,
claim) decreases the coefficient by some fixed factor   1 (currently 0.95).
Each accident caused by the insuree—there can be more than one in a contract
year—increases the coefficient by a factor   1 (currently 1.25).11 It follows
that any accident shifts the whole distribution of future (contingent) premia
upwards, by a factor . Roughly, the “cost” of the (n  1)-th accident is  times
larger than that of the n-th.
These properties will, in turn, affect the optimal effort profile. A natural
conjecture is that the increased marginal cost results in more cautious behavior
and smaller accident probabilities. This intuition, however, deserves more
careful scrutiny, because of the complex nature of the problem. Several effects
should be considered. For instance, the upward shift in the premium schedule
decreases the agent’s expected wealth and the resulting wealth effect can modify
risk aversion in a way that may confound our results. Also, the “future cost”
alluded to above is in fact a random variable. Its distribution depends not only
on the risk characteristics of the agent, but also on the future effort profile.
Conversely, the latter will depend on (the consequences of) current behavior. In
other words, the determination of the optimal effort level in each period requires
the solution of an optimal control problem. In Section 2, we carefully investigate
this problem by developing a theoretical model of dynamic moral hazard under
experience rating. We show that, under standard convexity assumptions on
preferences and the prevention technology, the intuition above is correct if the
cost of insurance (premium and deductible) is a small fraction of income.
Everything else equal (i.e., controlling for heterogeneity), the optimal effort
level should increase with the premium. This implies that, conditionally on the
driver’s characteristics, the dynamics of accidents should exhibit negative
“occurrence dependence”: the occurrence of an accident decreases the individ-
10. In the period covered by our data, the base premium could actually depend on the claim
history as well. If anything, however, the base premium varied like the bonus-malus coefficient and
amplified the experience-rating scheme.
11. In addition, there exists a cap and a floor of the bonus-malus coefficient (currently, 3.5 and
0.5). Also, insurees who have had the maximum bonus without a claim for at least three years
receive a “malus-deductible”: their next claim at fault does not trigger a malus but only loss of the
malus-deductible. It is easy to see that this does not qualitatively affect our conclusions on moral
hazard and occurrence dependence.
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ual’s probability of future accidents.12 This is the true state-dependence mech-
anism in our insurance context. Note that this prediction relies on the presence
of moral hazard.
As in the labor example above, this conclusion only holds conditionally.
Unobserved heterogeneity introduces an opposite association in the raw data:
good drivers, who pay lower premia, tend to have both a smaller number of past
accidents and a smaller probability of future accidents. Therefore, as in the labor
literature alluded to above, our main empirical task is to disentangle the effects
of pure heterogeneity from those of the particular type of state dependence that
is induced by the presence of moral hazard. Section 3 exploits these ideas in the
empirical analysis of moral hazard using longitudinal insurance data. We
specify a nonparametric econometric model of claim times that allows for both
occurrence dependence and dynamic selection on unobservables. The model is
specified in terms of the individual’s accident (or, better, claim) rate, which is
assumed to be proportional in occurrence-dependence and heterogeneity effects
on the one hand and the effects of time on the other hand. Our analysis extends
existing results of the state-dependence literature in various directions. We
develop a model that allows for general nonstationarity (through proportional
pure time effects) in the claim intensity. We propose new tests that correct for
such nonstationarity, and discuss their relation to the existing literature. Finally,
we analyze the identifiability of a special case of the model and present some
estimation results. Section 4 concludes. Details are relegated to the Appendix.
2. Dynamic Moral Hazard under Experience Rating: Theory
2.1 The Model
We consider a dynamic version of an insurance model along the lines of Mossin
(1968). Time is continuous on [0, T˜ ], for some finite T˜  0. The wealth of agent
i at time t is denoted by Wi(t) and accumulates as follows. At time 0, agent i is
endowed with some initial wealth Wi(0). Then, between t and t  dt agent i
receives some income flow wi(t)dt and chooses a consumption flow Ci(t)dt
(where 0  t  T˜ ).13 In addition, the agent causes an accident with some
probability pi(t)dt.14 If so, she incurs some monetary loss, which is covered by
an insurance contract involving a fixed deductible Di and a premium qi(t)dt that
is paid continuously.
The premium depends on past experience. In particular, it satisfies the
12. This type of state dependence is labelled “structural occurrence dependence” by Heckman
and Borjas (1980).
13. We assume that the income path is integrable on [0, T˜ ].
14. Accidents that are not caused by the agent are fully covered and have no impact on future
premiums. Such accidents can be and are disregarded in our analysis.
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following “bonus-malus” system. If agent i does not cause an accident between
t and t  dt, the premium is decreased by an amount dqi  qi(t)dt (the
“bonus”). If she causes an accident, on the other hand, the premium jumps
discontinuously to qi(t). Here,   1  0 is the proportional “malus.”
Accidents caused by the agent are subject to moral hazard. That is, at each
time t, the agent chooses the intensity pi(t) of having an accident from some
bounded interval [0, p i], at a utility cost i(pi(t)). We assume that i is twice
differentiable on (0, p i), with i  0 and i  0. In words, reducing accident
rates is costly and returns to prevention are decreasing. For definiteness, we also
assume that limp1p ii(p)  0.
The agent’s instantaneous utility from consuming Ci(t) and driving with
accident intensity pi(t) at time t is ui(Ci(t))  i(pi(t)). We assume that ui is
increasing and strictly concave, so that the agent is risk-averse. The agent
chooses consumption and accident-intensity plans that maximize total expected
utility

0
T˜
	ui	Ci	t

  i	 pi	t


dt
subject to some final wealth constraint, given the wealth and premium dynamics
described above. For simplicity, we assume that the agent perfectly foresees her
income path {wi(t); 0  t  T˜}. Thus, she only has to form expectations on
future accidents and their implications.
2.2 Results
For notational convenience, we now drop the index i. It should be clear,
however, that all results are valid at the individual level, irrespective of the
distribution of preferences and technologies across agents. In particular, the
results hold for any type of unobserved heterogeneity in these primitives of the
model.
A first result is
LEMMA 1. At each time t, the optimal consumption and accident intensities only
depend on the past history through the agent’s wealth W(t) and the premium
q(t).
Lemma 1 states that the only channel through which past accidents influence
current behavior is their impact on the incentives faced by the agent, for which
the current premium is a sufficient statistic, and on wealth. We have disregarded
alternative channels, such as learning, fear, or cautionary reaction to an accident
by assuming that the prevention technology, as represented by the cost function
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, does not depend on the past experience of accidents directly. The empirical
relevance of this assumption will be discussed in Section 3.
The agent faces an optimal control problem. The value function V for this
problem satisfies the Bellman equation
V	t, W, q
  max
C, p
u	C
dt 	p
dt pdtV	t dt, W w	t
dt D Cdt
 qdt, q
 	1 pdt
V	t dt, W w	t
dt Cdt qdt, q qdt
.
In words, between t and t  dt the agent derives utility from her consumption
and disutility from her prevention effort. If no accident occurs (with probability
1  pdt), her wealth is increased by the income flow minus consumption and the
premium, and the premium is continuously reduced. If the agent causes an
accident (with probability pdt) then she must in addition pay the deductible, and
the premium jumps to q. The Bellman equation can be rewritten as
0  max
C,p
u	C
 	p
 pV	t, W, q
 V	t, W D, q

 Vt	t, W, q
 VW	t, W, q
w	t
 C q Vq	t, W, q
q, (B)
with Vt, VW, and Vq the partial derivatives of V with respect to t, W, and q,
respectively.
We are interested in the qualitative properties of the value function V and
the optimal accident intensity. First note that agents dislike high premiums.
Take some premiums q and q  q. At any moment t, an agent who faces q
could derive higher utility than under the higher premium q by simply using the
strategy that would be optimal under q. Using the optimal strategy at q instead
can only further improve the gain. Hence,
LEMMA 2. The value function V is decreasing in the premium q.
We now concentrate on the impact of the current premium on the optimal
accident intensity. First note that the agent’s behavior for “large” premium
levels may be atypical. Given the dynamics described previously, the premium
could exceed the agent’s current income, current wealth, or even lifetime wealth
if the number of accidents is large enough. This situation, however, will not
arise because the agent can always choose a zero accident probability (although
presumably at a high cost), say by giving up driving. Note that in that case, the
accident probability becomes totally inelastic to the premium.
In most cases, however, both the premium and the deductible are “small”
relative to income.15 We now show that for such “small” values of the premium
and the deductible, the prevention effort is increasing (the accident intensity is
15. Both premiums and deductibles are a few hundred dollars in our sample, which is one or two
percent of the median household income in the population under consideration.
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decreasing) in the premium, as intuition suggests. To this end, consider the first
order conditions of the program (B),
u	C*	t, W, q

  VW	t, W, q

	p*	t, W, q

 V	t, W, q
 V	t, W D, q
,
where p*(t, W, q) and C*(t, W, q) are, respectively, the optimal accident and
consumption intensities at time t, wealth W, and premium q. The first equation
is the standard Euler condition for intertemporal optimality. The second condi-
tion implies that
	 p*	t, W, q

p*q	t, W, q
  Vq	t, W  D, q
  Vq	t, W, q
,
where p*q is the partial derivative of p* with respect to q. For “small” values of
q and D, this condition becomes
p*q	t, W, q
 
  1
	 p*	t, W, q

 Vq	t, W, 0
  0
and the accident intensity decreases with the premium.
As a consequence, the intensity of the accident process will drop discon-
tinuously at the time of an accident, in response to a discontinuous jump in the
premium. We formally state this conclusion as
PROPOSITION 1. For small enough values of the premium and the deductible, the
optimal accident intensity drops discontinuously at the time of an accident.
Proposition 1 provides a simple testable implication of moral hazard under
experience rating: under moral hazard, the occurrence of an accident results in
a discontinuous drop in the accident intensity. In other words, the accident
process should exhibit negative occurrence dependence. The rest of the paper is
devoted to empirical tests of this prediction.
It is important to stress again that the theoretical analysis in this section
operates at the individual level. For any given agent i the dynamics of accidents
should exhibit the type of state dependence just described, irrespective of the
distribution of preferences and technologies across agents. However, empirical
tests of occurrence dependence have to rely on interindividual comparisons, if
only to control for time-effects that are common across individuals. Unobserved
heterogeneity thus becomes a critical issue in the empirical analysis.
The theoretical model provides a simplified representation of actual expe-
rience-rating schemes and the agent’s behavior under these schemes. We al-
ready mentioned the fact that we ignore the nonmonetary consequences of an
accident. A more technical issue is that the theory assumes that the premium is
adjusted continuously, whereas premiums are typically only adjusted at discrete
dates (e.g., annually) in actual experience-rating systems. Finally, real-life
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schemes often entail ceilings and floors on the premium.16 Our view is that the
previous model nevertheless provides a useful approximation of actual behavior.
3. Econometric Specification and Empirical Analysis
3.1 Introduction
We now turn to the main problem of this paper, the empirical distinction of
moral hazard on the one hand and adverse selection or, more generally, selection
induced by unobserved heterogeneity on the other hand. As argued in the
introduction, we propose to exploit dynamic data on claims under experience-
rated contracts. Proposition 1 suggests a simple, direct test on negative occur-
rence dependence in observed claim rates. However, we can only directly
control for observed individual characteristics and the occurrence-dependence
effects due to moral hazard are likely to be confounded with the effects of
dynamic selection on unobservable characteristics. In particular, insurees with a
history of many accidents are likely to be more accident-prone for unobserved
reasons. This leads to a positive effect of past claims on current claim proba-
bilities that counters the negative effect of any moral hazard. In other words, the
problem of distinguishing between moral hazard and selection is similar to a
standard problem of distinguishing state (occurrence) dependence and unob-
served heterogeneity.
The solution to this problem depends primarily on the type of data available.
In many empirical studies in insurance (including ours), data are derived from
the insurance companies’ administrative files. Many relevant characteristics of
the driver (age, gender, place of residence, type of job, etcetera) and the car
(brand, model, vintage, power, etcetera) are used by companies for pricing
purposes. These data are typically available to the econometrician as well. The
same is true for the characteristics of the contract (type of coverage, premium,
deductible, etc.). Finally, each accident—or more precisely each claim—is
recorded with all the relevant background information.
Data sets mainly differ in the way the past claim history of insurees is
recorded and made available to researchers. Many experience-rating schemes
(including the French) can be implemented with data on the number of claims
in each contract year only. Often this results in only (panel) counts of claims
being provided to econometricians, without any information on the exact dates
16. In France, for instance, the bonus-malus coefficient cannot fall below 0.5 or increase above
3.5. Given the actual values of  (1.25) and  (0.95 annually), however, the 0.5 level cannot be
reached within thirteen years. The 3.5 coefficient can be reached more quickly, but requires at least
six accidents (and more if the agent receives bonuses for claim-free years before having six
accidents). Therefore, given that drivers have on average one accident every seven years, reaching
the ceiling quickly is a very rare event. Indeed, we do not find any driver in our data who is at the
ceiling.
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of the accidents. Some schemes can even be implemented if only the total
number of claims in a given period is known. This gives rise to (cross-sectional)
claim-count data. The empirical distinction of state-dependence and heteroge-
neity with such (panel or cross-sectional) count data is a difficult problem, but
one that has been studied in the literature. However, we leave application and
extension of this literature to our insurance problem for future work.
In this paper, we study the more favorable situation in which the exact date
of each claim is provided. This suggests specifying a continuous-time event-
history model of claims that allows for occurrence dependence and unobserved
heterogeneity. The theory of Section 2 shows that moral hazard leads to negative
dependence of individual claim intensities on the occurrence of previous claims.
Unobserved heterogeneity in claim intensities captures any dynamic selection
effects. In general, the occurrence-dependence effects of moral hazard will be
heterogeneous in the population. To accommodate this, we allow for general
interactions between occurrence dependence and individual-specific effects in
most of our analyses. We will derive some extra, stronger results for an
econometric model in which occurrence dependence acts proportionally on the
claim intensity and is homogeneous across agents.
Three caveats should be mentioned. First, premiums are only updated
annually and not continuously as in the theoretical model. Under discounting,
this may introduce nonstationarity in the agent’s decision problem beyond that
implied by the finite horizon in the theoretical model: when contract renewal is
near, the “cost” of an accident is higher than when premiums have just been
updated. This effect seems to be of only minor importance. It does however
suggest that we should allow for nonstationarity in “contract time” (i.e., time
since the last premium update).17 This is particularly true because contract-time
effects may bias our assessment of occurrence dependence in arbitrary ways.
Second, we observe only claims, not accidents, and the decision to file a
claim is endogenous. It is well known that this introduces a second type of moral
hazard, which is often referred to as “ex post” in the insurance literature. For
instance, experience rating results in more cautious driving ex ante and in-
creased reluctance to file a claim for a minor accident ex post.18 Neither the
17. In the French system, claims enter the bonus-malus coefficient with a delay of two months.
More precisely, the history considered in determining the new bonus-malus coefficient at any
particular contract renewal date consists of all claims corresponding to losses incurred during the
year that has ended two months before the renewal date. For example, a new premium that is issued
on January 1, 1989 is based on the history used in writing the old (January 1, 1988) contract and
all claims in the period November 1, 1987–October 31, 1988. One could say that contract time is
lagging claim-history time by two months. Clearly, theory predicts nonstationarity in claim-history
time rather than in contract time. However, because the difference between the two is common
across all agents, we can simply control for claim-history time by flexibly controlling for contract
time.
18. A possible solution, used by Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000) in their cross-sectional analysis,
is to consider exclusively accidents in which a second party was involved (in which case a claim
is almost automatically filed). However, this solution has two drawbacks in the present context: it
would decrease the number of accidents (and especially the number of cases in which two accidents
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theory nor the empirical analysis distinguishes between these two types of moral
hazard (in a sense, the prevention technology in the theoretical model can be
seen as a reduced form for both). It is not clear, actually, that ex-ante and ex-post
moral hazard should be distinguished at all (typically they should not be from
the insurer’s perspective). Anyhow, since both effects go in the same direction,
the presence of ex-post moral hazard (if any) can only bias our estimate of
ex-ante moral hazard upwards. Since we fail to find any significant effect at all,
we suspect that both effects are negligible.
Third, there may be learning effects. In the theory section, we assume that
past accidents only affect current behavior through a monetary channel (i.e.,
increased monetary incentives to exercise caution). In reality, there may be other
channels as well. In particular, a young driver is presumably not perfectly
informed about her driving ability and may learn about this ability from
accidents. In the presence of moral hazard, such learning may in turn affect the
probability of future accidents. For example, an upward reassessment of the
accident probability in the absence of effort may enhance the perceived benefits
of cautious driving. We address this problem in two different ways. First, even
though accidents in which the driver is at fault typically have both incentive and
learning effects, accidents that are entirely caused by a third party can only have
learning effects and have no monetary-incentive effects. We exploit this fact by
repeating our tests on a sample including all accidents, rather than just accidents
at fault. Second, learning should be more important for young drivers than for
experienced drivers. Thus, we can test for the relevance of learning by repeating
our analysis on subsamples of inexperienced and experienced drivers and
contrasting the results. These additional analyses, which are discussed in detail
in Subsection 3.6, suggest that our conclusions are robust to learning effects.
The remainder of the paper will be concerned with the specification,
identification and empirical analysis of an appropriate continuous-time model of
insurance claims. We have seen that, within such a framework, a test on moral
hazard boils down to a test with a null of no (genuine) occurrence dependence
against the alternative of (genuine, negative) occurrence dependence. Our
analysis will build on and extend the existing literature on state dependence and
heterogeneity in continuous-time event-history models.
It should be stressed from the outset that the null of no moral hazard is
consistent with the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, whatever its type.
Such heterogeneity may reflect the impact of any information that is not
available to the insurance company, but may or may not be known by the
insuree himself. In other words, we do not, under the null, distinguish between
adverse selection and symmetrically imperfect information.19 It is important to
are observed) and it would lead to ignoring events (i.e., one-person accidents) that nevertheless
influence incentives through their impact on the premium.
19. Moreover, in most of our analysis we do not control for observed heterogeneity (see the next
subsection). This observed heterogeneity will be absorbed by the individual-specific effect.
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note, however, that testing for adverse selection is certainly possible in this
context, and can provide interesting insights in the nature of learning processes.
The idea would be to analyze the changes in insurance contracts initiated by the
drivers, and the subsequent impact on the accident hazards.20 This is left for
future work.
3.2 The Econometric Model
Our analysis focuses on the occurrence of car insurance claims in a single
insurance contract year, i.e., the period bounded by two consecutive contract
renewal dates. We first present a model for the population of claim histories in
the contract year.
Let time have its origin at the start of the contract year. Then, if the contract
year is of length T, it can be represented by the interval [0, T ]. Let Tk be the time
of the k-th claim in the contract year. Denote the corresponding counting process
by N[0, T ] : {N(t); 0  t  T}, where N(t) : #{k : Tk  t} counts the number
of claims in the contract year up to time t. N[0, T] is the focus of our model and
empirical analysis.
The intensity  of claims at time t, conditional on the claim history N[0, t)
: {N(u); 0  u  t} up to time t and a nonnegative individual-specific effect
	 is
 	t	, N0, t

  	
		
N	t
	t
, (M)
with 
 : [0, )3 (0, ) a bounded measurable function and  : [0, T ]3 (0, )
a continuous function that captures contract-time effects.21 We frequently use
the notation (t) : 0t (u)du. We normalize (T)  1, so that 	 captures the
scale of . We assume that 	 has marginal distribution G. Together with
equation (M), this fully specifies the distribution of N[0, T].
Equation (M) gives the individual claim intensity at time t of an insuree
with characteristics 	 and claim history N[0, t). Any nontrivial dependence of
Therefore, any “unobserved” heterogeneity found may also reflect symmetrically observed infor-
mation.
20. Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000) find no evidence of adverse selection on a sample of “young”
(i.e., recent) drivers. They note, however, that adverse selection may also arise during the
relationship, due to asymmetries in learning between the firm and the client (e.g., such an
informative event as a near-miss is typically observed by the driver only). For a theoretical
investigation, see de Garidel (1997).
21. The model only recognizes contract time and does not explicitly consider the effects of
calendar time (or duration since last event for that matter). In a typical sample, different contracts
have different renewal dates, so that contract time and calendar time do not coincide (see the next
section). Nonstationarity in contract time arises in theory because of discounting and the discrete-
time nature of contract renewal, and possibly because of learning. Also, of all time effects,
contract-time effects are most likely to confound our analysis of occurrence dependence, which
concerns previous occurrence of claims in the contract year. We therefore want to deal with
contract-time effects in a flexible manner.
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this claim intensity on the insuree’s claim history N[0, t) can be interpreted as
true state dependence. In our model (M), this state dependence takes the form
of occurrence dependence: individual claim intensities at time t only depend on
the claim history N[0, t) through the number of past claims N(t).22 The
function 
 captures these occurrence-dependence effects. For an individual with
characteristics 	, the claim intensity is multiplied by a factor 
(	) each time a
claim occurs. We allow this effect to be different across insurees with different
characteristics by allowing 
 to be a nontrivial function of 	.
The claim intensity in (M) is multiplicative in individual heterogeneity and
occurrence-dependence effects on the one hand and time-effects on the other
hand. In this sense it is a proportional-hazards model. It should however be
stressed that our model does not involve observed individual characteristics and
that our main analyses do not use covariate information. Any covariate effects
are subsumed in the (unobserved) individual effect 	. This individual effect can
then also capture the cumulated effects of claims that have occurred before the
sampled contract year started. In Subsection 3.6, we repeat our analyses on
samples that are stratified on covariates. Through stratification we allow for
general interactions of the covariates on the one hand and 	 and the other model
components on the other hand. Either way, we avoid initial-conditions prob-
lems.23
As explained in the Section 2, in the French car-insurance system moral
hazard leads to a decline in the claim intensity with the number of previous
claims: 
(	)  1. Without moral hazard, we expect that 
(	)  1 for all 	. Our
empirical analysis focuses on distinguishing these two cases, in two stages.
First, in Subsection 3.4 we focus on testing the prediction expressed by
Proposition 1 without further assumptions on preferences and technologies. In
terms of the econometric model above, this amounts to testing the null hypoth-
esis that 
(	)  1 for all 	 against the general moral-hazard alternative that

(	)  1 for all 	. We first state a basic result that is useful in the development
of such tests:  and G are identified under the null of no moral hazard. We then
provide two nonparametric tests. The first of these tests, developed in Subsec-
tion 3.4.2, is rooted in the work of Bates and Neyman (1952) and Heckman and
Borjas (1980, Section II.a) for exponential models with general unobserved
heterogeneity. It exploits that, under the null, the total number of claims in a
given (data) period is a sufficient statistic for the unobserved heterogeneity in
the claim intensities. Our contribution is to provide a closely related test that
allows for general nonstationarity in the claim intensities (by not imposing any
restrictions on ). In Subsection 3.4.3 we develop an alternative test that is
inspired by the regression approach to event-history analysis (see, e.g., Heck-
22. Heckman and Borjas (1980) call this “structural occurrence dependence.”
23. Rather than stratifying on covariates, we could extend (M) to include proportional covariate
effects. In a random-effects setting, we would typically assume that 	 is independent of these
covariates. However, such independence will not hold if 	 captures the cumulated effects of claims
that have occurred before the sampled contract year.
781Abbring et al. Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data
man and Borjas 1980, Section II.b) and the methods for paired duration data
developed by Holt and Prentice (1974) and Chamberlain (1985). This test uses
within-individual variation in durations between claims to control for unob-
served heterogeneity. The main distinguishing feature of our test is again that it
allows for general nonstationarity.
Second, in Subsection 3.5 we concentrate on a particular version of the
model in which the occurrence-dependence effects 
(	) are the same across
insurees. More formally, 
 is a trivial function of the individual-specific effect
	. We provide some new identification results for this model, and point out a
relation to the literature on the identifiability of the two-sample mixed propor-
tional hazard (MPH) model (Elbers and Ridder 1982, and Kortram et al. 1995).
Finally, we provide some parametric estimates of 
, , and G.
3.3 Sampling and Data
We observe the claim histories for all insurance contracts at a French insurance
company in a given and common calendar time period of two years, October 1,
1987–September 30, 1989. Different contracts have different renewal dates, so
that contract time and calendar time do not coincide.
The length of the contract year is, appropriately, one year (i.e., T  1, with
time measured in years).24 Ideally, contracts cannot be terminated within a
contract year, except in special circumstances. An example is death of the agent.
Contracts can however be changed during the year. For example, the deductible
can be altered or the contract can be transferred to a new car, which may be in
a different risk class. In our data set, each change of contract triggers creation
of a new record. Records have to be consolidated back into single contracts.
Fortunately, high quality information is available to facilitate such linking.
However, some linking problems may remain and generate some spurious
attrition. Overall, 9.4 percent of the contracts written or renewed in the first
sample year fail to survive a full contract year after that.25 In this paper, we
ignore both true and spurious attrition.
With that qualification, we observe at least one full contract year for each
contract that is not terminated during the first sample year or written anew
during the second. For contracts with renewal dates coinciding with the start
date of the sample, we observe two full contract years if the contract is renewed
after one year. Our observations are the flow of contracts that are written or
renewed in the first sample year, and each observation provides information on
24. More precisely, given the presence of a leap year in the sample period, we take it to be 365
days.
25. More precisely, we compute the rate of attrition as a fraction of all the contracts that are active
at their renewal date in the first sample year, and survive for at least thirty-one days after that. The
latter condition excludes contracts that are terminated at their renewal date in the first sample year,
with a thirty-one-day grace period.
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N[0, T] for the contract year following the renewal or writing of the contract.26
Consistently with the prior discussion, contracts suffering from attrition during
the contract year are discarded. For contracts with two contract years in the
sampling period, the second year is discarded.
Let the resulting random sample contain n contracts, labelled 1, . . . , n. The
i-th observation in the sample is denoted by Ni[0, T ], i  1, . . . , n. Each claim
history Ni[0, T ] in the sample can alternatively be characterized as the number
of claims Ni(T) with, if Ni(T)  0, a vector (T1,i, . . . , TNi(T ),i) of claim times.
Each observation Ni(0, T) is complemented with an unobserved effect 	i that
has distribution G. The claim intensity for observation i is assumed to be given
by (M) evaluated at sample variables.
The bottom panel of Table 1 provides some information on the sample.
Accidents are fairly rare, but the number of contracts n for which we have at
least one full contract year is large, 79,684. Of these contracts, 4,831 have one
claim in the contract year, 270 have two claims, 15 have three claims, and 2
have four claims. No contracts have more than four claims.
One additional subtlety should be discussed here. The data distinguish
between various types of claims. Two types of claims are labeled to be at fault,
either full (inducing a 25 percent premium increase) or partial (12.5 percent),
26. Recall from Footnote 17 that claims in the last two months of the contract year [0, T] do not
affect the new premium that will be issued at T, but only the premium that may be issued one year
later, at 2T. We sample contract years to avoid attrition problems.
TABLE 1. MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES (DISCRETE HETEROGENEITY;
TWELVE TIME INTERVALS )
Occurrence dependence

 0.974 (0.677)
Unobserved heterogeneity
	a 0.052 (0.006)
	b 0.310 (0.427)
Pr (	  	a) 0.939 (0.104)
Pr (	  	b) 0.061 (0.104)
Contract time (piecewise-constant )
Wald statistic   1 15.617
Degrees of freedom 11
p-value 0.156
Number of observations by number of claims
M0,n (no claims) 74,566
M1,n (1 claim) 4,831
M2,n (2 claims) 270
M3,n (3 claims) 15
M4,n (4 claims) 2
Log-likelihood 3,536.16
783Abbring et al. Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data
and are directly relevant to our analysis of moral hazard. We will not distinguish
between these two types of claims and treat each claim, either partially or fully
at fault, to be an event counted by N(t). The sensitivity of the results with respect
to these and other choices is investigated by repeating the analyses on other
samples in Subsection 3.6.
More generally, note that we only model part of the relevant events at this
point. We do not deal with changes of contract as described above, and we
ignore claims that are not at fault (and, sometimes, claims at partial fault). To
some extent, we could deal with these events by including them as time-varying
covariates. However, because of the endogenous nature of, for example,
changes in contract, we plan to pursue a more structural approach, leading to a
richer event-history specification. This is left for future research.
3.4 Testing for Moral Hazard
3.4.1 Identification and Estimation of  under the Null of No Moral Hazard. We
will first show that the contract-time function  can be identified and estimated
under the null hypothesis that 
(	)  1 for all 	 (which, in the sequel, we simply
denote by 
  1). This result will be useful later. As a by-product, we will be
able to discuss and apply a well-known test for occurrence dependence due to
Bates and Neyman (1952) and Heckman and Borjas (1980). Our first moral-
hazard test, which will be discussed in next subsection, is based on this test.
Appendix A.1 provides details that are omitted from this subsection.
Let H1 be the distribution of the first claim time T1 in the subpopulation with
exactly one claim in the contract year (N(T)  1):
H1	t
  Pr	T1  tN	T
 1
.
Clearly, H1 is identified from the distribution of the claim history N[0, T] and
can be estimated consistently by the empirical analog of H1,
Hˆ 1,n	t
 
1
M1,n

i1
n
I	T1,i  t, Ni	T
  1
.
Here, Mk,n : ¥i1n I(Ni(T)  k) more in general denotes the number of
contracts in the sample with exactly k claims. It is easy to show that
H1	t
 
	t

	T
  	t
 (H1)
under the null hypothesis that 
  1. Note in particular that (H1) does not
involve the distribution G of the individual-specific effect 	. This reflects the
fact noted earlier that N(T) is sufficient for 	 under the null. It follows that 
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is identified directly from H1 and can be consistently estimated by Hˆ 1,n under the
null.
Note that identification of G under the null easily follows. The probability
q0(t) : Pr(N(t)  0) of observing no claims up to time t is given by
q0	t
  		t

,
where (s) :  exp(	s)dG(	) is the Laplace transform of G. We have just
seen that  is identified from H1 under the null. This implies that  is identified
on [0, 1] from q0 and H1 under the null. As a consequence,  and G are
identified under the null.27
So far, we have focused on the identification of  from H1 under the null
hypothesis that 
 1. If we would know , we could turn the argument around
and test the null hypothesis that 
 1 by testing the equality H1 . It is easy
to show that
H1	t	
 : Pr	T1  t	, N	T
 1
 	t
 if 
		
 1 and	t
 if 
		
 1 (H1†)
for all 	  0 and t  (0, T). Thus, a test based on the difference between Hˆ 1,n
and  could be designed to have power against the alternatives of moral hazard
(
(	)  1 for all 	, or simply 
  1) and, more generally, occurrence
dependence (
(	)  1 for some 	, or just 
  1).
Obviously, such a test would not be feasible because we do not know . In
the literature, feasible tests have been developed under the additional assump-
tion of stationarity (Bates and Neyman 1952). We say that the model in (M) is
“stationary” if (t) is constant over time t (  T1). The assumption of
stationarity simply pins down (t) to be t/T, so that we can test the null
hypothesis of no moral hazard by testing for uniformity of H1. In this paper, we
do not want to impose stationarity to facilitate a test on moral hazard. We will
however present a uniformity test of H1 and follow Heckman and Borjas (1980)
by interpreting this as a test of the joint null hypothesis of stationarity and no
moral hazard.
Standard distributional test statistics can be computed from Hˆ 1,n. We first
investigate Hˆ 1,n graphically. The top panel of Figure 1 plots Hˆ 1,n and the
uniform distribution function, together with some other functions that are only
of later concern. The bottom panel graphs a kernel estimate of the density of H1,
using an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth 0.05. All analyses are based on
the data described in the bottom panel of Table 1 and include both claims at full
27. This follows successively from the real analyticity and the uniqueness of the Laplace
transform (see, e.g., Widder 1946). Nonparametric estimation of G under the null is relatively hard
and will not be pursued here. The Laplace transform on [0, 1] can be directly estimated from Hˆ 1,n
and the empirical analog of q0 on [0, T ]. However, nonparametric estimation of  on (1, ) and
of G would somehow involve analytic extension and deconvolution, respectively, both of which are
relatively hard to implement empirically. A computationally feasible estimator can possibly be
developed along the lines of the method-of-moments estimator discussed in Heckman, Robb, and
Walker (1990) and in papers referenced therein.
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FIGURE 1. Empirical Distribution Function Hˆ 1,n of T1(N(1)  1), Hˆ 1,n2 , and Empirical
Distribution Function Hˆ 2,n of T2(N(1)  2) (Top), and Kernel Estimate of the Density
of T1N(1)  1 (h1) and Maximum-Likelihood Estimate of  (Bottom)
Note: Based on sample and estimates from Table 1. For the bottom graph, an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth 0.05
is used (see Appendix A.1).
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fault and claims at partial fault. At first glance, we find that Hˆ 1,n(t)  t/T. If we
would maintain the stationarity assumption, we could take this as evidence of
moral hazard (
 1). However, we will later conclude that the deviation of Hˆ 1,n
from a uniform distribution should be explained by nonstationarity rather than
moral hazard.
We have computed Pearson’s 2-tests and a two-sided Kolmogorov-Smir-
nov (KS) test. A natural grouping for the 2-statistics is in 365 daily intervals.
With 365 intervals, we have roughly thirteen observations per interval. The
2-statistic for uniformity is 408.4 and has 364 degrees of freedom. The
asymptotic p-value is 0.054. The p-value increases to 0.484 if time is grouped
in seventy-three intervals of five days. The (two-sided) KS-test is in line with the
first, finer 2-test, with supt[0,T]Hˆ 1,n(t)  t/T  0.019 and a corresponding
p-value equal to 0.058. The p-value is based on the finite-sample distribution
conditional on M1,n.
We conclude that a stationary model without occurrence dependence is only
(marginally) accepted at a size of 5 percent.
3.4.2 Comparison of the Distributions of the First and Second Claim Times. In
this subsection and Subsection 3.4.3, we concentrate on testing the null hypoth-
esis that 
  1 against moral hazard (
  1) or occurrence dependence (
 
1) without further assumptions on  and G.
Analogously to H1, define H2 to be the distribution of the second claim time
T2 in the subpopulation with exactly two claims in the contract year (N(T)  2):
H2	t
  Pr	T2  tN	T
 2
.
Recall that H1   under the null that 
  1. Now, it is easy to derive that
H2(t)  (t)2 and therefore that
H1	t
2  H2	t

for all t  [0, T ] under the null. The latter equality holds for all  and G. So,
a feasible test that allows for general nonstationarity () and heterogeneity (G)
can be based on the difference between the empirical counterparts Hˆ 1,n2 and Hˆ 2,n
of H12 and H2, where
Hˆ 2,n	t
 :
1
M2,n

i1
n
I	T2,i  t, Ni	T
 2

is defined analogously to Hˆ 1,n. To our knowledge, such tests have not been used
before.
For these tests to have power, the equality H12  H2 has to break down under
the alternatives of moral hazard (
  1) and occurrence dependence (
  1).
A formal power analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we will
show that H12  H2 is different from 0 under local alternatives to the null 
 
1. Recall that 
 is a function, giving the occurrence-dependence effect 
(	) for
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each individual-specific effect 	. Thus, one-sided local alternatives to the null

  1 can be expressed as 
  1  qu for some bounded measurable positive
function u and some small q  .28 Now consider H1(t)2  H2(t) as a function
of 
 for given t. Add the argument 
 and write H1(t; 
)2  H2(t; 
) to make this
explicit. We can get some idea of how H1(t; 
)2  H2(t; 
) would change if we
would move from the null 
  1 to some local alternative 
  1  qu by
computing the “directional (Gateaux) derivative” of H1(t; 
)2  H2(t; 
) at 
 
1 in the direction u. In this case, this directional derivative is simply the ordinary
derivative of H1(t; 1  qu)2  H2(t; 1  qu) with respect to q at q  0. It equals
(see Appendix A.2.1)
d
dq H1	t; 1  qu

2  H2	t; 1  qu
q0
 	t
2	1  	t

u	1
	1
  u	1
	1
, (G1)
where u(s) :  u(	)exp(	s)dG(	).
First, consider the special case that u(	)  1 for all 	. Then, the derivative
in (G1) represents the change in H1(t; 
)2  H2(t; 
) in response to a small
homogeneous (across 	) change in 
 at 
  1. In this case, u   and the
factor in brackets on the right-hand side of (G1) reduces to29
	1

	1
 
	1

	1
 0.
Thus, the right-hand side of (G1) is nonnegative in this case. This suggests that
moral-hazard alternatives (
  1) near 
  1 with homogeneous 
 correspond
to H12  H2. Under homogeneous 
  1, on the other hand, we should expect
that H12  H2.
For general directions u this result may not hold. However, if u is positive
and increasing, the derivative in (G1) is generally positive. Thus, the results for
the homogeneous-
 case still hold if occurrence dependence is stronger
(
(	)  1 is larger) for high-	 agents. In particular, in the case that 
  1 and
decreasing we should expect that H12  H2. In words, if there is moral hazard for
all agents and if high-	 (high-risk) agents are more responsive to incentives,
then the results for the homogeneous moral-hazard case still apply.
The top panel of Figure 1 plots Hˆ 1,n2 and Hˆ 2,n. Apart from some minor
reversals at the tails, we find that Hˆ 1,n2  Hˆ 2,n. The analysis above suggests that
this is evidence of 
  1. A typical one-sided test against the moral-hazard
28. This corresponds to local alternatives such that either 
(	)  1 (if q  0) or 
(	)  1 (if q 
0) for all 	 and includes homogeneous-
 alternatives.
29. The inequality follows from the facts that  is completely monotonic and that completely
monotonic functions are log-convex (Widder 1946). It holds strictly unless 	 is degenerate or has
two points of support of which one is 0, in which case it is binding. See Lemma 4 in Appendix
A.2.1.
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alternative 
  1 would accept the null that 
  1 at all sizes. In retrospect, the
fact that Hˆ 1,n(t)  t/T in Subsection 3.4.1 should be read as evidence of
nonstationarity rather than moral hazard. Once we correct for both heterogeneity
and nonstationarity, we do not find evidence of moral hazard.
One final concern is that we may even have evidence in favor of 
  1, for
which we have not put forward any economic theory. To assess the statistical
significance of the discrepancy between Hˆ 1,n2 and Hˆ 2,n, we compute a two-sided
KS-statistic,
Kn  sup
t0,T
Hˆ 1,n	t
2  Hˆ 2,n	t
.
This test is distribution-free and finite-sample p-values (conditional of (M1,n,
M2,n)) are easily simulated (see Appendix A.2.2). We find Kn  0.067 (p-value
of 0.423, conditional on (M1,n, M2,n)  (4828, 272)). So, we do not reject the
null that there is no occurrence dependence at any reasonable test size.
3.4.3 Direct Comparison of the First and Second Claim Durations. The test in
the previous subsection is based on a comparison of first and second claim times
across contracts. Here, we develop a test based on a more direct comparison of
the first and second claim times of each contract with two claims (or more).
Main Intuition: The Stationary Case Without Censoring. To develop the main
intuition, first consider the stationary model, i.e., let   T1. Then, for given
	, T1/T and (T2  T1)/T are independent exponential durations with parameters
	 and 
(	)	, respectively. So, we can write
ln	T1
 ln	T
 ln	E1
 ln		

and
ln	T2  T1
 ln	T
 ln	
		

 ln	E2
 ln		

for some unit exponential random variables E1 and E2 that are mutually
independent and independent of 	. It follows that
ln	T1
 ln	T2  T1
 ln	
		

 ln	E1
 ln	E2
,
with ln(E1)  ln(E2) independent of 	 and symmetrically distributed around 0.
This suggests that we use within-individual variation in claim durations to learn
about ln(
(	)).
Suppose we have an uncensored sample ((T1,1, T2,1), . . . , (T1,n, T2,n)) from
the joint distribution of (T1, T2). Then, we can estimate [ln(
(	))] by
ln 
ˆ*n 
1
n

i1
n
ln	T1,i
 ln	T2,i  T1,i
,
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in analogy to within-estimation with standard linear panel data, and simply base
a test on ln 
ˆ*n. Such a test would be a special case of the regression test for
“mean” occurrence dependence proposed by Heckman and Borjas (1980, end of
Section II.b).
Alternatively, note that
Pr	T1  T2  T1	


		

1 
		
 .
If 
(	)  1, either duration is equally likely to be the largest. If 
(	)  1, then
Pr(T1  T2  T1	)  1/2, as expected. This suggests that we can base a robust
test of the null 
  1 against the alternative of moral hazard on the share of
contracts for which the time up to the first claim is at least as large as the
duration between the first and the second claims,
ˆ*n 
1
n

i1
n
I	T1,i  T2,i  T1,i
.
This approach is somewhat reminiscent of the methods for paired duration data
that have been developed by Holt and Prentice (1974), Chamberlain (1985), and
Ridder and Tunalı (1999).30 In our case, it is hard to apply these methods
directly, for two reasons. First, we face a censoring problem: we only observe
(at least) two spells for contracts with T2  T. Second, we allow for nonsta-
tionarity. The standard methods can deal with duration dependence, i.e., a
common dependence of the hazards of T1 and T2  T1 on the duration since the
contract renewal date and the first claim, respectively. This generality carries
over to our robust statistic above. However, as the durations T1 and T2  T1 are
consecutive, nonstationarity can bias our comparison in arbitrary ways. We will
now investigate how we can deal with these two problems.
The Censoring Problem under Stationarity. First, focus on the censoring prob-
lem and maintain the stationarity assumption   T1 (Appendix A.3.1 pro-
vides details). Here, we explicitly analyze the case in which we select only
contracts with exactly two claims. This has some analytical advantages, notably
that the distribution of (T1, T2)(	, N(T)  2) does not depend on 	 under the
null 
  1 (again, because of the sufficiency of N(T) for 	 under the null). This
is particularly convenient when we can adapt ln 
ˆ*n into
ln 
ˆn 
1
M2,n

i1
n
ln T1,iT2,i  T1,i	I	Ni	T
 2
.
30. See also Van den Berg (2001) for an overview.
790 Journal of the European Economic Association June 2003 1(4):767–820
It is easy to show that ln 
ˆn is asymptotically normal under the null 
  1, with
expectation 0 and variance 2/(3np2). Here, pk is more generally the probability
that a contract has k claims in the contract year. Note that, given p2, the
asymptotic standard error does not involve (properties of) the distribution G of
	 and can be consistently estimated by /3M2,n.
Next, note that under the null
Pr	T1  T2  T1	, N	T
 2

1
2
is known and independent of 	 as before. Thus, it makes sense to adapt the
second test ˆ*n into
ˆn 
1
M2,n

i1
n
I	T1,i  T2,i  T1,i, Ni	T
  2
.
Under the null 
  1, ˆn is asymptotically normal with mean 1/2 and variance
1/(4np2). The variance can be estimated consistently by 1/(4M2,n). Note that
Pr	T1  T2  T1	, N	T
 2
 

1
2
if 
		
 1 and

1
2
if 
		
 1
for all 	  0, so that we can construct the test to have power against moral
hazard (
  1) in particular.
Appendix A.3.2 discusses the alternative case in which we select all
contracts with at least two claims. The analysis of the second, robust statistic ˆn
directly extends to this case. Extending ln 
ˆn to all contracts with at least two
claims is somewhat more cumbersome because, even given p2, p3, . . . , the
asymptotic distribution of this statistic depends on (properties of) the distribu-
tion G of 	 under the null. We will not pursue this here.
In our data set, we observe 270 contracts with exactly two claims. We find
that ln 
ˆn  0.043. This seems consistent with moral hazard (
  1), but the
estimated asymptotic standard error of ln 
ˆn under the null is relatively large,
0.110. Thus, the null that 
  1 is accepted at conventional test sizes. We also
find that the duration up to the first claim is larger than the duration between the
first and the second claims for ˆn  50.4 percent of the 270 contracts. If we test
against the alternative of moral hazard, we do not reject 
  1 at any size. The
estimated standard error of ˆn is 3.0 percent, so that we do not reject against the
two-sided alternative of occurrence dependence at conventional test sizes either.
We can also compute the equivalent of the second statistic for all 287 contracts
with at least two claims. We find that the duration up to the first claim is larger
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than the duration between the first and the second claims for 50.2 percent of
these contracts, with an estimated asymptotic standard error of 3.0 percent. This
confirms our conclusion based on ln 
ˆn and ˆn.
A General Test under Nonstationarity. These results depend on the stationarity
assumption   T1. Because we have found some circumstantial evidence of
nonstationarity in Subsections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, we would like to explore the
consequences of nonstationarity a bit further. First, suppose we know . Then,
we can deal with possible nonstationarity by working in integrated-hazard time
instead of contract time. Note that  is increasing on the supports of T1 and T2.
So, we can work with the transformed durations
T*1  	T1
 and T*2 	T2

instead of T1 and T2 without loss of information. This is convenient, as, for
given 	, T*1 and T*2  T*1 are again independent exponential random variables
with parameters 	 and 
(	)	, respectively. We can directly apply the analysis
for the exponential case above, provided that we know . Then, we can
construct T*1,i  (T1,i) and T*2,i  (T2,i) and therefore
ˆn	
 :
1
M2,n

i1
n
I	T*1,i  T*2,i  T*1,i, Ni	T
 2
.
This is a generalization of ˆn to arbitrary, but still known, nonstationarity.
In our application, we do not know  and ˆn() is not feasible. However,
recall from Subsection 3.4.1 that we can estimate  consistently by Hˆ 1,n under
the null that 
  1. This suggests substituting Hˆ 1,n for  and using ˆn(Hˆ 1,n) as
our test statistic. Under the null 
  1, ˆn(Hˆ 1,n) is asymptotically normal with
expectation 1/2 and variance 1/(4np2)  1/(6np1). The variance can be estimated
consistently as 1/(4M2,n)  1/(6M1,n). Appendix A.3.3 provides details.
Substitution of Hˆ 1,n for  comes at the price of lower power. This is due to
the fact that Hˆ 1,n is only a consistent estimator of  under the null and generally
captures some of the occurrence-dependence effect if 
  1. We can again
provide some insight by analyzing the local behavior of the test at 
  1. Let
 : h    Pr	2h	T1
 h	T2
N	T
 2
,
with  the set of all distribution functions on [0, T ] concentrated on (0, T ].
Then, the population-equivalent of ˆn(Hˆ 1,n) can be written as (H1).
First, consider the population-equivalent () of the infeasible statistic
ˆn(). As before, we can investigate the behavior of (), as a mapping 

(; 
) for given , locally at 
  1. The directional derivative of (; 
) at

  1 in the direction u  0 is given by
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d
dq 	; 1  qu
q0 
1
12
u	1

	1
  0. (G2)
This reestablishes, now locally at 
  1, that n() can distinguish between

  1 and 
  1 if we know .
For (H1), as a mapping 
  (H1(
); 
), we have instead that
d
dq 	H1	1  qu
; 1  qu
q0 
1
12 u	1
	1
  u	1
	1
. (G3)
The first term is again the effect in (G2) that works through the distribution of
(T1, T2)(N(T)  2). The second term is the counteracting effect on the
time-transformation H1. Note that the derivative in (G3) has the same sign as the
derivative of H12  H2 in Subsection 3.4.2. It follows that generally (H1)  1/2
for homogeneous moral hazard alternatives close to the null. Furthermore, this
result carries over to the moral-hazard alternative in which high-risk (high-	)
agents are more responsive to incentives (that is, have higher 
(	)  1).
Appendix A.3.4 provides details.
We find that ˆn(Hˆ 1,n)  50.7 percent in our data, confirming our earlier
conclusion that we do not reject the null 
  1 against the alternative of moral
hazard at any test size. The estimated asymptotic standard error is 3.1 percent,
so that we do not reject the null against a two-sided alternative at reasonable
sizes either.
3.5 Identification and Estimation
3.5.1 Identification. We now specialize the model in (M) by imposing homo-
geneity of the occurrence-dependence effects across contracts. Formally, we
impose that 
 is a trivial function of 	 and simply write
 	t	, N0, t

  	
N	t
	t
, (M†)
with 
 now a positive scalar parameter. This additional structure will facilitate
the identification and estimation of the model.
In this subsection we investigate identification. Appendix B.1 provides
proofs and other details. Note that the model is fully characterized by the triple
(
, , ): each choice of the triple (
, , ) maps into exactly one distribution
of N[0, T].31 We say that (
, , ) is “identified” if this mapping is one-to-one.
Identification of certain features of (
, , ) can be defined analogously. For
example, the sign of 
  1 is identified if it is uniquely determined by the
distribution of N[0, T ].
31. Recall that there is a one-to-one relation between G and its Laplace transform .
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The following result implies that the null of no moral hazard is empirically
distinguishable from the alternatives of occurrence dependence and moral
hazard without further assumptions.
PROPOSITION 2. The sign of 
  1 is identified.
PROOF. See Appendix B.1. 
In addition, we conjecture that the parameter 
 is point-identified without
further assumptions. Define qk(t) : Pr(N(t)  k) for t  [0, T]. Suppose that

  1, which we can tell from the data by Proposition 2 (the case 
  1 is
similar). Key to the identification of 
 is the fact that it satisfies
q1q01	1  

q1	t
  q0	t
  
q1	t
  	1  
2
q2	t
 (I)
for all t  [0, T]. Because the functions q0, q1, and q2 are data, this provides a
continuum of nonlinear restrictions on the scalar parameter 
. Further analysis
of this problem is beyond the scope of this paper.
Finally, we have a result on the identifiability of  and  in the case that

 is known. First note that we then also know
q˜	t
 : 	1 

q1	t
 q0	t
	
	t

.
We have already seen in Subsection 3.4.1 that  and  are identified if 
  1.
In the case that 
  1, note that q0 and q˜ jointly constitute the data of the
restriction of a two-sample MPH model to [0, T ], with “treatment effect” 
,
“integrated baseline hazard”  and Laplace transform  of the “mixing distri-
bution.” 32 Thus, we can identify  and  along the lines of standard two-
sample identification proofs for the MPH model (Elbers and Ridder 1982, and
Kortram et al. 1995). These proofs rely on the additional assumption that
[	]  . Thus, we have
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose that 
 is known. Then,  and  are identified in the
class of models (
, , ) such that (0)  [	]  .
PROOF. See Appendix B.1. 
The assumption that [	]   is not innocuous. Ridder (1990) provides
extensive discussion in the context of single-spell MPH models.
3.5.2 Maximum-Likelihood Estimation. Finally, we have estimated parametric
versions of the model (M†) by maximum likelihood. We have chosen a piece-
32. To be precise, suppose we observe two samples of durations. Then, q0 and q˜ are the survival
functions in the first and second sample in the case that the units in the first sample have hazards
(t)	 conditional on 	, the units in the second sample hazards 
(t)	 conditional on 	, and 	 has
the same distribution with Laplace transform  in both samples.
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wise-constant specification of . In particular, we partition the contract year
[0, 1] in 12 months and set  to be constant within each month:
	t
  
j1
12
jI j  112  t  j12	 ,
with 1, . . . , 12  0 parameters to be estimated, up to the normalization
(1)  (1/12) ¥j112 j  1. For the distribution G of 	, we have experi-
mented with various discrete distributions. We have found no evidence that
G has more than 2 mass points. Therefore we present results for a model
without unobserved heterogeneity, in which case we only estimate a con-
stant, and results for a model with two points of support for 	. In the latter
case, we have to estimate the support points 	a, 	b  0, and one probability
Pr(	  	a)  1  Pr(	  	b). Appendix B.2 provides details on the
construction of the likelihood.
Table 1 presents results for a specification in which the unobserved heter-
ogeneity has 2 points of support and  consists of 12 monthly pieces. We find
an estimate of 
 just below 1, with a large standard error. The point estimates
are consistent with nondegenerate heterogeneity, but again the precision is low.
If we estimate a model without unobserved heterogeneity, the estimate of 

increases to 1.729 with a relatively small standard error of 0.091. This clearly
illustrates the fact that unobserved heterogeneity causes spurious positive oc-
currence dependence.
In the bottom panel of Figure 1 we have plotted the estimated time effects
() of Table 1. The estimates closely track the kernel estimates of the density of
H1 discussed earlier. Figure 2 plots the corresponding estimate of  and its
pointwise 95 percent confidence bounds. The uniform cumulative distribution
function lies well within the latter. Indeed, we do not reject stationarity accord-
ing to a Wald test. If we estimate a specification with heterogeneity that imposes
stationarity, the estimate of 
 drops to 0.817 with an estimated standard error of
0.237. At conventional sizes, however, the estimate does not deviate signifi-
cantly from 1.
All in all, the results are consistent with the nonparametric tests of the
previous subsection. If we only control for heterogeneity and impose station-
arity, we find a point estimate of 
 below 1. This mirrors the finding that
generally Hˆ 1,n(t)  t/T, which under the assumption of stationarity can be
interpreted as evidence in favor of moral hazard (see Subsection 3.4.1). How-
ever, we do not find evidence of moral hazard once we control for both
heterogeneity and nonstationarity. This confirms the test results in Subsections
3.4.2 and 3.4.3. It should be noted that the precision of, in particular, the
maximum likelihood estimates is low if both flexible time effects and hetero-
geneity are included. We return to this in Section 4.
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3.6 Sensitivity Analysis
3.6.1 The Fault-Status of Claims. So far, we have pooled claims at full fault and
claims at partial fault, even though the financial consequences for the insuree
differ quantitatively. To check whether this matters for our results, we have
recomputed the tests and estimates of the previous subsections on data of claims
at full fault only. There are 4,340 contracts with one claim at full fault, 230
contracts with two such claims, eleven contracts with three such claims and one
contract with four such claims.
FIGURE 2. Maximum-Likelihood Estimate 
Note: Based on sample and estimates from Table 1.
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The test results are close to those based on all claims at fault. The
stationarity tests are slightly less marginal in not rejecting stationarity, with all
p-values now above 10 percent. All occurrence-dependence and moral-hazard
tests accept the null that 
  1, with only slightly lower precisions. The three
-statistics are still just over 50 percent; ln 
ˆn has switched sign to 0.026, but
remains very close to 0. The estimation results confirm these results and are in
line with the estimates on the pooled-claims data.
We have also rerun the tests and estimations on a data set that includes all
claims, rather than just claims at (full or partial) fault. Even though the
moral-hazard argument applies specifically to claims at fault, other theories may
imply state dependence involving occurrence of not-at-fault claims as well. For
example, agents may learn from accidents, even if they were not at fault, and
this may lead to negative occurrence-dependence in itself (see Subsection 3.1).
Obviously, given that we have not found any evidence of occurrence depen-
dence so far, we do not expect to find any if we include all claims either.
However, we should be careful as the precision of our tests and estimates will
typically increase. After all, the number of claims increases considerably: there
are 12,861 contracts with one, 1,996 contracts with two, 307 contracts with
three, 43 contracts with four, seven contracts with five, one contract with six and
one contract with seven claims.
We do not find much evidence of nonstationarity in the raw data. The
p-values of the 2-tests are now 0.503 and 0.063 and the p-value of the KS-test
is 0.077. The KS-test of occurrence dependence is highly insignificant. Surpris-
ingly, ln 
ˆn  0.147 with an estimated standard error under the null of 0.041.
The more robust -statistics are however consistent with the KS-test. Using
contracts with exactly 2 claims only, we find ˆn  52.0 percent (standard error
1.1 percent). If we use all contracts with at least 2 claims, we find 51.8 percent
(1.0 percent). The corresponding p-values for a two-sided test are 0.081 and
0.080, respectively. This may seem slightly supportive of the result for ln 
ˆn, but
recall that neither of these tests corrects for nonstationarity. The most general
-test does, and delivers ˆn(Hˆ 1,n)  51.2 percent (standard error 1.2 percent).
The two-sided p-value is 0.327.
The parametric estimation results confirm this picture. The most appropriate
specification seems to be one with two-point heterogeneity and 24 (half-
monthly) time-intervals. Without regressors, the estimate of 
 is 1.117 with a
standard error of 0.131. A Wald test with 23 degrees of freedom rejects
stationarity at all reasonable sizes (p-value 0.005). As expected, overall the
precision is much higher, even though we now have 24 instead of 12 time
intervals.
In conclusion, we do not find evidence of occurrence dependence in data
including all claims, even though the results are relatively precise. One of the
reasons we have put forward for (negative) occurrence-dependence effects of
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claims in general is learning. Thus, this suggests that there are no such learning
effects. Note though that learning is particularly relevant for young and inex-
perienced drivers. If so, learning implies different occurrence-dependence pa-
rameters for young and old drivers. In the next subsection, we provide some
results for samples stratified in this and other ways, both for data with at-fault
claims only and for data with all claims.
3.6.2 Stratification with Respect to Some Regressors. First, consider again the
data with claims at (full or partial) fault. We have stratified the data on
respectively sex, age and experience (driver’s license age) and have rerun the
tests on each of the sub-samples.
We have 61,564 contracts with male insurees and 26,372 contracts with
female insurees. The male test results closely resemble the results for males and
females pooled, with the KS-test now accepting stationarity at all reasonable
sizes. The results for females based on the 2-tests, ln 
ˆn and the -tests are also
in line with the overall results. The precision is, understandably, low. Unlike the
overall and male KS-statistics, the female KS-statistics are significant at low
sizes. The KS-statistic for stationarity has a p-value of 0.004; the KS-statistic for
occurrence dependence a p-value of 0.013. We find that Hˆ 1,n2  Hˆ 2,n. Thus, for
females we have an inconsistency between the 2-tests, ln 
ˆn and the -tests on
the one hand and the KS-tests on the other hand. One explanation is that the low
female sample size leaves room for outliers to affect the results.
Of all contracts for which the insuree’s year of birth is observed, 26,372 are
born in 1951 or later (“young”) and 61,564 are born in 1950 or before (“old”).
Recall that our data concerns contract years starting anytime during the year
following October 1, 1987. We have deliberately constructed the young drivers
to be truly young (and therefore a relatively small group), because we expect
that any learning effects of accidents would quickly disappear with age. The test
results are very similar between both age groups and are in line with the overall
results. Again, the 2-tests are even less significant. One difference is that the
KS-test on stationarity for young insurees is now highly significant, with a
p-value of 0.004. This is somewhat comparable to the results for the similarly
small sample of females.
These results suggest that learning effects, leading to relatively strong
negative occurrence dependence for young drivers, are not important. It seems,
though, that driving experience rather than age per se would interact with
learning. Obviously, we do not observe actual driving experience, but we do
know the years in which the insurees’ driver’s licenses were issued. We have
divided the sample in 12,712 insurees with licenses issued in 1980 or later
(“inexperienced”) and 75,909 insurees with licenses issued in 1979 or before
(“experienced”). We do not find evidence of nonstationarity, although the
KS-statistic for (again, the small group of) inexperienced insurees has a p-value
as low as 0.082. The KS-tests on occurrence dependence are highly insignificant
for either experience level, but the other occurrence-dependence tests produce
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some interesting results. For inexperienced drivers, we find that ln 
ˆn  0.296
with a standard error of 0.222. The three -statistics are in the range 40.3–41.2
percent, with standard errors 6.1–6.3 percent. For experienced drivers, on the
other hand, we have that ln 
ˆn  0.041 (0.127) and -statistics in the range
53.0–53.7 percent (3.4–3.6 percent). The results for experienced drivers are
consistent with the results for the pooled sample. Also, even if we use one-sided
tests on moral hazard, we do not reject the null that 
  1 at a 5 percent size
for inexperienced drivers. However, the differences between both experience
levels are remarkable and suggest that, if anything, there is negative occurrence
dependence for inexperienced drivers only. This points at learning rather than
moral hazard effects of accidents.
Clearly, this conclusion cannot be drawn with any reasonable statistical
significance because of the imprecision of our results. However, we have earlier
argued that it may make sense to include claims that are not at fault in an
analysis of learning. If this is correct, the resulting larger sample may be more
informative on any differences in occurrence-dependence effects between ex-
perience levels.
The results for experienced drivers are consistent with the results for the
pooled data. The occurrence-dependence tests that do not correct for nonsta-
tionarity are strongly in favor of 
 1. However, the KS-statistic on occurrence
dependence is very insignificant and ˆn(Hˆ 1,n)  51.8 percent with a standard
error of 1.3 percent and a two-sided p-value of 0.165. The results for inexpe-
rienced drivers are all insignificant, but indeed mostly pointing at 
  1.
However, ln 
ˆn is slightly positive and ˆn(Hˆ 1,n)  49.6 percent (standard error
2.8 percent). We conclude that the data including all claims are not supporting
differences in occurrence-dependence effects between experience levels. For
now, we can shelve the learning explanation of occurrence dependence.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we show that the experience-rating structure commonly found in
insurance contracts can be exploited in the empirical analysis of moral hazard. In
particular, experience rating implies negative occurrence dependence of individual
claim intensities under moral hazard. In other words, under moral hazard and
experience rating individual claim intensities decrease with the number of past
claims. In observed claim intensities, this negative occurrence dependence effect is
confounded with a positive selection effect: an insuree with a large number of past
claims is likely to be a bad driver and therefore to have a high future claim intensity.
Thus, from an empirical perspective the distinction between moral hazard and
(adverse) selection boils down to disentangling “true” state dependence and unob-
served heterogeneity. This is a problem that has been studied at length in labor
economics in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Following up on this literature, we
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develop general tests of the null of no moral hazard. Our tests are nonparametric
(except for a separability assumption), and generalize existing work by allowing for
general nonstationarity of the claim intensity.
We have applied our tests to French car-insurance data and have found no
evidence of moral hazard (or more general occurrence dependence). More
precisely, we have not rejected the null of no moral hazard against the alterna-
tives of moral hazard or general occurrence dependence at conventional levels.
This result is confirmed by parametric estimates of a flexible model that allows
for both occurrence dependence and selection on unobservables.
One remaining, practical concern is that observations of multiple claims by
a single insuree are central to identifying moral hazard effects. Because claims
are relatively rare and we focus on claims at fault within a single contract year,
we observe multiple claims for relatively few of the many contracts in our data
set. This translates into a fairly low precision of our empirical results. One
solution would be to resort to low-dimensional parametric models, but this
would artificially generate precision at the expense of robustness. We prefer to
simply qualify our identification results by noting that even a large data set
carries limited information on moral hazard effects. Note that this problem does
not seem to be fundamental (i.e., it would be resolved if we would have a very
large data set): a complementary analysis of a larger data set of all (at-fault and
not-at-fault) claims yields results of satisfactory precision.
An obvious way to expand the data is to include claim histories beyond a
single contract year. Our French data provide information for up to two years
and, at least in principle, it should be possible to collect alternative data on many
more years. Obviously, multiple claims will be more prevalent in longer claim
histories. On the downside, however, using claim histories that extend beyond
a single contract year introduces the problem of dynamic contract selection. This
may imply nonignorable attrition.
This takes us to our final remark. The main contribution of this paper is to
provide, in a dynamic context, tests of moral hazard that are valid in the presence
of general unobserved heterogeneity. Our analysis is consistent with heterogeneity
in accident rates that is symmetrically observed between the insurer and the agents.
It also allows for adverse selection in the technical sense, which arises if agents are
better informed about their risk than insurers. However, because we focus on claims
and ignore other insurance events, we are not able to distinguish between both types
of heterogeneity. In particular, we have not modelled changes in contracts (risk
class, coverage, etc.). Such changes are observed across contract years, but also
within contract years. Some contract changes may be forced by events that can
safely be considered to be external to the claims process, but occasionally a case can
be made for the endogeneity of contract changes to the agent’s claim history. A
common assumption in insurance theory is that both the agent and the insurer learn
about the agent’s ability, but that the learning process is asymmetric because the
information available to the agent is much richer. If so, one would expect the agent’s
decisions about contract changes to be informative about her risk, even after
controlling for the information available to the insurer (i.e., the agent’s observable
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characteristics and past history). Again, this (complex) problem is left for future
research.
Appendices
A. Testing for Moral Hazard
This appendix provides results for Subsection 3.4. Note that the analysis in this
subsection is based on the general econometric model (M).
A.1 Results for Subsection 3.4.1 (H1)
A.1.1 Asymptotic Properties of Hˆ 1,n. We use “f” to denote convergence in
distribution (weak convergence) and “¡a.s.” to denote almost-sure convergence.
Throughout, U is a uniform (on [0, 1]) Brownian bridge and, for any distri-
bution H, H  U  H a H-Brownian-bridge. The following properties of the
estimator Hˆ 1,n are standard.
LEMMA 3.
supHˆ 1,n  H1O¡
a.s.
0 and n 	Hˆ 1,n  H1
f
1
p1 H1
as n 3 .
PROOF. The result follows from the Glivenko-Cantelli and Donsker theorems
(e.g., Van der Vaart 1998, Theorems 19.1 and 19.3), the law of large numbers
and Slutsky’s lemma. 
Note that H1   under the null that 
  1.
A.1.2 The Behavior of H1 under the Alternative that 
  1. Under the null that

  1, H1(t	)  (t) for t  [0, T ], so that H1(1(z)	)  z for z  [0, 1].
If 
(	)  1, on the other hand,
Pr	N	t
 1, N	T
  1	
  
0
t
		u
e	1
		
	u
	
		
du

e	
		

1 
		
 1 e
	1
		
	t
,
801Abbring et al. Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data
so that
H1	t	
 
Pr	N	t
 1, N	T
 1	

Pr	N	T
 1	
 
1 e	1
		
	t

1 e	1
		
 .
Substituting z  (t) gives
H1	1	 z
	
 
1  e	1
		
 z
1 e	1
		
 .
H1(1(z)	) increases from 0 to 1 on [0, 1] and is strictly concave if 
(	) 
1 and strictly convex if 
(	)  1. This implies that
H1	1	 z
	
    z if 
		
 1 and z if 
		
 1
for all 	 0 and z (0, 1). The inequalities in (H1†) in Subsection 3.4.1 follow.
A.1.3 Kernel Estimation of the Density of H1. Here, we provide the details of the
estimation procedure used to estimate the Lebesgue density h1 corresponding to
H1. A standard kernel density estimator of h1 is
h˜ 1	t
 :
1
b  kt xb 	dHˆ 1,n	x
 1bM1,n i1
n
I	Ni	T
 1
kt T1,ib 	,
with 0  b  1⁄2 the bandwidth and k the Epanechnikov kernel function
k	 x
  3⁄4 	1  x2
 if x 1, and0 if x 1.
Now, as H1 has support [0, T ], h˜1(t) may have support on [b, T  b]. The
restriction of h˜1(t) to [0, T ] generally under-estimates h1 on [0, b] and [T  b,
T ]. The ad hoc solution we have used here is to “reflect” the mass of h˜1 outside
[0, T ] into [0, T ], and estimate h1 by
hˆ 1	t
  

h˜ 1	t
  h˜ 1	t
 if 0 t b,
h˜1	t
 if b t T b,
h˜1	t
 h˜1	2T t
 if T b t T,
0 if t 0 or t T.
A.1.4 Computing the Distributions of the Uniformity Tests under the Null. Time
is grouped in 365 days in our sample. If we maintain that Hˆ 1,n is defined on the
underlying continuous-time sample, this translates into observing Hˆ 1,n on a grid
{T/365, 2T/365, . . . , T} only. Chi-square statistics can be straightforwardly
computed using the natural grouping of the data in 365 days (or any coarser
grouping). The computation of KS-statistics requires slightly more care.
Grouped data only allow us to compute bounds on the continuous-time KS-
statistic
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sup
t0,T
Hˆ 1,n	t
 t/T. (1)
A sharp lower bound is given by the discrete-time KS-statistic
max
tT/365,2T/365, . . . , T
Hˆ 1,n	t
 t/T. (2)
An upper bound is also easy to derive and the bounds can be expected to be
narrow due to the small size of the intervals relative to the density of the
claims (see the similar analysis in Appendix A.2.2). We could use standard
distribution theory for the continuous-time statistic in (1) to derive corre-
sponding bounds on the p-value for this statistic. In this case, however, it is
easier to simply use the discrete-time statistic in (2) itself. Its distribution
under the null is known and exact critical and p-values are easy to simulate
by Monte Carlo methods.
The finite-sample p-values reported are conditional on the subsample size
M1,n, which is random even if n is not. It is easy to see that Hˆ 1,n  Hˆ *1,m given
M1,n  m , with Hˆ *1,m the empirical distribution of a random sample of fixed
size m from H1.33 Here and below, “” denotes equality in distribution.
A.2 Results for Subsection 3.4.2 (H12  H2)
A.2.1 The Behavior of H12  H2 under Local Alternatives to 
  1. This
appendix provides details on the directional derivative of H1(t; 
)2  H2(t; 
)
at 
  1 in the direction u. From Appendix A.1.2 we know that
H1	t; 1  qu
 
 e	1qu		
qu		
 e	qu		
	t
 1dG		

 e	1qu		
qu		
 e	qu		
 1dG		

.
33. For l   and (t1, . . . , tl)  l, we can write
Pr	Hˆ 1,n	t1
 x1, . . . , Hˆ 1,n	tl
 xlM1,n  m

 Pr	Hˆ 1,n	t1
 x1, . . . , Hˆ 1,n	tl
 xlN1	T 
, . . . , Nn	T 
, M1,n  m
M1,n  m.
Note that this holds in particular for l  365 and tj  Tj/365. Because
Pr	Hˆ 1,n	t1
 x1, . . . , Hˆ 1,n	tl
 xlN1	T 
 n1, . . . , Nn	T 
 nn

 Pr¥i1m I	T1,i  t1

m
 x1, . . . ,
¥i1
m I	T1,i  tl

m
 xlN1	T 
 · · · Nm	T 
 1	
for each (n1, . . . , nn)  {0, 1}n such that ¥i1n ni  m, it follows that
Pr	Hˆ 1,n	t1
 x1, . . . , Hˆ 1,n	tl
 xlM1,n  m

 Pr¥i1m I	T1,i  t1

m
 x1, . . . ,
¥i1
m I	T1,i  tl

m
 xlN1	T 
 · · · Nm	T 
 1	.
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It is easy to derive that
d
dq  e	1qu		
qu		
 	e	qu		
	t
 1
dG		

q0

1
2 	t
2	t
u	1
,
so that
d
dq H1	t; 1  qu

2q0  	t

21	t

u	1

	1
 .
Next, for 	 such that 
(	)  1, we have that
Pr	N	t
 2, N	T
 2	

 
0
t 
t1
t
	2
		
	t1
	t2
e
	1
		
	t1
	
		
1
		
	t2
	
		
2dt2dt1

e	
		

2
	1 1 
		
e	
		
1
		
	t
 
		
e	1
		
2	t


1 
		
21 
		
 .
Thus, for q  0
H2	t; 1  qu
 
 e	1qu		
2q2u		
22 qu		
 	1 2 qu		
e	qu		
1qu		
	t

 1 qu		
e	qu		
2qu		
	t
)dG		

 e	1qu		
2q2u		
22 qu		
 	1 2 qu		
e	qu		
1qu		

 1 qu		
e	qu		
2qu		
)dG		

.
Now, using that
d
dq  e	1qu		
2q2u		
22 qu		
 	1 2 qu		
e	qu		
1qu		
	t

 1 qu		
e	qu		
2qu		
	t

dG		

q0

1
2 	t

22	t
u	1
u	1
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we find that
d
dq H2	t; 1  qu
q0  	t

21	t

u	1

	1
 .
Conclude that
d
dq H1	t; 1  qu

2  H2	t; 1  qu
q0
 	t
2	1  	t

u	1
	1
  u	1
	1
. (G1)
The following two results provide sufficient conditions for (G1) to be
positive on (0, T). First, if u is constant (trivial) then u(k)(1)  u(k)(1) (here,
the superscript (k) denotes the k-th derivative). Then, Lemma 4 implies that (G1)
is positive if u is positive and G has at least two positive points of support.
LEMMA 4. If  is the Laplace transform of a distribution G with nonnegative
support such that G(0)  1, then

d
ds ln 	s
	s
	s
	s
  	s
	s
 0, (3)
with equality holding if and only if G is either degenerate or has two points of
support of which one is 0.
PROOF. For given s  (0, ), x  [0, )  (s  x)/(s) is the Laplace
transform of a distribution G˜ that has the same support as G. The k-th moment
of G˜ exists and is given by ˜k : (1)k(k)(s)/(s). Thus, (3) has the sign of
˜3˜1  (˜2)2 and the claimed result follows from standard results for the
Stieltjes moment problem (e.g., Shohat and Tamarkin 1943, Theorem 1.3). 
Second, for positive and increasing u we can apply
LEMMA 5. If u is positive and increasing, then
u	1

	1
 
u	1

	1
 0.
PROOF. Define
u :
u	1

	1
 and u˜		
 : u		
 u .
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Then u˜(1)  0, so that
u	1
	1
   u	1
	1
 
 u	1

	1
 	1
	1
  	1
	1

 u˜	1
	1
. (4)
We have to show that (4) is positive. The first term on the right-hand-side of (4)
is nonnegative by Lemma 4. Next, note that [	  u1(u)]u˜(	)  0 for all 	 
u1(u). This implies that
u˜	1
  	3u˜		
e	dG		
  	2	  u1	u
u˜		
e	dG		
 0.
Thus, the second term on the right-hand side of (4) is positive. 
A.2.2 Computing the Distribution of Kn under the Null. The finite-sample
distribution of Kn conditional on the relevant subsample sizes (M1,n, M2,n)
follows from a simple quantile transformation.
PROPOSITION 4. Under the null 
 1 and conditional on (M1,n, M2,n)  (m1, m2),
Kn  sup
u0,1
Uˆ 1,m1	u
2  Uˆ 2,m2	u2
.
Here, Uˆ 1,m1 and Uˆ 2,m2 are independent uniform empirical distribution functions
with m1 and m2 points of support, respectively, for given m1, m2  .
PROOF. Along the lines of Footnote 33 it is easy to show that (Hˆ 1,n, Hˆ 2,n) 
(Hˆ *1,m1, Hˆ *2,m2) conditional on (M1,n, M2,n)  (m1, m2), with Hˆ *1,m1 and Hˆ *2,m2
independent empirical distributions of random samples of sizes m1 and m2 from
H1 and H2, respectively. Therefore, conditional on (M1,n, M2,n)  (m1, m2)
Kn  sup
t
Hˆ *1,m1	t
2  Hˆ *2,m2	t
  sup
t
	Uˆ 1,m1  H1	t

2  Uˆ 2,m2  H2	t

 sup
t
	Uˆ 1,m1  H1	t

2  Uˆ 2,m2  H1	t
2
 sup
u0,1
Uˆ 1,m1	u
2  Uˆ 2,m2	u2
. 
Next, recall from Appendix A.1.4 that durations are rounded to integer days
in our sample. Formally, we can only compute KS-statistics for the discretized
distributions on {T/365, 2T/365, . . . , T}. Again, the resulting statistic is not
distribution-free. In the present case, in which the null hypothesis does not
specify the distribution H1 (or H2), this complicates the computation of exact
p-values. However, as argued before, the effect of the discretization is likely to
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be small. To check this, we have computed (sharp) bounds on the (continuous-
time) KS-statistic and its p-value imposed by observations of Hˆ 1 and Hˆ 2 on
{T/365, 2T/365, . . . , T}. The discrete (and reported) KS-statistic provides a
sharp lower bound. In the main text, we report a statistic of 0.067 with a p-value
of 0.423. Note that this p-value provides an upper bound on the p-value under
continuous observation. An upper bound on the KS-statistic is easily found by
including distances of Hˆ 1(t)2 and Hˆ 2(t) for t and t one day apart in the
comparison. The upper bound on the statistic is 0.070. The corresponding
p-value, 0.358, provides a lower bound on the p-value under continuous obser-
vation. As expected, the bounds are narrow and justify the conclusion that the
results are not affected by the discretization.
A.3 Results for Subsection 3.4.3 	ln 
ˆn, 	
, and (H1))
A.3.1 Properties of ln 
ˆn and ˆn. Let ln 
ˆn	
 be defined as ln 
ˆn for the
transformed durations T*1,i and T*2,i  T*1,i. Note that (T*1,i, T*2,i  T*1,i) is
uniformly distributed on {(t1, t2) : 0  t1  1, t1  t2  1} conditional on
Ni(T)  2 under the null. Using this, the asymptotic distribution of ln 
ˆn	

under the null (and therefore ln 
ˆn under the assumption of stationarity) is easy
to derive. Let (, 2) denote a normal random variable with mean  and
variance 2. Then, we have
PROPOSITION 5. Under the null 
  1,
n ln 
ˆn	
f 0, 23p2	
as n 3 .
PROOF. Let 
  1. Then [(ln(T*1,i)  ln(T*2,i  T*1,i))I(Ni(T)  2)]  0 and
	ln	T*1,i
 ln	T*2,i  T*1,i

2I	Ni	T
 2

 2p2 
0
1 
t1
1
	ln	t1
 ln	t2  t1

2dt2dt1  p2
2
3 .
Also, n1M2,n ¡a.s. p2 as n 3  by the law of large numbers. The result follows
by the central limit theorem and Slutsky’s lemma. 
The distributional properties of ˆn() under the null (and therefore of ˆn
under the assumption of stationarity) are standard.
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PROPOSITION 6. Under the null 
  1,
Prˆn	
 imM2,n  m mi 	2m
for i  0, . . . , m, and
n ˆn	
  12	 f 0, 14p2	
as n 3 .
PROOF. This follows from the well-known application of the central limit
theorem to the binomial distribution, n1M2,n ¡a.s. p2 as n 3  and Slutsky’s
lemma. 
Finally, we can sign ()  1⁄2 under the alternative using that
Pr	T*1  T*2  T*1 	, N	T
  2

  
		
2
		
 1	 2
		
 1e
	  2
		
 1e	1/ 2
 
		
1	  e
		
2	

		
e	  
		
 1e
		
	  e
		
2	
for 
(	)  1.
A.3.2 Adapting ˆn to Selection on Ni(T)  2. Consider the alternative case in
which we select on Ni(T)  2. It is easy to check that the distribution of (T*1,
T*2  T*1) conditional on N(T)  2, unlike that conditional on N(T)  2,
depends on the distribution G of 	 under the null. However,
Pr	T*1  T*2  T*1 	, Ni	T
 2

 


		


		
 1	 
		
 1e
	  2e	1/ 2
 
		
1	  1 
		


		
e	  e
		
	  1 
		

if 
  1, and
1
2
if 
  1.
Under the null 
  1, we again have that Pr(T*1  T*2  T*1	, N(T)  2)  1⁄2
is known and independent of 	. The distributional properties of the equivalent
of ˆn() that conditions on Ni(T)  2 are analogous to Proposition 6, with ¥k2
Mk,n replacing M2,n and ¥k2 pk replacing p2. Finally,
Pr	T*1  T*2  T*1 	, N	T
 2
  1⁄2 if 
		
 1, and 1⁄2 if 
		
 1
for all 	  0.
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One attractive difference with selection on N(T)  2 is that the baseline case
without selection arises if we take the limit T 3 :
lim
T3
Pr	T*1  T*2  T*1 	, N	T
 2


		


		
 1 .
A.3.3 Asymptotic Properties of ˆn(Hˆ 1,n) under the Null 
  1. The main result
is
PROPOSITION 7. Under the null 
  1,
n ˆn	Hˆ 1,n
  12	 f 0, 14p2  16p1	
as n 3 .
PROOF. Let
 : h    Pr	2h	T1,i
 h	T2,i
Ni	T
 2
, (5)
with the set of all distribution functions on [0, T ] concentrated on (0, T ]. Note
that  does not depend on i and that ()  1⁄2 if 
  1 (as is maintained
throughout). It is convenient to write
n	ˆn	Hˆ 1,n
  1⁄2
  n	ˆn	Hˆ 1,n
  	Hˆ 1,n

  n		Hˆ 1,n
  1⁄2

and analyze the two terms in the right-hand side. Lemmas 6 and 7 below imply
that
n	ˆn	Hˆ 1,n
  	Hˆ 1,n

 f 10, 14p2	
and
n	Hˆ 1,n
  12	 f 20, 16p1	
as n 3 , with 1	0, 1/	4p2

 and 2	0, 1/	6p1

 independent normal random
variables. The claimed result follows. 
It remains to state and prove Lemmas 6 and 7.
LEMMA 6. Under the null 
  1,
n	ˆn	Hˆ 1,n
  	Hˆ 1,n

 f 0, 14p2	
conditional on {Hˆ 1,i} almost surely as n 3 .
PROOF. Denote Yn,i : I(2Hˆ 1,n(T1,i)  Hˆ 1,n(T2,i), Ni(T)  2). Note that
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Yn,iNj	T
, Hˆ 1, j  I	Ni	T
  2
	Hˆ 1,n
 and
var	Yn,iNj	T
, Hˆ 1, j
 I	Ni	T
 2
	Hˆ 1,n
	1	Hˆ 1,n


almost surely, that  is continuous at , that supHˆ 1,n  ¡a.s. 0 as n 3 
(Lemma 3) and that n1M2,n ¡a.s. p2 as n 3 . It follows that for all   0
0  
i1
n
 n Yn,iM2,n	
2
I n Yn,iM2,n  	 Nj	T
, Hˆ 1, j
  nM2,n	
2
n1 
i1
n
PrYn,i  n  M2,nn Nj	T
, Hˆ 1, j	 3 0
and

i1
n
varn Yn,iM2,nNj	T
, Hˆ 1, j	 nM2,n 	Hˆ 1,n
	1	Hˆ 1,n

 3 	
	1	

p2

1
4p2
almost surely as n3 . As a consequence, by the Lindeberg-Feller central limit
theorem (Van der Vaart 1998, Proposition 2.27)
n 
i1
n  Yn,iM2,n  	Hˆ 1,n
	 f 0, 14p2	
conditional on {Nj(T), Hˆ 1, j} almost surely as n3 . Note that the limit does not
depend on {Nj(T), Hˆ 1, j} and that
ˆn	Hˆ 1,n
  
i1
n Yn,i
M2,n
.
The claimed result follows. 
LEMMA 7. Under the null 
  1,
n	Hˆ 1,n
  12	 f 0, 16p1	
as n 3 .
PROOF. We need some notation and conventions. Let(Z) be the set of bounded
-valued functions on Z  . We abbreviate [0, T ] : ([0, T ]), etc. We
equip(Z) with the uniform norm and the product space(Z) (Z) with the
810 Journal of the European Economic Association June 2003 1(4):767–820
norm (g1, g2)  ((Z)  (Z))  max{supg1, supg2}. All subsets of (Z)
and (Z)  (Z) inherit the corresponding metrics. Multiplication of elements
of (Z) is defined as point-wise multiplication. (Z) is the set of uniformly
continuous functions in (Z). Throughout, we take 
  1.
Below, we show that the Hadamard derivative of  at  tangentially to [0,
T] is
 : u  0, T  2 
0
1/ 2
2u	1	 z

  u	1	2z

dz.
With the facts that n(Hˆ 1,n  ) f (1/p1) (Lemma 3) and that 
assumes values in [0, T], the functional Delta method (Van der Vaart 1998,
Theorem 20.8) implies that
n		Hˆ 1,m
  	

 f
1
p1 	
 
2
p1 0
1/ 2
2	1	z


	
1	2z

dz

2
p1 0
1/ 2
2U	z
U	2z
dz
0, 16p1	
as n 3 .
It remains to show that  is Hadamard differentiable at  tangentially to
[0, T ] with the derivative  given above. Note that the Lebesgue density of
(T1, T2)(N(T)  2) at (t1, t2) equals 2(t1)(t2) if 0  t1  t2  T and 0
otherwise. Using this, we can rewrite (5) as
	h
  2 
0
T 
h1	h	t
 / 2

t
	
d	t
dt  1  2    h1  h2		d.
where h1(p)  inf{t : h(t)  p} is the generalized inverse of h. The functional
 :  3  can be decomposed as
h  

 h2 , h1	  1  

 h1  h2	  T 3   h1  h2		  0, T

 1  2    h1  h2		d  .
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Recall that   [0, T ] is the set of distribution functions on [0, T ] concen-
trated on (0, T ]. Also, 1  [0, T ] and T  [0, T ] are the sets of,
respectively, [0, 1)-valued and [0, T ]-valued functions on [0, T ] and   [0,
1) is the set of [0, T ]-valued functions on [0, 1).
We first show that each of the maps , ,  and  is (tangentially) Hadamard
differentiable and then derive  by the chain rule.
(i). Hadamard derivative of  :  3 1   at  tangentially to [0, T ]
By Van der Vaart (1998), Lemma 21.4, the inverse map h [0, T ]
 h1   is Hadamard differentiable at  tangentially to [0, T ] with
derivative u  [0, T ]  (u/)  1. Thus, the Hadamard derivative
of  at  tangentially to [0, T ] is
 : u  0, T  u2 , u	  1	0, T 0, 1
.
(ii). Hadamard derivative of  : 1   3 T at ()  (/2, 1)
tangentially to [0, T ]  [0, 1)
By the assumption that  is continuously differentiable with positive
derivative  on [0, T ], 1 is uniformly differentiable on [0, 1) with
uniformly bounded derivative (1/)  1. Thus, by Van der Vaart and
Wellner (1996), Lemma 3.9.27, the Hadamard derivative of  at (/2,
1) tangentially to [0, T ]  [0, 1) is34
34. It may be helpful here to construct the proof of this lemma for our special case. Let
(uq, vq) 3 (u, v)  [0, T ]  [0, 1) uniformly as q 2 0 and ()  q(uq, vq)  1   for
all q. We have that
0   	
1  qvq
  2  quq	  1  2 	
q  v  2 	  u
  1  2 	
 
1  2  quq	  1  2 	
q 
uq
  1  2 	
 
uq  u
  1  2 	  v  

2  quq	  v  2 	   	vq  v
  2  quq	 .
The first term in the right-hand side converges (uniformly) to 0 because of the uniform differen-
tiability of 1. The second term converges to 0 because supuq  u 3 0 and the denominator
is bounded away from 0. The third term converges to 0 because v is uniformly continuous. The
fourth term converges to 0 because supvq  v 3 0.
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	
 : 	u, v
  0, T  0, 1
  v  2 	

u
  1  2 	
 0, T.
(iii). Hadamard derivative of  : T 3 [0, T ] at (())  1  (/2)
Let uq3 u  [0, T ] uniformly as q2 0 and (())  quq  T for
all q. Abbreviate s : (()) and consider
0  	s  quq
  	s
q  	  s
u
   	s  quq
    sq  	  s
uq  	  s
	uq  u

   	s  quq
    sq  	  s
uq  	  s
uq  u .
The first term in the last line converges uniformly to 0 as q 2 0 by the
uniform differentiability of . The second term converges uniformly to 0
because  is uniformly bounded. Thus, the right-hand side of the first line
converges uniformly to 0 as q 2 0 and the Hadamard derivative of  :
T 3 [0, T ] at (())  1  (/2) is
		

 : u  0, T    1  2 		u  0, T.
(iv). Hadamard derivative of  : [0, T ] 3  at ((()))  /2
Let uq3 u  [0, T ] uniformly as q2 0 and ((()))  quq  [0,
T ] for all q. Then,
	/2  quq
  	/2

q  2  uqd 3 2  ud
as q 2 0 because the sequence uq is uniformly bounded. So, the Had-
amard derivative of  : [0, T ] 3  at ((()))  /2 is
			


 : u  0, T  2  ud.
By the chain rule (Van der Vaart 1998, Proposition 20.9), the Hadamard
derivative of          at  tangentially to [0, T ] is ((()))  (())
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 ()   (note that the tangent spaces are properly lined up). Substitution of
the derivative maps derived in (i)–(iv) gives the desired result. 
A.3.4 The Behavior of (H1) under Local Alternatives to 
  1. This appendix
provides details on the directional derivatives of (; 
) and (H1(
); 
) at

  1 in the direction u.
First consider (; 
). We have earlier seen that the Lebesgue density of
(T1, T2)(N(T)  2) at (t1, t2) equals 2(t1)(t2) if 0  t1  t2  T and 0
otherwise if 
  1. For 
(	)  1, the density of (T1, T2)(	, N(T)  2) at (t1,
t2) equals
	2
		
	t1
	t2
e
	1
		
	t1
	
		
1
		
	t2
	
		
2

0
T 
0
2
	2
		
	1
	2
e
	1
		
	1
	
		
1
		
	2
	
		
2d1d2
for 0  t1  t2  T and 0 elsewhere. Thus, for 
  1  qu and q  0 we have
that
	; 



 
0
1 
2/ 2
2
	21  qu		
e	qu		
1	1qu		
qu		
2	1qu		
2d1d2dG		

 
0
1 
0
2
	21 qu		
e	qu		
1	1qu		
qu		
2	1qu		
2d1d2dG		

Using that
d
dq  
0
1 
2/ 2
2
	21  qu		
e	qu		
1	1qu		
qu		
2	1qu		
2d1d2dG		

q0

5
24 u	1

1
4 u	1

and that
d
dq  
0
1 
0
2
	21  qu		
e	qu		
1	1qu		
qu		
2	1qu		
2d1d2dG		

q0

1
2 u	1

1
2 u	1

we find that
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d
dq 	; 1  qu
q0 
1
12
u	1

	1
 . (G2)
Next, consider (H1(
); 
). The analysis in A.2.1 implies that
d
dq H1	1  qu
q0  
1
2
u	1

	1
 	1

so that
d
dq 	H1	1  qu
; 1
q0   12 u	1
	1
 	1
	 112 u	1
	1
 .
Thus, it follows that
d
dq 	H1	1  qu
; 1  qu
q0 
d
dq 	; 1  qu
q0

d
dq 	H1	1  qu
; 1
q0 
1
12 u	1
	1
  u	1
	1
. (G3)
B. Identification and Estimation
This appendix provides results for Subsection 3.5. Note that the identification and
estimation analyses in this subsection assume that 
 is homogeneous, as in (M†).
B.1 Results for Subsection 3.5.1 (Identification)
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. Denote the subdensity of (T1, . . . , Tk) on N(T)  k by
fk (i.e., f1(t)  d Pr(T1  t, N(T)  1)/dt, etc.). We first show that the cases 
 
1 and 
  1 can be distinguished from data on f1 and f2. With the normalization
(T)  1, we have that
f2	t1, t2

f1	t1
 f1	t2
  

		1  

		t1
  
	t2

  
2

		1  

	t1
  

		1  

	t2
  


.
Straightforward calculations show that
 ln
f2	t1, t2

f1	t1
 f1	t2
	
t1

 ln f2	t1, t2
f1	t1
 f1	t2
	
t2

t1t2t
 	1 

2	t

		1 
2
	t
 
2

		1 
2
	t
 
2
 ,
which equals 0 (for all t) if and only if 
  1. This establishes whether 
  1.
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In the case that 
  1, it remains to distinguish between 
  1 and 
  1.
To this end, note that the claim intensity at t conditional on (T1  t1, T2  t),
t  t1, is given by
 	tT1  t1, T2  t
  
	t

		1  

	t1
  
	t


		1 

	t1
 
	t


.
Lemma 4 in Appendix A.2 implies that the function /() is trivial if 	
either is degenerate or has two points of support of which one is 0. Otherwise,
/() is (strictly) decreasing. Clearly, if  (tT1  t1, T2  t) is decreasing
in t1, we know that 
  1. Similarly, if  (tT1  t1, T2  t) is increasing in t1
then we can conclude that 
  1. If  (tT1  t1, T2  t) is constant in t1, we
know (because 
  1) that 	 either is degenerate or has two points of support
of which one is 0. In that case,
	s
  Pr		  0
 	1 Pr		  0

exp			  0s

and  (tT1  t1, T2  t)  [		  0]
(t). With the normalization (T)  1,
this identifies [		  0]
 and . Then,
Pr	T1  t
		t

 Pr		  0
 	1 Pr		  0

exp			  0	t


identifies Pr(	  0) and [		  0] and therewith 
. 
Note that the proof only uses data on first and second claim times (that is, the
sub-distributions of T1 on N(T)  1 and T2 on N(T)  2 and the claim intensities
at 0 and 1 claim). A central role is played by the way  (tT1  t1, T2  t)
depends on t1. Conditional on 	 however, the claim intensity only depends on
the occurrence, and not the timing, of past claims. Thus, the dependence of
 (tT1  t1, T2  t) on t1 works by way of the heterogeneity. This explains that
a special role is played by the cases that 	 is degenerate and that 	 has two points
of support of which one is 0. In either case, 	 is degenerate at the non-zero point
of support [		  0] conditional on past occurrence of a claim and there is no
heterogeneity conditional on (T1  t1, T2  t). We have seen these cases
appearing in the analyses of the behavior of the two general tests in Subsections
3.4.2 and 3.4.3 under homogeneous-
 local alternatives. Note that these alter-
natives fit the special model (M†) that we are studying here.
Next, consider the key identifying equation (I). Recall that q0(t)  ((t))
and note that
q1	t
 
	
	t

  		t


1  
 and
q2	t
 

		t

  	1  

	
	t

  	
2	t


	1  
2
	1  

 .
if 
  1. Also, define q˜(t) : (1
)q1(t)  q0(t)  (
(t)). If 
  1 then
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q1q01q˜	t
 
	
2	t

  	
	t


1  
 ,
which indeed equals 
q1(t)  (1  
2)q2(t).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. The case 
  1 has been covered in Subsection 3.4.1.
So, consider the case that 
  1. If we know 
 we can compute the function q˜
defined above. The remainder of the proof closely follows Kortram et al. (1995),
in particular a version thereof by Abbring (2002) that can directly be applied to
our finite-support setup here. Suppose that 
 1 (the case 
 1 is similar). We
have that, for any t [0, T ], y : q˜(t) (
(t))N(t)  
11(y). Also,
t  q˜1(y), so that
q0	q˜1	 y

  q0	t
  		t

  	
11	 y

 .
By induction, it follows that, for y  [q˜(T), 1],
	q0  q˜1
	n
	 y
  	
n1	 y

, (6)
where q0  q˜1 is the composition of q0 with q˜1, and superscript (n) denotes the
n-fold composition. Now, l’Hoˆspital’s rule gives
	1	 y
  lim
n3
1	
n1	y



n
 lim
n3
	1 	q0  q˜1
	n
	y



n
(7)
on [q˜(T), 1]. Evaluating (7) at q0(T)  [q˜(T), 1] gives [	], because
1(q0(T)) (T)  1. So, 1 is uniquely determined on [q˜(T), 1]. We then
have that (t)  1(q0(t))  
11(q˜(t)) on [0, T ]. From 1 on [q˜(T), 1]
we can identify on [0,1(q˜(T)]  [0, 
(T)]. Finally, can be analytically
extended to [0, ). 
B.2 Results for Subsection 3.5.2 (Estimation)
In this appendix we construct the likelihood on which the estimates in Subsec-
tion 3.5.2 are based. Choose some marginal density g(  ; ) of 	i and some
contract-time function (  ; ). As before, we define (t; ) : 0t (u; )du
and make sure that the normalization (T; )  1 is satisfied. Both  and  are
finite-dimensional parameter vectors.
Consider the likelihood contribution Li of contract i. For contract i, we
observe a claim history Ni[0, T ] (we ignore the discretization of time in days
here). First consider the likelihood contribution for the case that we observe 	i.
Now, recall that Tk,i is the time of the k-th claim and let T0,i : 0. For contract
i, we observe the number of claims Ni(T) in the contract year, and, if Ni(T) 
1, the times T1,i, . . . , TNi(T ),i of these claims. Straightforward calculations show
that this “full information” likelihood contribution of contract i is
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Li	
, ,  ; Ni0, T, 	i
   
k1
Ni	T

	i

k1	Tk,i; 
e	i

k1	Tk,i;
	Tk1,i;

 e	i

Ni	T
1	TNi	T
,i;
g		i; 

if Ni(T)  1, and
Li	
, ,  ; Ni0, T, 	i
  e	ig		i; 

if Ni(T)  0. Thus, the marginal likelihood contribution for the case we do not
observe 	i is
Li	
, ,  ; Ni0, T
   
k1
Ni	T


k1	Tk,i; 
 	1
Ni	T 
	Ni	T 


Ni	T 
1
	TNi	T 
,i; 
 
k1
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k1	Tk,i; 
	Tk1,i; 
; 
if Ni(T)  1, and
Li	
, ,  ; Ni0, T
  	1; 

if Ni(T)  0. Here, (k)(  ; ) is the k-th derivative of the Laplace transform of
g(  ; ).
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INCENTIVE MECHANISMS FOR SAFE DRIVING: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS WITH DYNAMIC DATA
Georges Dionne, Jean Pinquet, Mathieu Maurice, and Charles Vanasse*
Abstract—Road safety policies often use incentive mechanisms based on
traffic violations to promote safe driving—for example, fines, experience
rating, and point-record driver’s licenses. We analyze the effectiveness of
these mechanisms in promoting safe driving. We derive their theoretical
properties with respect to contract time and accumulated demerit points.
These properties are tested empirically with data from the Quebec pub-
lic insurance plan. We find evidence of moral hazard, which means that
drivers who accumulate demerit points become more careful because they
are at risk of losing their license. An insurance rating scheme introduced
in 1992 reduced the frequency of traffic violations by 15%. We use this
result to derive monetary equivalents for traffic violations and license
suspensions.
I. Introduction
SINCE the 1970s fatality rates due to road traffic accidentshave decreased steadily in developed countries, although
risk exposure increased concomitantly (OECD, 2005). For
example, over the past ten years, the road fatality rate
decreased by 40% in France. However, the implied social cost
of road accidents remains high (Doyle, 2005). A major reason
for the improvement of the situation in the OECD has been
the development of incentives for safe driving. Experience
rating schemes used by the insurance industry have incentive
properties (see Boyer & Dionne, 1989; Abbring, Chiappori,
& Pinquet, 2003). They are supplemented by point-record dri-
ver’s licenses based on traffic violations. In many countries,
each convicted traffic offense is filed with a specific number
of demerit points. When the accumulated number of points
exceeds a given threshold, the driver’s license is suspended.
Point removal clauses are added so that this penalty can
be avoided in the long run.1 A point-record driver’s license
implemented in Quebec in 1978, together with a no-fault
insurance plan for bodily injuries, replaced a tort system.2
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1 These clauses and their incentive properties are detailed in section III.
2 North America preceded Europe in the design of such systems. Point-
record driver’s licenses were introduced in 1947 in the United States.
Germany, France, and Spain implemented these mechanisms in 1974, 1992,
and 2005, respectively.
The road fatality rate decreased by 50% during the fifteen
years that followed.3
In Quebec, the Société de l’Assurance Automobile du Que-
bec (SAAQ) is a public monopoly that provides coverage for
bodily injury. The SAAQ is also in charge of accident pre-
vention and control, including the management of driver’s
licenses. Before 1992, the rating structure for bodily injury
insurance was completely flat. Since December 1, 1992, the
public authorities in Quebec have implemented an experi-
ence rating system based on accumulated demerit points. This
mechanism was added to other incentives, such as fines, the
point-record driver’s license in force since 1978, and the pri-
vate sector insurance rating for coverages other than bodily
injury.
This paper analyzes the incentive properties of fines, point-
record driver’s licenses, and experience rating based on traffic
violations. Studies on incentive mechanisms for road safety
have appeared in the economic literature for many years
(Peltzman, 1975; Landes, 1982; Boyer & Dionne, 1987). In
the presence of asymmetric information, insurers use partial
insurance or experience rating to improve resource allocation.
Both systems have proved to be efficient for handling moral
hazard and adverse selection. Empirical tests have measured
the effectiveness of such mechanisms for road safety (Sloan,
Reilly, & Schenzler, 1995; Boyer & Dionne, 1989) and the
presence of residual asymmetric information problems in
insurers’ portfolios (Chiappori & Salanié, 2000; Dionne,
Gouriéroux, & Vanasse, 2001). More recently, Abbring et al.
(2003) designed a new test based on the dynamics of insur-
ance contracts to detect the presence of moral hazard. Their
model makes it possible to separate the moral hazard effect
on accidents from unobserved heterogeneity. They found no
evidence of moral hazard in the French car insurance market.
The convex structure of the French bonus-malus system is
used to show that the optimal effort level exerted by a ratio-
nal policyholder increases after a claim at fault. In our study,
insurance pricing is not the major incentive scheme but rather
a measure used to complement fines and the point-record dri-
ver’s license. Moreover, the pricing scheme of the Quebec
public automobile insurance is an increasing step function of
past demerit points.
Insurance pricing may not suffice as a tool for design-
ing an optimal road safety policy because it may not create
the appropriate incentives for reckless drivers (Sloan et al.,
1995). Bourgeon and Picard (2007) show how point-record
driver’s licenses provide incentives for road safety among
3 We do not have information on factors different from the incentive
schemes analyzed in this paper that might have explained this decrease.
This study is performed in a no-fault environment. For a recent compari-
son of strict liability and a negligence rule for risk incentives trade-off, see
Fagart and Fluet (2009).
The Review of Economics and Statistics, February 2011, 93(1): 218–227
© 2011 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
INCENTIVE MECHANISMS FOR SAFE DRIVING 219
normal drivers (those who respond to the usual incentive
schemes) when the judicial system or the insurance mar-
ket fails to provide optimal incentives. Point-record driver’s
licenses also allow the government to incapacitate reckless
drivers because fines for traffic violations are bounded above
in many jurisdictions. Bounded fines exist for different rea-
sons: many offenders are judgment proof and are unable to
pay optimal fines; many drivers are expected to escape from
paying tickets issued by the authorities when fines are very
high; and society thinks it is unfair that rich and reckless
drivers will pay high fines and continue to drive danger-
ously (Shavell, 1987a, 1987b). However, fines do reinforce
the effectiveness of the point-record mechanism by provid-
ing normal drivers with more incentives. In Bourgeon and
Picard’s model, which uses only two levels of prevention,
the optimal fine must be set at the maximal level and must be
neither progressive nor regressive. These authors also discuss
the optimality of point-removal mechanisms as a screening
device. Public intervention can be justified when there is
a significant difference between the private and the social
cost of human lives (Viscusi, 1993). Finally, drivers may
be unaware of their own accident or infraction probabili-
ties or may misunderstand some features of the incentive
environment.
We present the database in section II, as well as our
first empirical results related to the introduction of the new
pricing policy implemented in 1992. The point-record mech-
anisms (driver’s license suspensions and insurance pricing)
are described in section III, and their incentive properties are
investigated in an optimal behavior model in which time and
effort are continuous. If incentives are caused by fines and
by the point-record driver’s license, we show that the opti-
mal effort level increases globally with the number of demerit
points accumulated and decreases with the seniority of nonre-
deemed traffic violations, if any. Traffic violation risk varies
conversely, as it decreases with the effort level.
These results are compared with the data in section IV.
The observed dynamics on the drivers result from the incen-
tive effects and the revelation with time of hidden features
in risk distributions (that is, an unobserved heterogeneity
effect). Let us compare these two effects at the time and
event (accident or traffic violation) level of the data dynam-
ics. Drivers with more traffic violations committed during a
given period are riskier with respect to hidden features in risk
distributions. Hence, unobserved heterogeneity entails a risk
reassessment after each event, and the event effect of risk
revelation counters the corresponding incentive effect of the
point-record driver’s license. The revelation effect on the risk
level of a period without traffic violations is negative.4 The
time effect of unobserved heterogeneity is also converse to
that of the incentive effect, which raises an identification issue
in the interpretation of the observed dynamics on the drivers.
4 Increases in premium after an event and “no claims discount” clauses
observed in non–life insurance can be explained by the revelation effect of
unobserved heterogeneity.
Abbring et al.’s (2003) test for moral hazard can be used if
there are no time effects in the incentives. Because the time
effects are important in Quebec’s point-record system, we use
another approach. We test for an increasing link between traf-
fic violation risk and the number of demerit points. Rejecting
this assumption amounts to finding evidence of moral hazard
(ab absurdo, because of the increasing event effect created
by unobserved heterogeneity). In section IVB, the incentives
created by the threat of driver’s license suspension are found
to increase with accumulated demerit points. These findings
confirm the theoretical analysis.
The insurance rating scheme introduced in 1992 reduced
the frequency of traffic violations by 15%. In section IVB,
we link the incentive levels of the three point-record mecha-
nisms as derived from the theoretical analysis of section III
and the observed efficiency of these mechanisms. Monetary
equivalents for traffic violations and license suspensions are
derived from this analysis. Conclusions are drawn in section
V and technicalities are relegated to an appendix available
online at http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00414479/fr/.
II. Presentation of the Database and Preliminary
Empirical Results
Our database represents roughly 1% of the SAAQ port-
folio. The panel covers the period from January 1, 1983, to
December 31, 1996. A first sample of 40,000 license hold-
ers was selected at random at the beginning of 1983, and
about 300 young drivers were added each following year.5
The attrition rate per year is close to 1.5%, which is very low
compared with the private sector. Due to the monopolistic
status of the SAAQ, leaving the company means that drivers
lose their license, which explains the low attrition rate. The
endogenous attrition is not very high. It was estimated from
a bivariate probit model on traffic offenses and departures
from the sample. A score test for the nullity of the corre-
lation coefficient between the two equations was performed
with the regression components set used in section IV.6 The
null hypothesis was not rejected at a 5% significance level.
Hence, the attrition risk adds no significant information to
the assessment of traffic violation risk.
The personal characteristics of each driver are available on
the driver’s license for the current period. These characteris-
tics are used as regression components in the empirical study.
Several types of events are recorded in the database:
• Accidents that have led to a police report. Only those
with bodily injury are compensated by the SAAQ.
5 Selecting at random 1% of the new license holders every year would
evidently have been a preferable sampling procedure. One thousand new
license holders would then have been selected every year, as the entry rate
in the SAAQ portfolio is close to 2.5%.
6 Binary variables related to traffic offenses and attrition were created on
a monthly basis and explained with the covariates used in section IVA. The
score test statistic is equal to 0.34. Hence, we do not reject the nullity of the
correlation coefficient at the usual significance levels.
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Figure 1.—Relative Frequencies (in Percentage) for Traffic Violations and Accidents
Frequencies derived form a one-year centered moving average. The reform introducing the insurance experience rating structure based on demerit points took effect on December 1, 1992.
• Convicted violations of the Highway Safety Code,
together with the number of demerit points used in the
point-record mechanisms. The number of demerit points
is based on the severity of the traffic violation. Their
distribution is given in section IIID.
• Driver’s license suspensions, which are spells rather
than events.
• Premium payments, which since the 1992 reform are
related to accumulated demerit points. These payments
are made every two years on the policyholder’s birthday.
Between 1985 and 1996, the average yearly frequencies
of accidents with bodily injuries, accidents of all types (not
including joint reports filed with private insurers), and traffic
violations are 1.4%, 6.7%, and 16.9%, respectively. Figure 1
represents the relative frequencies derived from a one-year-
centered moving average.7
There is an overall decline in the frequency of accidents,
whereas the frequency of traffic violations remains more sta-
tionary. This may seem surprising, but it is explained by the
evolution of the traffic control environment. For instance, the
number of traffic control devices such as radars increased
during the 1980s and 1990s. An increase in the rate of traf-
fic offenses recorded by devices or police officers among
those committed explains this relationship. Figure 1 shows
evidence of several periods where the frequency of traffic
violations increased along with opposite variations in the fre-
quencies of accidents. A step-up in traffic control during these
periods may well explain such observations.
7 We begin in 1985 in order to match the regressions that follow because a
two-year history is needed to obtain the accumulated demerit points. Data
are first averaged over one year, to account for strong seasonal effects. A
centered moving average derived on five fortnights is then performed twice
in order to reduce the volatility of the series.
A traffic violation committed by a driver must be selected
twice in order to be filed with demerit points. It must first
be recorded by a control device or a police officer. We
already mentioned that the related selection rate had pre-
viously increased. Second, the offender must be convicted
of the recorded traffic violation. The filing of a traffic vio-
lation is somewhat discretionary. Since the 1992 reform, for
instance, drivers are being forced to pay more in premiums
given demerit points, and we might expect police to be more
hesitant to hand them out and to give warnings instead.8
The conviction rate is less likely to vary with time than the
recording rate.
In figure 1, a downturn is also observed in the frequency
of traffic violations just before the date of the reform that
introduced the experience rating structure based on demerit
points (December 1, 1992). The reform was announced on
August 1, 1992, which may explain why the downturn starts
slightly before December 1, 1992. The experience-rated pre-
mium was first applied at the contract anniversary following
December 1, 1992, and used the complete two-year history of
demerit points. Hence the new incentives for safe driving took
effect for most of the drivers on August 1, 1992 (drivers with
their next birthday after December 1, 1992).9 On average,
the annual frequency of traffic violations was equal to 17.6%
8 We thank a referee for suggesting this interpretation.
9 The SAAQ had the information on the drivers’ traffic violation his-
tory since 1978. Drivers with a contract anniversary falling between the
announcement of the reform and its enforcement are not incited by the
experience-rated premium before this anniversary. Incentives exist other-
wise (for these drivers after their birthday and for all the other drivers since
the announcement of the reform). A referee suggested using this natural
experiment in order to disentangle the incentive effects of the reform from
calendar effects. We did not obtain significant results. Four months is a short
period, and on average only one driver out of twelve was not incited by the
rating scheme during the period.
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before the reform and 15.4% afterward, which corresponds
to a 12.5% decrease. The 1992 reform can be interpreted
as a laboratory experiment to test whether experience rating
based on demerit points reduces traffic violations. Nonethe-
less, the lower rate of traffic violations following the 1992
Quebec reform may be due to the changes in other factors
that influence driver behavior. Identifying the influence of
these factors necessitates a control group that is not affected
by the policy change. Unfortunately, we do not have access
to such a control group because the insurer is a monopoly and
bodily injury insurance is compulsory.10 In section IVB, we
link the average decrease in the frequency of traffic violations
before and after the 1992 reform to the overall effectiveness
of incentive schemes.
Monetary and nonmonetary incentives for safe driving are
based on traffic violations as well as the optimal behavior
models presented in Section III. However, the actual social
cost of road traffic is caused by accidents. To reconcile these
two approaches, two results are worth mentioning. First,
demerit points are good predictors of accidents. This is well
documented in the literature and is confirmed in our data in
section IVA. Second, the global stationarity of convicted traf-
fic violation frequency observed in figure 1 concurs with a
probable decrease in the frequency of committed traffic viola-
tions (see the already noted developments on selection rates).
Lowering traffic violation risk through point-record mecha-
nisms should also lower accident risk and the related social
cost.
Finally, figure 1 shows that accidents with bodily injuries
evolve in much the same way as those recorded in the SAAQ
file. We include accidents of all types in the empirical analysis
in order to obtain more stable results.11
III. Incentive Effects of Point-Record Mechanisms
A. Point-Record Mechanisms in Quebec
In this section, we describe Quebec’s point-record mech-
anisms, which are based on traffic violations, both monetary
(insurance premiums) and nonmonetary (point-record dri-
ver’s license). Comparisons are made with respect to the
mechanisms used in other countries.12 We investigate the
incentive properties of point-record mechanisms in sections
IIIB to IIID.
In many countries, driver’s license suspensions are based
on demerit points. In Quebec, demerit points are assigned
to convictions for traffic offenses, and their number depends
on the traffic violation severity. When the accumulated num-
ber of demerit points reaches or exceeds a given threshold,
10 See Manning et al. (1987) for the use of a control group in the assessment
of a cost-sharing modification in the health insurance market.
11 Important variables in the regressions such as the number of accumu-
lated demerit points have low frequencies for the highest values. It is hard
to make an accurate estimate if the frequency of events is low, as is the case
for accidents with bodily injury.
12 We focus on license suspensions in the comparisons. However, financial
penalties are also associated with demerit points in some U.S. states.
the driver’s license is suspended. Before January 1990 this
threshold was set at twelve in Quebec and has since been
increased to fifteen.
In order to mitigate the social cost of license suspensions,
point-removal systems exist for most point-record driver’s
licenses. In Quebec, the demerit points related to a given
driving offense are removed after two years. Hence, driver’s
license suspensions depend on the demerit points recorded
during the previous two years. Most of point-removal sys-
tems used in American states follow the same approach. The
average number of demerit points per convicted offense is
2.4 in Quebec. It takes about six traffic violations within two
years to trigger a license suspension, an unlikely outcome
when the annual traffic violation frequency is 16.9%. How-
ever, the heterogeneity of risks is high, and a point-record
driver’s license is also an incapacitating device for risky and
reckless drivers through license suspensions. Another point-
removal system consists of cancelling all the demerit points
after a given period of violation-free driving. This mechanism
was recently implemented in Spain, with a two-year seniority.
The French driver’s license uses the two removal systems.
The experience rating structure introduced by the SAAQ
on December 1, 1992, links each premium paid every two
years to the demerit points accumulated over the previous two
years. The rating structure is given in section IIID. Once the
premium is paid, the driver is reinstated with an unblemished
record. Thus the length of the record relevant to the derivation
of optimal behavior never exceeds two years.
B. Basic Model for a Point-Record Driver’s License without
Point Removal
Bourgeon and Picard (2007) analyze the incentive effects
of point-record driver’s licenses using a binary effort vari-
able. We extend their approach with a continuous effort level.
Hence, the effectiveness of effort may also be a continuous
function of contract time, a desirable property for empirical
validation. We show that under fairly general conditions, a
rational policyholder’s safe driving effort will increase with
the number of demerit points accumulated.
We assume that the driver’s license is revoked when the
driver reaches a total of N demerit points. For simplicity,
each convicted traffic violation is linked to one supplemen-
tary demerit point in this section. A driver with a suspended
driver’s license is reinstated after a period D with an unblem-
ished record like that of a beginner.13 The duration D may
be fixed or random in the model. In Quebec, a license sus-
pension is of random length because drivers must pass a new
exam after a given period before recovering their license.14 A
rational driver maximizes his or her expected lifetime utility
expressed in dollars and derived from:
13 This reinstatement can be seen as a removal of demerit points. In this
paper, we consider a point-removal mechanism to be a cancellation of
demerit points applied before the suspension of the driver’s license.
14 The failure rate at the first exam after the license suspension is 25%.
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• An instantaneous driving utility, du.
• A time-dependent disutility of effort, denoted as e(t).15
This effort level is linked to an instantaneous traffic vio-
lation frequency risk, denoted as λ(e(t)). The hazard
function λ(e) corresponds to a probability p(e) in static
or discrete time incentive models and is assumed to be a
positive, decreasing, and strictly convex function of the
effort level.
In this section, we suppose that there is no point-removal
mechanism. In that case, the lifetime expected utility (we
assume an infinite horizon) depends on only the number n
of accumulated demerit points and is denoted as un. The
Bellman equation on the expected utility leads to
un = du
r
− cλ(un − un+1)
r
, (0 ≤ n < N), (1)
where r is a subjective discount rate and cλ is defined as
cλ(Δu) =
def
min
e≥0
e + [λ(e) ×Δu]. (2)
Technical details can be found in appendix A1. From equa-
tion (2), incentives are effective if we have Δu > −1/λ′(0).
In this equation, Δu is the lifetime utility loss between the
current state and the one reached after an additional traffic
offense. Once quantified, Δu is the monetary equivalent of
this traffic violation. Values of this type are derived in section
IVB. The function cλ minimizes the sum e + [λ(e) × Δu],
which is the disutility flow of both effort (short-term com-
ponent) and the expected lifetime utility loss (long-term
component). All un are lower than umax = du/r, the pri-
vate lifetime driving utility without the point-record driver’s
license. Equation (1) means that cλ(un − un+1)/r is the min-
imal private utility cost of the point-record mechanism for a
driver with n demerit points. The cycle of lifetime utilities is
closed with a link between u0 and uN , the lifetime expected
utility just after the suspension of the driver’s license. For
instance, if the private disutility of driver’s license suspen-
sion is only the loss of driving utility during a period D, we
have that
uN = βu0, β = E[exp(−rD)]. (3)
The utilities are then derived from the recurrence equations
(1) and (3). Optimal effort depends on the variation of life-
time utility Δu because it minimizes the function defined in
equation (2). The variableΔu (the argument of cλ in equation
(2)), which determines optimal effort, will be referred to later
as the incentive level. In this setting, optimal effort depends
on the number n of accumulated demerit points but not on
time, and we denote it as en. We show in appendix A1 that
15 Safe driving effort can also reduce the expected disutility of accidents.
If e → δ(e) is the implied decrease in the disutility flow, replacing e by
e−δ(e) in the model includes the influence of safe driving effort on accident
disutility.
en increases with n for any given value of N . The related fre-
quency of violations λn = λ(en) thus decreases with n. The
intuition behind this result is the following. A given reduc-
tion in traffic violation risk is more efficient as the threat of
the license suspension gets closer. Hence, the efficiency of
effort increases with the number of demerit points accumu-
lated, and we obtain an increasing link between this number
and the optimal effort level. A parallel can be drawn with the
“three strikes and you’re out” rule enforced in California to
deter crime. The deterrence effect increases from one to two
strikes (Helland & Tabarrok, 2007).16
Fines represent another monetary incentive scheme
applied in Quebec throughout the period investigated in this
study. Let us denote fa as the average fine for a traffic vio-
lation conviction. Given that fines and premiums are low in
comparison to average wealth, risk aversion is not signifi-
cant. If fines are combined with the preceding point-record
driver’s license, the incentive level is equal to fa + un
−un+1. This means that the average fine is added to the utility
loss in the variable, which determines optimal effort. Besides,
the optimal effort still increases with n for a given value of
the average fine.
C. Point-Record Driver’s Licenses with Point Removal
In Quebec, each traffic violation is redeemed at the end
of a two-year period. Integrating this feature in the opti-
mal behavior model is difficult because all the seniorities
of nonredeemed driving offenses must be included as state
variables in the dynamic programming equations. Lifetime
utility is expected to increase with time for a given number
of demerit points accumulated. Optimal effort depends on the
difference between the existing utility and a substitute utility
(that reached after an additional traffic violation). With the
point-removal system in force in Quebec, the substitute utility
increases with time, as does the existing utility. Time should
have more value for worse situations, which implies that the
substitute utility should increase faster than the existing util-
ity. Optimal effort should thus decrease with time. Appendix
A2 provides proof that optimal effort is continuous at the
time of a point removal. Optimal effort is then expected to
increase with each traffic violation in order to compensate for
the decreasing link between time and effort. To summarize,
we expect the effort level to increase globally with the num-
ber of demerit points accumulated and to decrease with the
seniority of nonredeemed traffic violations if any.
Figure 2 illustrates the changes in the optimal traffic vio-
lation risk during a period that includes two violations and
their point removal. The continuous time effect of incentives
16 We thank a referee for suggesting this connection. A “strike” is a con-
viction for a serious felony, the equivalent of a demerit point. Three strikes
entail a prison sentence of 25 years to life, which in our context would be
the license suspension. Comparing the time to rearrest for criminals with
one or two strikes in California, Helland and Tabarrok (2007) conclude that
those with two strikes are less risky than those convicted twice, with one
strike only. They thus observe an increase in the deterrence effect at the
second strike.
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Figure 2.—Time Evolution of Traffic Violation Risk Related to
Optimal Effort: Example with Two Traffic Offenses
The function t → λ(e(t)) is represented by the thick line. In this example, the first traffic violation
occurs at t1, the second at t1 + 1. The two demerit points are removed at t1 + 2 and t1 + 3. The optimal
effort level is denoted as e(t). It is determined by all the seniorities of nonredeemed traffic violations, if
any. The minimum effort level is denoted as emin and may be greater than 0, depending on the individual
characteristics of the driver. After each traffic violation, there is an upward jump in the optimal effort
level and an implied drop in traffic violation risk if incentives are effective. The continuous time effect
of incentives counters the event-driven effect (e(t) decreases with t and λ(e(t)) increases). Before t1, the
effort level is minimal. It increases after the first traffic violation. The drop in traffic violation risk is the
opposite of the unobserved heterogeneity effect. The effort is maximum after the second offense, and then
we have e(t1 +2) = e(t1 +1) at the time of the first point removal (one nonredeemed traffic violation with
a one-year seniority in both cases). We also have e(t1 + 3) = emin at the time of the second removal.
balances the downward jump in risk after each violation. The
incentive effects at the time and event level are the opposite
of those created by the revelation of unobserved heterogene-
ity. The incentive properties of the point-removal system in
force in Quebec are similar to those of a mechanism with-
out point removal concerning the number of demerit points
accumulated. In section IV, we use the model of section III
B as a proxy for the incentive environment in Quebec.
D. Incentive Effects of Premiums Indexed on Demerit
Points in Quebec
Table 1 presents the rating structure enforced for each
driver’s license on the first contract anniversary following
December 1, 1992. The premium paid every two years after
this date depends on the number of demerit points accumu-
lated in the previous two years. It does not represent the total
premium for bodily injury insurance but rather the additional
premium related to demerit points. This average premium,
equal to $54.60, complements a yearly driver’s license fee
for insurance coverage equal to $107.
In this section, the incentive properties of this rating struc-
ture are analyzed separately from the point-record driver’s
license. An important input is the distribution of demerit
points for a given driving offense, which we left out in
section IIIB. Denoting fj as the proportion of traffic violations
with j demerit points, we have the following values:
f1 = 4.71%; f2 = 52.32%; f3 = 38.34%;
f4 = 2.83%; f5 = 1.80%. (4)
Note that f5 refers to offenses with five or more points. Table
1 shows that the premium is a step function of the accumu-
lated demerit points. Because of the local nonconvexity of
the premium, the incentives may not always increase with
the number of demerit points accumulated. Consider, for
Table 1.—SAAQ Insurance Premiums for Bodily Injury as a Function
ofAccumulated Demerit Points since the Last ContractAnniversary
Accumulated Demerit Points Premium for the Frequency
(Last Two Years) Next Two Years (Canadian $) (%)
0–3 50 93.7
4–7 100 4.9
8–11 174 1.1
12–14 286 0.2
15 or more 398 0.1
The premium is a step function of accumulated demerit points. The incentives for safe driving depend on
the accumulated demerit points. For example, we document in the text that the incentive level is stronger
with two accumulated demerit points than with four because the probability of climbing a step in the rating
structure after a traffic violation is higher.
instance, a policyholder just before her contract anniversary.
The incentive level will be stronger with two accumulated
demerit points than with four. With four points, it is indeed
less than likely that the next traffic offense will trigger
an increase in premium. The corresponding probability is
2.83 + 1.80 = 4.63%, if we assume that the distribution
of the fj is independent of the accumulated demerit points.
The incentives for safe driving are stronger at a two-point
level because the probability of climbing a step in the rat-
ing structure after a traffic offense is close to 1. The result
is in contrast to that obtained by Abbring et al. (2003) for
the French bonus-malus scheme and its exponential struc-
ture. Hence, step pricing schemes may have poor incentive
properties. They are employed because they are simple.
Let us design an optimal behavior model based on this
rating structure. Once the premium is paid, the driver is
reinstated with an unblemished record. Hence, the optimal
control model can be designed with the next contract anniver-
sary as the horizon. Letπn be the premium paid for n demerit
points accumulated during a period of T = 2 years between
two contract anniversaries. As we disregard the point-record
driver’s license and its possible deprivation, the driving util-
ity is no longer a parameter. However, we retain fines in the
incentives for safe driving. We denote vn(t) as the expected
disutility of premiums and fines paid until the next contract
anniversary, where t is the seniority of the last anniversary
and n is the number of demerit points accumulated since that
date. We have the terminal conditions
vn(T) = πn, ∀n = 0, . . . , N . (5)
If incentives are related to fines and insurance premiums,
the incentive level is the sum of the average fine fa and the
expected variation of vn(t) after a traffic offense (see appendix
A3). Hence, optimal effort is determined by fa+Δvn(t), with
Δvn(t) =
(∑
j/fj>0 fj vmin(n+j,N)(t)
)−vn(t). Derivations show
that the average of Δvn(t) with respect to n does not vary
much with time. The terminal values ofΔvn are derived from
equations (4) and (5) and table 1. For n = 0, 2, 4, we obtain
Δv0(T) = $2.32; Δv2(T) = $47.65; Δv4(T) = $3.43.
(6)
The incentives with two points accumulated are much
stronger than with four points, which confirms the analysis
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following equation (4). The overall average of Δvn(t) with
respect to t and n is close to $12, a 9% increase for a $130
average fine. In section IVB, this increase will be compared
with the variation in traffic violation frequency before and
after the reform.
IV. Empirical Results on the Incentive Effects of
Point-Record Mechanisms
A. Point-Record Driver’s License
In this section, we analyze the data before the 1992
reform that introduced the experience rating scheme based on
demerit points. Thus, the point-record driver’s license inter-
acts only with fines. Regressions are performed from January
1985 (we need a two-year history to derive the accumulated
demerit points) to December 1992, the date of the reform
enforcement. We try to confirm the theoretical findings of
sections IIIB and IIIC (that the effort level increases globally
with the number of demerit points accumulated and decreases
with the seniority of nonredeemed traffic violations, if any),
and to find evidence of moral hazard in the data.
We estimate the hazard functions of convicted traffic
offenses and accidents with a proportional hazards model
(Cox, 1972). We retained the following specification:
λ
j
i(t) = exp((xi(t)βj) + gj(adpi(t))) × hj(ci(t)). (7)
In equation (7), λji(t) is the hazard function of type j ( j = 1 :
traffic violation or j = 2 : accident) for driver i at calen-
dar time t. Regression components are denoted by the line
vector xi(t). We retained the gender, driver’s license class,
place of residence, age of the driver, calendar effects related
to years and months, and the number of past license suspen-
sions.17 The number of demerit points accumulated in the
previous two years is denoted as adpi(t). Let us comment on
the expected shape of g1, which links traffic violation risk to
accumulated demerit points. The revelation effect of unob-
served heterogeneity is increasing in adp and is converse to
the incentive effect. In the absence of moral hazard, g1 should
then be increasing. We will test the null hypothesis that g1
is weakly increasing against the alternative that it is not (g1
strictly decreases for at least some values), rejecting the null
amounts to finding evidence of moral hazard.18
Contract time ci(t) is integrated into the baseline hazard
function hj. The function ci is set at 0 at the beginning of the
period. Then it is reset to 0 at each event that triggers a vari-
ation of the accumulated demerit points (traffic violation or
point removal). This event-driven operation should eliminate
interactions between calendar and contract-time effects.
Table 2 shows that ĝ1 is increasing until adp reaches the
seven-point threshold, at which point the increasing property
is no longer fulfilled, and ĝ1 reaches a maximum at seven
17 Comprehensive regressions based on two-year periods can be found in
Dionne et al. (2001).
18 We thank a referee for suggesting this formulation of the test.
Table 2.—Estimation of the Hazard Function for Traffic Violation
and Accident Frequency Risks
Traffic P-value (H0 :
Frequency Violation g1(7) ≤ g1(adp), Accident
Variable Level (%) Risk (g1) adp > 7) risk (g2)
adp: 0 pointa 76.60 0 0
Number of 1 point 0.39 0.311 0.243
accumulated 2 points 9.36 0.500 0.328
demerit points 3 points 6.23 0.522 0.449
(last two years) 4 points 1.92 0.794 0.496
5 points 2.09 0.854 0.595
6 points 1.25 0.873 0.647
7 points 0.72 0.974 0.601
8 points 0.55 0.876 0.0130 0.736
9 points 0.43 0.764 < 0.0001 0.797
10 points 0.32 0.786 0.0002 0.842
11 points 0.06 0.906 0.2328 0.522
12 points 0.04 0.378 < 0.0001 0.810
13–14 points 0.04 0.571 0.0004 0.222
Controlling for other variables, a driver with seven accumulated demerit points who gets a supplementary
two-point offense has a traffic violation risk reduced by 1−exp(0.764−0.974) = 19%. As the unobserved
heterogeneity effect is increasing with adp, the estimated risk reduction due to the incentive effect is greater
than 19%. The p-values refer to tests for the null assumption: g1(7) ≤ g1(adp) (with adp > 7) versus the
alternative, with one-sided rejection regions. For instance, the null assumption related to adp = 8 is rejected
at the level α if α is greater than the p-value 1.3%, and accepted otherwise. The results suggest that g1 is not
increasing beyond adp = 7, which shows evidence of moral hazard. A global test for the increasing shape
of g1 is presented in figure 3. Additional regression variables are gender, driver’s license class (nine levels),
place of residence (sixteen levels), age of the driver (five slopes), number of past suspension spells (three
levels), as well as calendar effects related to years (eight levels), and months (twelve levels). Number of
observations: 3,492,868 duration-event indicator pairs, derived from 41,290 driver’s licenses. The durations
are bounded above by one month.
aThe reference level.
points. It is worth mentioning that the SAAQ warns the pol-
icyholders when their accumulated demerit points increase
beyond a seven-point threshold.19 When the accumulated
demerit points are less than or equal to seven, the unobserved
heterogeneity effects outweigh the incentive effects because
ĝ1 is increasing. Controlling for other covariates, a driver with
seven accumulated demerit points is exp(0.974) = 2.65 times
riskier than a driver with a violation-free record. Hence, unob-
served heterogeneity effects strongly outweigh incentives to
drive carefully between zero and seven points. This result
is reversed beyond seven points. For instance, a driver with
seven accumulated demerit points who gets a supplementary
two-point offense has a traffic violation risk that is 19% lower.
As the unobserved heterogeneity effect is increasing with
adp, the estimated risk reduction due to the incentive effect
is greater than 19%. A 20% value for the risk reduction after
a traffic offense will be retained in the next section in order to
derive monetary equivalents for traffic violations and license
suspensions. Table 2 presents tests where the null assumption
is g1(7) ≤ g1(adp), for adp > 7. The null is rejected for these
values of adp at significance levels greater than 1.3%, except
for adp = 11. We also performed a global test on the weakly
increasing shape of g1. The test statistic is a squared distance
between the unconstrained estimation of g1 given in table 2
and the set of weakly increasing functions of adp (see appen-
dix A4 for more details). A graphical illustration is given in
figure 3. We reject the increasing shape assumption for every
usual significance level. As an absence of incentive effects
entails an increasing shape for g1 (unobserved heterogeneity
effect), rejecting the null shows evidence of moral hazard.
19 Drivers are not informed when offenses are redeemed.
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Figure 3.—Global Test for the Increasing Shape of the Traffic Violation Risk as a Function of Accumulated Demerit Points
This figure presents a graphical test where the null is the weakly increasing shape of g1 as a function of adp, the number of accumulated demerit points. The test statistic is a squared distance between the unconstrained
estimation of g1 (thick line) given in table 2, and the set of weakly increasing functions of adp. The metric is that of the Wald asymptotic test, and the weakly increasing function closest to g1 is represented by the
dashed line. The statistic is equal to 43.18, and its asymptotic distribution is less than that of a χ2(13) in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. This leads us to reject the increasing shape assumption for every
significance level greater than 42 × 10−6. As an absence of incentive effects entails an increasing shape for g1 (unobserved heterogeneity effect), rejecting the null shows evidence of moral hazard.
Table 2 shows less evidence of moral hazard on accident
risk than on traffic violation risk, as the estimation of g2
increases until adp = 10. A possible interpretation is that
we cannot separate at-fault from no-fault accidents. In the
literature, the incentive effect is usually higher with at-fault
accidents. Besides, drivers nearing the license suspension
threshold might also apply opportunistic strategies regard-
ing traffic violations (for example, paying more attention to
radar) without otherwise modifying their attitude toward road
traffic risk.
The estimated hazard function from the traffic violation
equation globally decreases with time.20 This means that the
continuous time effect created by the revelation of unob-
served heterogeneity outweighs the incentive effects (see
figure 2 and the discussion that follows). This is not sur-
prising, given that the average increase of g1 in table 2 (a vast
majority of drivers have fewer than seven demerit points)
must be balanced by a negative time effect in order to obtain
stationary risk levels on average. As effort is expected to
decrease with time only if the number of demerit points accu-
mulated is greater than zero, the statistical analysis can be
refined with a stratified proportional hazards model.21 Two
strata can be created, depending on whether the variable
adpi(t) is equal to 0 or not. On both strata, we observe a
decreasing shape for the estimated hazard function.
20 Results are available from the authors on request.
21 Stratification in a proportional hazards model means that Cox likeli-
hoods (of a multinomial logit type) are derived for each stratum and then
multiplied together. In other words, an individual with an observed event
is assumed to have competed only with other individuals in the same stra-
tum and at risk at the same date. However, the same coefficients for the
covariates are used across all strata.
B. Incentive Effects of the 1992 Reform and Monetary
Equivalents for Traffic Violations and License Suspensions
In this section, we assess the efficiency of the 1992 reform.
We compare its incentive level to those of fines and of the
point-record driver’s license. We relate the efficiency of the
reform to its relative weight in the three incentive mecha-
nisms, and we infer results on the shape of the link between
the cost and efficiency of effort. Finally, we derive mone-
tary equivalents for traffic violations and license suspensions
from the estimated efficiency of incentives created by a
supplementary traffic violation.
In section II, we mentioned a 12.5% decrease in the aver-
age frequency of traffic violations before and after the reform,
which introduced the experience rating structure based on
demerit points. This result changes slightly if we control with
the regression components used in table 2. A regression esti-
mated from 1985 to 1996 with the covariates of section IVA
and a dummy related to the period following December 1,
1992, associates the reform with a 15% decrease.22 The
results of section IIID (for instance, equation (6)) suggest that
the number of demerit points accumulated since the previous
anniversary should influence the effectiveness of the 1992
reform. However, we did not obtain significant results in this
direction. The drivers’ limited knowledge of the environment
could explain this poor result, a point developed later.
22 We retained the covariates used in table 2 except for dummies related
calendar effects and to the number of past license suspension spells. The
estimated parameter for the reform dummy is equal to −0.163, and the
related standard deviation is equal to 0.008. Hence, the reform effect is
conclusive at the usual tests significance levels.
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We perform an overall comparison of the three incen-
tive schemes. We use the model without point removal of
section IIIB to analyze the incentives for drivers in Quebec.
Before the 1992 reform, fines were supplemented by a point-
record driver’s license. Optimal effort after n nonredeemed
traffic violations depends on the incentive level—that is, the
argument of the function cλ defined in equation (2). This level
is equal to fa + un − un+1 (see section IIIB). The average fine
fa is equal to $130, and the 1992 reform entails an average
increase in the incentive level equal to $12 from section IIID.
At this point, it seems interesting to relate optimal frequency
risk and the incentive level. This relation can be assessed
from the elasticity between the former and the latter variable.
When the incentives are effective, it can be shown that this
elasticity is less than −1 if and only if log(λ) is a concave
function of effort (elasticity and concavity are considered
locally; see appendix A5 for a proof). A global elasticity
equal to −1 is linked to an exponential decay of λ. With
λ(e) = λ(0)× exp(−αe), the optimal risk level as a function
of fa +Δu (the incentive level) is equal to 1/(α× (fa +Δu))
if the incentives are effective.
We now apply this result to the 1992 reform. As the
reform entailed a significant reduction in traffic violation risk
regardless of the number of demerit points accumulated, we
can assume that incentives are effective for a representative
driver.23 This leads us to analyze the elasticity between traf-
fic violation risk and the incentive level. Suppose that we
leave out the modifications of incentive levels due to the
aggregation of incentive mechanisms. Then we can relate:
• On the one hand, a 15% reduction in the frequency of
traffic violations since the 1992 reform.
• On the other hand, a relative increase in the incentive
level ranging between 9% and 10%. Indeed, the 1992
reform entails a $12 average increase in the incentive
level. This increase supplements the other components
of the incentives—the $130 average fine and the util-
ity variation for the point-record driver’s license. In
table 2, the point-record driver’s license offers signif-
icant incentives beyond a seven-point threshold, a result
corresponding to only a minority of drivers (1.4%). The
contribution of the point-record driver’s license to the
incentives is low compared with that of fines.
This suggests that the elasticity between the optimal fre-
quency risk and the incentive level is less than −1 in this case.
This result is linked to a locally concave shape of log(λ) for
the representative driver. However, external effects could also
explain the reduction in the frequency of traffic violations.
We cannot eliminate these effects because there is no control
group that is not affected by the reform. Besides, the elas-
ticity would be modified if the distribution of demerit points
for a given driving offense (see equation (4)) was wrongly
23 From section IIIB, a sufficient condition to have this result is that
the average fine is higher than the threshold −1/λ′(0) beyond which the
incentives are effective.
perceived by the drivers. The $12 contribution of the reform
to the incentive level is low because of the high frequency
of drivers without demerit points since the previous birthday
(87%) and the low incentive level of the reform for these
drivers (see equation (6)). This level depends largely on the
probability of moving up a step in the premium schedule after
an additional traffic violation, which must be associated with
four demerit points or more. If the perceived frequency of
corresponding traffic violations was greater than the actual
one (f4 + f5 = 2.83 + 1.80 = 4.63%), the variation of the
incentive level induced by the reform would increase. In that
case, the elasticity would be closer to 0.
Finally, let us assess monetary equivalents for a traffic
violation and a license suspension. The monetary equiva-
lent of a traffic violation is the component of the incentive
level related to the point-record driver’s license. It is equal
to the loss of lifetime utility after a traffic violation, which
depends on the number of traffic violations accumulated. A
value can be derived from the effectiveness of effort esti-
mated in table 2 and from the link between efficiency of
effort and the incentive level. An additional traffic violation
beyond seven accumulated demerit points entails a reduc-
tion of traffic violation frequency of close to 20%. Although
these drivers cannot be seen as representative, we will apply
the elasticity derived from the preceding developments. If
the 9% increase in the incentive level induced by the 1992
reform entails a 15% reduction in the frequency of traffic
violations, a 20% decrease in traffic violation frequency is
associated with a 12% increase in the incentive level. The
implied loss of lifetime utility depends on the traffic viola-
tion frequency risk λ but mostly on the discount rate r (see
appendix A6). With λ = 0.15, the monetary equivalent of
an additional traffic violation for these drivers belongs to the
interval [$120, $195] if r = 3%, and to [$41.1, $55.7] if
r = 6%. Besides, the growth rate of this monetary equivalent
with respect to the number n of nonredeemed traffic viola-
tions falls between r/λn and r/λn+1, where λn is the optimal
traffic violation frequency related to n. Monetary costs for
license suspensions are then obtained by adding the costs of
traffic violations until the crossing of the demerit point thresh-
old. Starting from a zero-point record and assuming that six
traffic violations are needed to trigger a license suspension,
the monetary cost of a license suspension is bounded by $700
and $1, 178 if r = 3% and if λ0 = 0.17; λ1 = 0.17; λ2 =
0.16; λ3 = 0.15; λ4 = 0.12; λ5 = 0.09.24 A misperception
of the environment could modify the monetary equivalents
of traffic violations and license suspensions. In the discus-
sion on the elasticity between the optimal frequency risk and
the incentive level, we argued that an overestimation of the
frequency of severe traffic violations would increase the per-
ceived incentive effect of the 1992 reform. The $12 average
effect of the reform on the incentive level should then be
upgraded, and the monetary equivalents of traffic violations
and license suspensions should also be upgraded.
24 These values correspond to an effort level that increases with the number
of demerit points accumulated.
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V. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the properties of policies designed
to promote safe driving. Three important incentive mecha-
nisms for road safety are used in Quebec. When the Quebec
government introduced a no-fault insurance regime in 1978,
it implemented a point-record driving license to maintain
incentives for road safety. Because prevention activities are
not observable by the public insurer, the new mechanism
uses drivers’ accumulated demerit points to approximate past
safety activities and increase incentives to reduce infractions.
Under moral hazard, drivers who accumulate demerit points
become more careful because they are at threat of losing
their license. This result was confirmed from the data. Other-
wise, we would have accepted an increasing link assumption
between accumulated demerit points and traffic violation risk.
Fines are on average the most efficient device, but they are
associated with a uniform incentive level. We designed our
incentive models with a representative driver, but there is,
of course, heterogeneity in the individual parameters, such
as the threshold beyond which the incentives are effective.
We did not have wealth variables at hand, and an interesting
empirical issue would have been to cross such variables with
a reform dummy in risk assessment.
The experience-rated premium based on accumulated
demerit points is a monetary point-record mechanism. The
empirical results exhibit a rather uniform effectiveness after
its enforcement in 1992—a 15% decrease in the frequency of
traffic violations. Its incentive effects do not strictly increase
with the accumulated demerit points, however, because of
the steps in the rating structure. The actual incentive effect of
the reform looks more like that induced by an increase in the
average fine. The SAAQ modified its rating policy in 2008,
with a premium increase from the first demerit point.
Regulations are not self-enforcing. To successfully achieve
a reform, the regulator must implement enforcement activ-
ities and bear the costs thereof. In our application to road
safety, the police is the most important enforcer of the differ-
ent incentive schemes. Police officers have a limited capacity
to modify the penalties for a given infraction but may affect
the detection probabilities based on the aggregate convic-
tions cycles, the driver’s accumulated demerit points, or other
tasks. When analyzing our results, we must consider the effect
of these potential behaviors. For example, is it possible that
when accumulated demerit points are greater in a given file,
police officers have an incentive to issue them more or less
often because of risk of the driver’s losing his license?
We did not have precise information to control for these
factors. It is well documented that the police collaborate
very well with the Quebec public insurer and government.
There is, consequently, a low probability that aggregate
safety scores would have affected police behavior without the
agreement of the government, which is assumed to be fully
committed to its road safety policies. Regarding the effect
of accumulated demerit points, we do not believe there is a
general policy in the police force on the behavior to adopt
based on a driver’s past experience, although some individu-
als may modify their behavior in one direction or the other.
This effect is implicitly considered a purely random effect in
our analysis and should not have affected our results on the
point-record incentives.
In this study, we have not examined the long-term evolu-
tion of accidents in detail, because we did not have access to
the control variables of interest. In recent years, many road
safety initiatives have had an impact on accidents but did not
necessarily have any effect on violations. These initiatives
include measures such as occasional campaigns to prevent
fatal accidents, increased police patrols to reduce speed-
ing, and designated-driver campaigns to prevent drinkers
from getting behind the wheel. The decline in deaths and
serious injuries can also be explained by vehicular improve-
ments and the wearing of seat belts. All such measures are
complementary to those studied in this article.
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A Appendix
A.1 Incentive e¤ects of point-record drivers licenses: Model
without point removal
The Bellman equation on the expected utility is
un = max
e0
(du e)dt+(exp( rdt) [((1  (e)dt) un) + ((e)dt un+1) + o(dt)]) :
We then obtain
0 = max
e0
(du   e)  (r + (e))un + (e)un+1;
and equation (1).
We give the main properties of the function
c(u) =
def
min
e0
e+ [(e)u] = min
e0
h(u; e) ;
with  a positive, decreasing and strictly convex hazard function. The related
optimal e¤ort level is equal to
eopt(u) = argmin
e0
h(u; e))
eopt(u) = 0 if u   1

0
(0)
; eopt(u) =


0
 1 1
u

if u   1

0
(0)
: (8)
Hence the function c is dened on the real line as the optimal e¤ort. From the
last equation, we obtain
u   1

0
(0)
) c(u) = (0)u; (9)
and c is linear in the neighborhood of 0, which corresponds to no e¤ort. The
function c is strictly increasing because  is strictly positive. If u  0, we
have that:
c(u) = h(u; eopt(u))  eopt(u)) lim
u!+1
c(u)  lim
u!+1
eopt(u) = +1:
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Hence c is an increasing homeomorphism on the real line.
The function c is concave. From the envelope theorem, we have
h
0
u(u; e) = (e)) c
0
(u) = h
0
u(u; eopt(u)) = (eopt(u)): (10)
Hence c is concave from the assumptions on  and from the properties of eopt.
We give a proof of the increasing property of the optimal e¤ort level as a
function of accumulated demerit points. From equation (1), we obtain
un   un+1 = c 1 (r(umax   un)); umax =
du
r
(0  n < N): (11)
The sequence (un)0nN is decreasing because we have umax  un. Plug-
ging this result into equation (11) implies that the sequence (un   un+1)0n<N
is increasing. The optimal e¤ort level is denoted as en, and expressed as
en = arg min
e0
e+ [(e) (un   un+1)] = eopt(un   un+1);
for 0  n < N , where eopt is dened from (8). As eopt is an increasing function,
the optimal e¤ort is an increasing function of the number of demerit points for
any given value of the license suspension threshold.
Let us specify the condition under which incentives are e¤ective. From
(11) and (9), we obtain
en > 0, un   un+1 = du   run
(0)
>
 1

0
(0)
= u: (12)
If nes are included in the incentives, un+1 is replaced by un+1  fa in equation
(1), which leads to the recurrence equation (see Figure 4)
du   run = c(un   un+1 + fa)
, un+1 = un + fa  c 1 (du   run) = g(un): (13)
The xed point of g is the lifetime driving utility if nes were the only incentive
scheme, i.e. eumax = du   c(fa)
r
:
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We evidently assume that du > c(fa); i.e. eumax > 0. If the two incentives are
mixed, we have un  eumax and we deduce from (13) the properties of utilities
and of optimal e¤ort levels as functions of n that we obtained in the rst place.
In addition, we have
en > 0 ;8n; , fa+ un   un+1 > u ;8n:
This condition is fullled if
fa > u =  1=0(0);
in which case the incentives are e¤ective at every level.
A.2 Incentive e¤ects of point-record drivers licenses: Model
with point removal
The Bellman equation on a holistic incentive model can be written as follows
du   ru(S) +

d
dt
[u(St)]

t=0+
= c(fa+ u(S)  E [u(TR(S))]): (14)
The state variables S are the seniorities of each non-redeemed tra¢ c o¤ense (if
any), the related demerit points and the seniority of the last contract anniversary
if the premium is included in the incentives. The related lifetime utility is u(S).
The state St is reached from S with an eventless history (no tra¢ c o¤ense, point
removal or contract anniversary) of duration t. The parameters du and fa are
the driving utility ow and the average ne, and E [u(TR(S))] is the lifetime
utility averaged with transition probabilities on the state(s) reached from S after
a tra¢ c o¤ense. Continuity equations on utility at the time of a point removal
or of a contract anniversary (in the latter case, the increase in lifetime utility
is equal to the disutility of the premium) and the equation linking the utility
of a beginner and the utility just after a license suspension dene the solution
together with equation (14).
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Let us prove the continuity of optimal e¤ort after a point removal in a sys-
tem where each tra¢ c violation is redeemed beyond a given seniority threshold,
equal to T . We suppose that each tra¢ c violation is associated with one demerit
point, and that incentives are related to nes and to the point-record drivers
license. The state variables are then the seniorities of each non-redeemed tra¢ c
o¤ense, if any. Let us denote these variables as
S = (t1; : : : ; tn); 0  t1 < : : : < tn < T:
The corresponding optimal e¤ort is denoted as e(S). The states reached without
tra¢ c o¤ense before the next point removal are then
St = (t1 + t; : : : ; tn + t); 0  t < T   tn:
We denote the state reached from S after an additional tra¢ c o¤ense (if n < N)
as (0; t1; : : : ; tn) = TR(S): As the lifetime utility is continuous after a point
removal, we have the following result:
n  1 : lim
t!(T tn) 
u(St) = u(S
R); SR = (t1 + T   tn; : : : ; tn 1 + T   tn):
The state SR is reached from S if there is no tra¢ c o¤ense before the rst point
removal. Then it is easily seen that
lim
t!(T tn) 
u [TR(St)] = u

TR(SR)

= u(0; t1 + T   tn; : : : ; tn 1 + T   tn):
This means that the left continuity at T   tn of the map t ! u(St) also holds
for the map t ! u [TR(St)] ; which is associated with the states reached after
an additional tra¢ c o¤ense. The reason is that removal of past o¤enses occurs
regardless of the future individual history.
From the three last equations, we obtain
lim
t!(T tn) 
e(St) = e(S
R)
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and the continuity property of the optimal e¤ort level. Since we expect a global
increasing link between optimal e¤ort and the accumulated demerit points, the
time-e¤ect should be decreasing globally in order to fulll this continuity prop-
erty.
A.3 Incentive e¤ects of the experience rating system
Let us derive the Bellman equation on the expected disutility function given in
(15), including an average ne of faj for a j demerit point tra¢ c violation. The
optimal disutility function is obtained from the program
vn(t) = min
e0
edt+ (exp( rdt) (1  (e)dt) vn(t+ dt))
+
0@exp( rdt)
24 X
j = fj>0
fj (e)dt

vmin(n+j;N)(t+ dt) + faj
351A+ o(dt);
which leads to
0 = v
0
n(t) + c
0@fa+
0@ X
j = fj>0
fj vmin(n+j;N)(t)
1A  vn(t)
1A  rvn(t);
with fa =
P
j = fj>0
fj  faj the average ne. Then we obtain the Bellman
equation
v
0
n(t) = rvn(t)  c
 
fa+vn(t)

; (0  n  N): (15)
The argument of c; fa+vn(t); is the incentive level.
A.4 Test for the increasing shape of a vector of parame-
ters, and for evidence of moral hazard
Let  be the vector of values reached by the function g1; where g1 is dened in
equation (7). We have adp = g1(adp); 1  adp  13; with adp the number
of demerit points accumulated in the last two years. In what follows,  can be
5
ha
l-0
04
14
47
9,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 9
 S
ep
 2
00
9
replaced by g1, but we use here the usual notations for asymptotic tests. The
level adp = 13 also includes the 14 point total. As adp = 0 is the default level
in the regression, the increasing shape of g1 is related to the null assumption
g1(0) = 0  1  : : :  13: (16)
Rejecting this assumption amounts to nding evidence of moral hazard. The
null assumption is obviously expressed as a set of inequalities of the type fi() 
0 (i = 1; : : : ; 13); with
f() = vec
i
(fi()) = J  ; J
13;13
=
0BBBBBBBB@
1 0 : : : : : : 0
 1 1 . . . 0 ...
0
. . . . . . . . .
...
... 0
. . . 1 0
0 : : : 0  1 1
1CCCCCCCCA
:
A usual asymptotic test for the nullity of f() derived from b; the maximum
likelihood estimation (m.l.e.) of  estimated here together with nuisance pa-
rameters is the Wald test. The related statistic writes as follows
W = jjf(b)jj2M = d2M(f(b); 0); M = bV hf(b)i 1 = hJf (b) bV (b) tJf (b)i 1 ;
where Jf (b) is the Jacobian of f (Jf (b) = J as f is linear), and where bV (b) is
derived from the asymptotic e¢ ciency of the m.l.e. Under the null, the Wald
statistic follows a 2(13) distribution asymptotically. The null (i.e. f() = 0,
 = 0 as f is one-to-one; as J is invertible, we have W = jjbjj2
[bV (b)] 1) is rejected
from our data at every usual level, as W = 1933:12.
The increasing shape of g1 is the null to be tested for with inequalities,
and is expressed as follows
H0 : fi()  0 8i = 1; : : : ; 13, f() 2 O+;
where O+ is the positive orthant of R13. In order to test for H0 against the
alternative, a natural statistic derived from the Wald test uses the distance
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between the unconstrained estimation of positivity constraints and the positive
orthant, i.e.
W+ = d2M(f(
b); O+) = min
z2O+
jjf(b)  zjj2M = jjf(b)  z0jj2M ; z0 = PO+(f(b)):
The metric M was already used for the Wald statistic. As 0 belongs to the
positive orthant, we have W+  W . The derivation of the projection PO+(f(b))
of f(b) on the positive orthant O+ can be seen numerically as a quadratic pro-
gramming problem. As this projection belongs to the frontier of the positive
orthant, the issue is to nd the set of coordinates that are strictly positive.
The asymptotic properties of the statisticW+ under the null are described
by Wolak (1991). The statistic is not asymptotically distribution free under the
null, as is the case in the equality setting. The limit distribution is a mixture of
2(i) distributions (0  i  13), where 2(0) is the unit mass (Dirac) at zero.
If f() belongs to the interior of O+, the limit distribution of W+ is obviously
equal to 2(0), due to the pointwise convergence of f(b) towards f(). Otherwise
the weights of the mixture depend on the position of f() at the frontier of the
positive orthant. As a 2(i+1) variable is obtained as the sum of a 2(i) variable
and of a nonnegative variable, the 2(i) distributions increase with i in the sense
of rst order stochastic dominance. Then all the limit distributions of W+ will
be rst order-dominated by a 2(13) distribution, owing to their denition as
mixtures. This result is also simply obtained from the inequality W+  W .
On our data, the projection PO+(f(b)) is found equal to the projection of
f(b) = J  b on the subspace of R13 dened by fz 2 R13 = z7 = : : : = z13 = 0g.
We have: PO+(f(b)) = f(b0)) b0 = J 1  hPO+(J  b)i, with
tb =  0:311 0:500 0:522 0:794 0:854 0:873 0:974 ::::::: 0:571  ;
tb0 =  0:312 0:500 0:523 0:795 0:855 0:870 0:870 ::::::: 0:870  ;
The missing components of b can be found in Table 2, and we have b06 = : : : = b013.
Hence b0 is the vector of parameters with a weakly increasing shape that is the
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closest to our estimation with respect to the metric tJMJ = [bV (b)] 1. Both
vectors are represented in Figure 3 (with  replaced by g1). From our data, the
statistic W+ is equal to
W+ = jjf(b)  f(b0)jj2M = jjb   b0jj2[bV (b)] 1 = 43:18;
The statistic W+ is a squared distance between the unconstrained estimation
of g1 and the set of weakly increasing functions of adp. If F is the distribution
function of a 2(13) variable, we have that F (43:18) = 0:999958: If the null
assumption: f() 2 O+ is tested for with rejection regions of the type [W+ >
a], it will be rejected at any signicance level greater than 1   0:999958 =
4210 6. To see this, it is enough to apply the rst order stochastic dominance
property given before. Then the increasing shape of g1 is rejected at every usual
signicance level, which shows evidence of moral hazard.
A.5 Elasticity between the optimal frequency risk and
the incentive level
We relate the shape of  and the elasticity between optimal frequency risk and
the incentive level. Let us perform a local expansion around a value u0 of
the incentive level, in a situation where the incentives are e¤ective (i.e. u0 >
u =  1=0(0)). If we write
e0 = eopt(u
0); e0 + de = eopt(u
0 + du);
the equations
1 + 
0
(e0)u0 = 0; 1 +
h

0
(e0 + de)
 
u0 + du
i
= 0
lead to
de =
 0(e0)

00
(e0)u0
du+ o (du) ;
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and to
d
(e0)
=

0
(e0)
(e0)
de =
h
 0(e0)
i2
(e0) 00(e0) 
du
u0
:
Hence the aforementioned elasticity is equal to


0
2
=
00
. Now we have that
(log )
00
=

00

 
 

0

!2
=

00

0B@1 +


0
2

00
1CA :
Then the conclusions given in Section 4.2 are easily obtained.
A.6 Monetary equivalents of tra¢ c violations
Let us suppose that the increase in the argument of c is close to 12% after a
tra¢ c violation. This is the value retained in Section 4.2 for a driver with seven
demerit points accumulated, which corresponds to n = 3 tra¢ c violations on
average. As the argument of c in the model without point removal and with
nes is equal to fa+ un   un+1 (see equation 13) we have that
fa+ un+1   un+2 = 1:12
 
fa+ un   un+1

: (17)
We shall compare the utility losses un+1 un+2 and un un+1 from the recurrence
equation on lifetime utility, and obtain a monetary equivalent of an additional
tra¢ c violation from a derivation of the utility loss un   un+1. We have
un+1 = g(un); g(u) = fa+ u  c 1 (du   ru)
(see Figure 4). From the equality c
0
(u) = (eopt(u)) (see equation (10)), we
obtain
g
0
(un) = 1 +
r
n
; n = (eopt(fa+ un   un+1)):
The parameter n is the frequency risk corresponding to the optimal e¤ort ex-
erted with n tra¢ c violations accumulated. As n decrease with n, we have
that
1 +
r
n
 un+1   un+2
un   un+1 =
g(un)  g(un+1)
un   un+1  1 +
r
n+1
: (18)
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From equations (17) and (18), we obtain
r

0
n
  0:12

 (un   un+1) = 0:12 fa = 15:6 $; n+1  0n  n:
The monetary equivalent of an additional tra¢ c violation is then bounded as
follows:
, 15:6 $r
n+1
  0:12  un   un+1 
15:6 $
r
n
  0:12 :
Section 4.2 provides numerical examples with n = 0:15; n+1 = 0:12. The
monetary cost of a license suspension follows from a sum of the items related to
tra¢ c violations and from the inequalities given in (18).
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Figure 4
Recurrence equation on the lifetime utility function
Point-record drivers license without nes: u0n+1 = f(u
0
n)
Point-record drivers license with nes: un+1 = g(un)
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q
umax = du=ruun
un+1 = g(un)
umax
f(u) = u  c 1 (r(umax   u)); g(u) = f(u) + fa:
E¤ective incentives condition with and without nes
en > 0, un < u = umax

1 +
(0)

0
(0) du

:
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1 Incentive e¤ects of point-record mechanisms
1.1 Models for point-record driving licenses with redemp-
tion
In Quebec, each tra¢ c violation is redeemed at the end of a two year period.
Integrating this feature to the optimal behavior model is di¢ cult, as all the
seniorities of non-redeemed driving o¤enses must be included as state variables
in the dynamic programming equations. Another redeeming system consists in
cancelling all the demerit points after violation-free driving of a given duration,
say T . Such mechanisms are also enforced in the real world (see Section ??).
An optimal behavior model is easier to design in this framework since only the
seniority of the last convicted driving o¤ense must be added to the number of
demerit points accumulated as a state variable. Later on, we will denote the
latter redeeming mechanisms as of Type I, and the Quebec-like systems as of
Type II.
The model of the preceding section can be extended to a Type I redeeming
system (see Appendix 1.2). The conclusions are the following.
 For every given number of demerit points, optimal e¤ort increases con-
tinuously with time. If optimal e¤ort is greater than zero, it is strictly
increasing.
 When all the demerit points are redeemed (i.e. after a violation-free driving
record of duration T ), the e¤ort collapses to the minimum level.
 E¤ort variation after a convicted driving o¤ense may be positive or neg-
ative. If the last tra¢ c violation immediately follows another one, the
variation is positive, but decreases with the duration between the two last
o¤enses. A drop in the e¤ort level is expected if the duration is large
enough.
The time-e¤ect of point-record driving licenses on optimal driving behavior is
very di¤erent with a Type II redeeming system like the one in Quebec. We do
not have rigorous proofs to provide in that intricate framework, but we use the
1
preceding results to guess the main qualitative properties of Type II redeeming
mechanisms.
For both types, lifetime utility is expected to increase with time for a given
number of demerit points accumulated. However the link between utility and
e¤ort is di¤erent according to the type. Optimal e¤ort depends on the di¤erence
between the present utility and a substitute utility (i.e. that reached after an
additional tra¢ c violation). With a Type I mechanism, the substitute utility
only depends on the number of demerit points accumulated as the time variable is
reset to zero after a tra¢ c violation. Hence we obtain an increasing link between
time and e¤ort. With a Type II redeeming system, all the seniorities of past
tra¢ c violations are kept as state variables after an additional tra¢ c violation,
and the substitute utility increases with time as the present utility. Time should
have more value for worse situations, hence the substitute utility should increase
faster than the present utility. Thus optimal e¤ort should decrease with time.
Besides, we prove in Appendix 1.2 that optimal e¤ort is continuous before and
after a redemption, a property which does not hold for a type I mechanism. This
property will be tested empirically in Section ??. Optimal e¤ort is then expected
to increase at each tra¢ c violation in order to compensate the decreasing link
between time and e¤ort. On the whole, the incentive properties of a Type II
system are closer to those of a mechanism without redemption than to those of
a Type I system.
1.2 Incentive e¤ects of point-record driving licenses: Mod-
els with redemption
We derive below the incentive properties of the Type I redeeming systems pre-
sented in Section 1.1.
The expected utility is denoted as un(t), where t (0  t  T ) is the seniority
of the last convicted tra¢ c violation. The expected utility for n = 0 does not
depend on time, and is denoted as u0. All the demerit points are redeemed if
t = T; and we have un(T ) = u0 for n = 1; : : : ; N   1. With the assumptions and
notations of Section ??, the Bellman equation is
u
0
n(t) = (run(t)  du) + (un(t)  un+1(0)) (0  n < N)
2
, u0n = fun+1(0)(un); fv(u) = (ru  du) + (u  v): (1)
Hence un(t) is dened implicitly by the equationZ un(T )=u0
un(t)
du
fun+1(0)(u)
= T   t; 8t 2 [0; T ]: (2)
The functions fv are strictly increasing and the integral of 1=fv diverges in the
neighborhood of the value which nullies fv because we have
r < f
0
v(u)  r + (0) 8u; v:
Hence un+1(0) is dened from un(0) from equation (2) with t = 0; which implies
that
fun+1(0)(un(0)) > 0:
This condition holds if fv(un(0)) > 0 for positive values of v, which amounts to
un(0) > u; with f0(u) = (ru  du) + (u) = 0:
Then
fun+1(0)(u) > 0 8u 2 [un(0); un(T ) = u0]
and un is strictly increasing on [0; T ] from (1).
A result with an obvious economic interpretation is that the sequence (un(0))n=0;:::;N
is decreasing. Indeed, we have
fun+1(0)(un(0)) > 0, un(0)  un+1(0) >  1 (du   run(0)) > 0: (3)
Let us prove now the concavity of the sequence (un(0))n=0;:::;N ; which means that
the sequence (un(0)  un+1(0))n=0;:::;N is increasing. The recurrence equation
un+1(0) = w(un(0)); with
Z u0
v
du
(ru  du) + (u  w(v)) = T (4)
follows from (2) with t = 0. Consider v0; v1 with u < v0 < v1 < du=r.
We haveZ u0
v1
du
(ru  du) + (u  w(v1)) = T ;
Z u0
v0
du
(ru  du) + (u  w(v1) + v1   v0) > T:
3
The rst equality results from (4). The second integrand is greater than the
rst one if the comparison starts from the lower bound of the integral, and the
wider range of the second integration reinforces the inequality. As these integrals
increase with w, we have that
v0 < v1 ) w(v1) + v0   v1 > w(v0):
Hence the function v ! v   w(v) is decreasing. We obtain the desired result
with v0 = un+1(0) and v1 = un(0).
We can then prove the results given in Section 1.1 on the optimal e¤ort level,
which we denote as en(t). We have
en(t) = eopt(un(t)  un+1(0)); (5)
where eopt is the increasing function dened in equation (??). Since the functions
un are strictly increasing on [0; T ], equation (5) implies the optimal e¤ort level
increases with time for a given number of demerit points. From the denition
of eopt, the optimal e¤ort is strictly increasing if it is greater than zero.
If the duration between demerit points n and n+ 1 is equal to t, the transition
between the optimal e¤ort levels is
en(t) = eopt(un(t)  un+1(0))! en+1(0) = eopt(un+1(0)  un+2(0)):
If the last tra¢ c violation immediately follows another one, the variation is
positive because of the concavity of the sequence (un(0))n=0;:::;N . Since un is
increasing, the variation of optimal e¤ort after a convicted tra¢ c violation de-
creases with the duration between the two last o¤enses.
The following picture gives an example where
un(t)  un+1(0) > un+1(0)  un+2(0);
which implies a drop of the e¤ort level and an increase in risk if the driver is
convicted with a supplementary demerit point. This result is in contrast with
what is expected with a Type II redeeming mechanism.
Insert Figure 5 about here
4
Figure 5: Utility functions and variation of the optimal e¤ort level
Optimal e¤ort decreases after a tra¢ c violation in the state (n; t) if and only if
un(t)  un+1(0) > un+1(0)  un+2(0)() t > t0:
- time
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